

A CAMPAIGN OF THE GREAT HETMAN JAN ZAMOYSKI IN MOLDAVIA (1595). PART II. THE BATTLE OF ȚUȚORA AND AFTERMATH

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Rezumat: O campanie a marelui hatman Jan Zamoyski în Moldova (1595). Partea II. Bătălia de la Țuțora și consecințele sale

Marele hatman Jan Zamoyski a ales să lupte la Țuțora cu 7.250 ostași împotriva unor forțe tătaro-turce superioare numeric (20-70.000 oșteni) deoarece orașul Iași, nefiind fortificat, nu era potrivit pentru bătălie. În urma bătăliei de la Țuțora (câștigată de trupele polone datorită superiorității în arme de foc (în special artilerie) și a calităților de conducător militar ale Marelui Hatman polon), pericolul direct turco-tătar care plana asupra hotarelor Republicii polone a fost înlăturat. Totodată, au fost îngrădite pretențiile de suveranitate ale Habsburgilor asupra Moldovei iar influența polonă în Moldova a fost reconstituită, fără a se ajunge la un război cu Imperiul Otoman.

Datorită rezultatului fericit al bătăliei de la Țuțora, Jan Zamoyski reușește să-l înscăuneze pe Ieremia Movilă domn al Moldovei. Încercarea lui Ștefan Răzvan, fost domn al aceleiași țări, de a-l detrona pe Ieremia Movilă cu ajutorul trupelor transilvănene puse la dispoziție de principele Sigismund Báthory este respinsă de trupele polone de sub comanda acestuia.

Încercările Imperiului Habsburgic de a atrage Polonia în războiul anti-otoman al Ligii Sfinte eșuează deoarece liderii politici și militari ai Poloniei ajunseseră la concluzia că această alianță nu ar aduce nici un folos țării lor.

Abstract

The Great Hetman Jan Zamoyski chose to fight at Țuțora with a small army (7,250 soldiers) against numerically superior Tatar-Turkish forces (20-70,000 soldiers) because the town Iași, not being fortified, it was not suitable for a defensive battle.

The battle of Țuțora was won by the Polish troops because of their superiority in firearms (especially artillery) and because of fine qualities of military leader demonstrated by Jan Zamoyski. As a result of this battle, direct Turkish-Tatar danger was moved away from the borders of Rzeczpospolita, a dam to Habsburg aspirations to sovereignty over Moldavia was put and, finally, Polish influences were rebuilt there, not causing a war with the Ottomans.

Thanks to the happy outcome of the battle of Țuțora, Jan Zamoyski manages to enthrone Jeremiah Moghila as Hospodar of Moldavia.

Attempting of Stephen Răzvan, a former Hospodar of Moldavia, to overthrow Jeremiah Moghila with Transylvanian troops provided by Prince Sigismund Báthory, is rejected by the Polish troops.

Habsburgian attempts to attract Poland in the anti-Ottoman war of the Holy League fails because Poland's political and military leaders had come to the conclusion that this alliance would not bring any benefit to their country.

Résumé Une campagne du grand hetman Jan Zamoyski dans la Moldavie (1595). La II-ème partie. La bataille de Țuțora et ses conséquences

Le grand hetman Jan Zamoyski choisit à se confronter à Țuțora, avec seulement 7.250 soldats, avec les forces tataro-turques supérieures du point de vue numérique (20-70.000 soldats) comme la ville de Iași, pas fortifiée, n'était pas appropriée pour la lutte. A la suite de la bataille de Țuțora (gagnée par les troupes polonaises grâce à la supériorité des armes de feu (spécialement l'artillerie) et aux qualités de dirigeant militaire du Grand Hetman polonais), le danger direct turco-tatar qui planait sur les frontières de la République polonaise fut écarté. En même temps, on limita les prétentions de souveraineté des Habsbourgeois sur la Moldavie et l'influence polonaise en Moldavie fut reconstituée, sans déclencher la guerre avec l'Empire Ottoman.

Grace au résultat heureux de la bataille de Țuțora, Jan Zamoyski réussit à apporter sur le trône de la Moldavie Ieremia Movilă. L'essai de Ștefan Răzvan, ancien prince régnant du même pays, de détrôner Ieremia Movilă à l'aide des troupes transylvains mises à dispositions par le prince Sigismund Báthory fut repoussé par les troupes polonaises commandées par celui-ci.

Les essais de l'Empire Habsbourgeois d'attirer la Pologne dans la guerre anti-ottomane de la Sainte Ligue échouèrent parce que les leaders politiques et militaires de la Pologne arrivèrent à la conclusion que cette alliance n'apporterait aucun avantage à leur pays.

Keywords: *Moldavia, Poland, Turkey, Habsburg Empire, Moldavia, Jan Zamoyski, Sigismund III Wasa, Gazi Giray, Ieremia Movilă, campaign, Țuțora.*

Actions in Moldavia before the battle at Țuțora

Hetman was trying to delay the hostile actions, because he feared ally of the Turks and Sinan pasha with the Tatars, and at the same time he wanted to strengthen the fait accompli of Movilă and the sway of Rzeczpospolita in Moldavia. The first attempt to realize these objectives was the correspondence with the Sanjak-bey of Tehinia (Rom. Tighina), which was to become a Beylerbey of Moldavia on behalf of Turkey. It was a mutual attempt to sleep an opponent and to play on postponement, as Zamoyski wanted to strengthen in Moldavia, and Ahmed pasha waited for the Tatars. Therefore he advised Zamoyski to withdraw, promised that Khan will not move forward, and then again he pretended to believe in the peaceful intentions of the Hetman. He has even sent to the Hetman a beautiful bow, as a symbol of friendship, in return, has been gifted by Zamoyski by a precious cup¹.

The Sanjak-bey of Tehinia had to be more careful with Zamoyski, because the Cossacks, who admittedly did not want to take part in an expedition, organized by the Hetman, but recognized it as a great opportunity to enter Moldavia and to take booty,

¹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 348-349 and J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 241-242.

had threatened Tehinia². Zamoyski feared that this new provocation of Cossacks would infuriate the Turks and encourage them to an expedition to Moldavia, which he was trying to avoid at all costs. So he sent a warning to the Cossacks, which forced them to retreat and saved Ahmed pasha. Disappointed and embittered Cossacks, whom Zamoyski said, "that if you do not withdraw and will not sit still, you will be treated as enemies" („że jeżeli się nie cofną i spokojnie siedzieć nie będą, będzie ich uważał za nieprzyjaciół”³), unloaded their anger on lands in the vicinity of Hetman near Szarogród, after robbing it they went to Volhynia⁴.

The Hetman did not neglect also the political aspects of his project. Having divided his troops in three columns, with the right-handed under the command of Potocki, Kamianets Starosta, having entrusted to Żółkiewski left one, and the center left for himself, he went from the Prut up in Moldavia and reached Iași⁵. He brought with him a new Hospodar to seat him on a throne in the capital of Moldavia⁶.

On the eve of the official departure the Hetman "in a dozen of horses"⁷ went in person to the city to see if it is suitable for base and stronghold for the Polish army, which will sooner or later have to face the Tatars. View that unfolded before him, had to inevitably disappoint everybody, because "almost everything he found empty, for which the Cossacks did not destroyed, it Razvan (i.e. the Hospodar of Moldavia, Stefan Razvan) has spoiled riding away, and even cannons were put in a pond, their wheels still have been seen" („pustkami prawie wszystko zastał; albowiem czego Kozacy nie zburzyli, to Rozwan odjeżdżając wszystko pokaził, a nawet i działa w staw powmiewał, których koła jeszcze było widać”⁸). The last year's trip of Loboda (a Cossak chieftain, our note) and recently hasty evacuation have destroyed the capital of Moldavia, so that it could not oppose to the Poles. The city was indeed in nature undefendable and without walls - that's why the Turks forced Moldavian Hospodars in the 16th century to move their capital here from fortified Suceava⁹.

The entrance into Iași was used for the appropriate setting to give the throne to Ieremia Movilă and bolster his image among the subjects. Zamoyski did not fail to do so, and the day after his arrival he officially introduced the new Hospodar into his capital¹⁰. The great assistance of Zamoyski to the new Hospodar was followed – if to

² R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, s. 349–350, writes: „Przed przybyciem jeszcze Chana, kozacy daremnie przedtém wzywani, przybyli na granice Mołdawji w nadziei jakiejś zdobyczy”.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 349-350.

⁵ L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, p. 78.

⁶ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 239.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 239–240.

⁹ See: A. Dziubiński, *Na szlakach Orientu*, p. 13-14.

¹⁰ „Tysiąc naszych co przedniejszych, to jest rotmistrzów wszystko a towarzyszków z nim wjechało, a piechoty było kilka rot. Wjechawszy do miasta naprzód wstąpił w Czerkwie: gdzie nabożeństwo swe odprawiwszy na hospodarskim stolcu usiadł. Potym jechał do

believe in Heidenstein - by a wonderful party, which has prepared to Movilă by people, perhaps linking with the new Hospodar a hope for peace and escape from the Turks¹¹.

On 17 September Jeremia sent a message to King Sigismund III with a letter from the Hetman¹². Zamoyski himself also reported the King about his actions, submitting reasons for which he decided to conquer Moldavia – a country ravaged by recent wars but rich and strategically important for Poland¹³. Sigismund III left a free hand to the Hetman for his further pursuits. At the same time letters were sent to the districts, calling for the payment of taxes enacted by Sejm to support army. King wrote on this subject in September to the senators, asking them to guard the timely pay of the area tax, which would be passed for the army in Moldavia¹⁴. It was expected that the army would be needed, because nobody seemed to believe that the Turks would appreciate Zamoyski's actions and would not try to throw him from Moldavia.

The way to Țuțora

Zamoyski, since he is convinced that there is no way to stand in Iași, left for the Hospodar 300 recruited royal infantry as a crew, and he went with the army two miles to the south-east and camped on the plain known as the Țuțora or Cecora¹⁵. Clash with an opponent was inevitable.

Sinan pasha, who just finished to build bridges over the Danube, got the news that Zamoyski with the Polish army has taken Iași, did not rush with the expedition towards the Hetman, but waited for the reinforcements from Tatars¹⁶. Meanwhile, there was coming autumn and Turkish army began to demand a return to their winter

Dworu gdzie Aaron mieszkał, tamże jadł: siedzieli z nim u stołu Rotmistrze naszy. Panów wołoskich mało co było, a potem już późno jechali wszyscy naszy do obozu” - J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 240.

¹¹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 347, presents the whole thing in the following way: „Mohiła wjechał do Jass i przez Biskupa greckiego przyjętym i wprowadzonym na hospodarstwo został. Dodał mu Zamojski dla honoru i okazałości kilka chorągwi pancernych. Mnóstwo ludu wyległo na jego spotkanie – porzuciwszy tajemne kryjówki, słało mu drogę gronami winnemi i kłosami zboża i głośnie witało go okrzykami. W cerkwi przedniejszej spotkał go włądyka i duchowieństwo z krzyżami w uroczyste przybrane szaty. Włądyka wprowadził go przez carskie wrota, przez które nikomu prócz samego włądyki wchodzić nie wolno; następnie został publicznie osadzony na stolcu książęcym, będącym w kościele, wśród najweselniejszych okrzyków”.

¹² T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...*, p. 114.

¹³ J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 77–78.

¹⁴ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 348. He writes: „Sam tylko król trzymał za Zamojskim, nie ukrywając tego, że sprawa to jest bardzo ważna, bo może Polskę w wojnę z Turcją wprowadzić i silne zaburzenie wewnętrzne wzniecić”. The same is described by J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 77–78 and A. Filipczak-Kocur, *Skarbowość...*, p. 89.

¹⁵ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 240.

¹⁶ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 348.

quartiers¹⁷. The Turkish chief had then to take a rearrangement of his troops and was even less reluctant to leave for Iași.

The Tatars were eagerly awaited by Sinan pasha and Sanjak-bey Ahmed pasha, the first based on the fact that, having annihilated Zamoyski, they would help him to finish with Michael the Brave and Sigismund Báthory, the second one – that they finally would bring him to Moldavia. They were expected to appear any day in the Polish camp¹⁸. For a long time they did not hurry at all, but finally went with all their power, lead by the Khan Gazi Giray¹⁹. It gave them a significant advantage in number, because, including the supporting Turkish troops, they had more than 20,000 people. And while they were less than Poles in firepower – they possessed only five hundred janissaries, issued by the Sanjak-bey of Tehinia and few Tartar segbans – the Khan could be sure of victory²⁰.

Zamoyski, persuaded that the impact will come up from the lower Dniester, from the east, crossed with the army on October 6 on the left bank of the Prut and there, in a convenient place for the defense, which was created by a bend of the river, decided to fortify and await for the coming of Khan²¹.

Having chosen a place to camp, Zamoyski with his personal example gave the sign for pouring shafts. Measuring and drawing with the Field Hetman Żółkiewski a figure of a trench - 4000 łokiec along (one łokiec, a Polish measure of length, is between 57 to 62 centimeters), that is 2200 m, in breadth 4 and in depth 3 łokiec, which gave 6-elbow height from the bottom of the trench to the top of the shaft for an enemy to climb – the Hetman with Żółkiewski first took up spades, followed by the captains. The army took an example for digging, and when everyone, both rider and infantry, accounted for half an elbow to dig, it went fast and there, „zaczynamy tegoż dnia mało nie wszystkie stanąć”²² stood a trench. The ramparts were reinforced by thirteen towers, there were set up four gates, “each with his colonel, which would guard it” („z których każda miała pułkownika swego, co jej strzeżeł”) ²³. Thus, dividing the army in six regiments, Zamoyski destined to guard the first gate on the north, the Colonel Struś, the governor of Bratslav, while Gulski and Potocki, the governor Kamianets - to the middle gates, and Przerębski - to the last, the south²⁴. Hetman's regiments, the fifth and sixth, were inside the square. Position was well chosen

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 350 and J.U. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje...*, p. 164–165. The necessity to end military campaigns in autumn arose in Turkish army, among other things, because of the will of sipahies, lending timars of land, to return to their possessions before the autumn harvest.

¹⁸ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 348–349.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

²⁰ An estimation of the number of Tatar troops see: L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, p. 79; about Turkish Janissaries of Ahmed pasha see: R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 351.

²¹ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 242.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 243.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 243. About the defensive position of Polish troops see also: M. Plewczyński, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 125.

²⁴ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 243.

because Prut was surrounded on three sides by the camp, which was completely secured from the fourth by the trench and Polish army, few in number. Lying on the back Iași had become a center of supply²⁵.

Polish forces were small. Bielski says that it was „naszych mało co więcej siedmiu tysięcy według rot licząc: Hetmani obadwa mieli Usarzow 300. Szczęsny Herbot 200. Przerębscy dwa 300. Marcin Tarnowski 200. Chański 150. Potockich kilka braciey 500. Branicki 100. Jan Tarnowski 100. Jan Zebrzydowski 100. Myszkowski 100. Prusnowski 100. Leśniowski 100. Starosta Skalski 100. Daniełowicz 100. Wierszek 100 y Kozakow 100. Michał Stanisławski 100. Sładkowski 100. Arkebuzerow 100. A Droiewskiego Starosty Przemyskiego Arkebuzerow 150 y Kniazia Poryckiego 100. Gulski Kasztelan Chalicki Kozakow miał 200. Xiążę Wiśniowieckie 200. Struś 150. Rożyński 150. Hornostay 150. Tworzyiański 200. Temruk 100. Czertański 100. Bilstrup 100. Ulanicki 100. Zamoyski Strażnik 100. Jan Gulski 100. Koryciński 100. Piechoty też było Hetmański 100. Starosty Przemyskiego 200. Z Kamieńca 200. Przerębskiego 100. Kłanickiego 100. Wytosławskiego 100. A wybrańców do 1500”²⁶. But he does not mention anything about cannons, although we know that the Hetman had with him a few, and during the battle they will soon have come in handy. But counting Bielski data, we get the following picture of the Polish forces:

Hussars	2,750
Harquebusiers	350
Cossacks	1,850
Infantry	800
Royal recruits	1,500

In total 7,250

It must be reckoned with the fact that they were not real power, but rather the number that correspond to expectational lists, as it is particularly evidenced in their rounding. In any event, the Polish forces were counted in an approaching way²⁷. Hetman was also expecting the arrival of Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, the Voivode of Lublin, with troops, sent by King Sigismund III in the rescue of Polish troops in Moldavia, as well as a number of Russian rulers²⁸. The arrival of several thousand Cossacks under Ataman Loboda was also expected, „a ci mogliby byli przysługę jaką uczynić, by byli chcieli słuhać: ale większą tych kozaków szkodę mamy niż pożytek”²⁹. Indeed, the Cossacks did not come, and even other supporting units did not make their way in time, so it was necessary to meet the head of the Khan, which was spot on.

²⁵ About the Polish camp see: J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 242–243 and T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...*, p. 115.

²⁶ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 250–251, also T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...*, p. 115–116.

²⁷ Similar T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...*, p. 116.

²⁸ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 251.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

The battle at Țuțora and the treaty with the Khan

Tatars crossed the Dniester in mid-October and joined with the Hordes of Belograd (in Romanian: Cetatea Albă) and Dobruza (nowadays Dobrogea, in Romania)³⁰. The Sanjak-bey Ahmed pasha immediately regained his self-confidence and informed the Poles through his messenger that the Khan, who is in four years back with the payment of gifts by the Republic, now goes against them with all his power to make Ahmed pasha a Beylerbey of Moldavia³¹. The Khan announced that Poles would be rushed into captivity, and Hetman Zamoyski would be a gift to the Vizier Sinan pasha³².

Zamoyski did not care too much about these threats, but has sent people to capture an enemy in order to get knowledge about the direction of the march of the Tatars³³. Muslim army, probably to facilitate the supply of food, at first went in two separate routes. While Ahmed pasha led the Turks straight to the Polish camp along the river Byk (in Romanian: Bîc or Bâc), calling Moldavians to submit to his authority, the Khan walked through the valley of the river Łopuszna (in Romanian: Lăpușna)³⁴. Polish soldiers, commanded by Ulanicki, tore the enemy and provided a captured enemy to the Țuțora camp, but Tartars also had luck and captured the officer Jarocki, whom the Khan inquired about the Hetman and his willingness to battle. On Wednesday, October 18, Turkish-Tatar armies joined and in the evening they appeared at the Polish camp in order to identify the positions of their enemy³⁵. Minor skirmishes began to happen between the frontiers of the two armies, in which especially famous became Prince Kiril Rożyński. He managed to shoot two times with a bow to the nephew of the Khan, Ahmed pasha, who seemingly drew to near to Polish positions, “however pagan power, that was great, made our frontiers to retreat to the very borders of our camp” („wszakże moc pohańska która wielka była straż naszą aż pod obóz wsparła”)³⁶ and the Sanjak-bey was saved from oppression. After spending the Poles from the field and watched the camp, Tatars have retreated a half of a mile down the Prut and there they laid out for the night.

The view of the Polish camp had to convince Khan that it cannot be taken during an initial fight despite the outnumbered power he had, (over twenty to seventy thousand people), all this because of the absence of artillery and the shortage in infantry. So he conceived a plan to lure Poles from their fortifications and surround

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

³¹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 349.

³² J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 243.

³³ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 350.

³⁴ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 243–244.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, s. 244. R. Heidenstein presents that „Chan z zarozumiałością zwykłą dziczy, oznajmił sam Zamojskiemu przez owego jeńca [whom Poles captured – D.M.], że nazajutrz we czwartek z całą siłą przybędzie” – *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 350.

³⁶ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 244–245.

them in an open field, and probably it would be successful and lead to the extermination of the Polish army.

Then the next day, 19 October, at dawn, “so that even little could be seen” („tak iż jeszcze mało co widać było”)³⁷, Tatars appeared before the Polish camp. There were a few groups of skirmishers, to lure the Poles in the field. The main forces were hidden by the Khan over the surrounding hills surrounding and in the valley of the Prut River, lower from the Polish camp³⁸. Zamoyski, who was not going to fight the battle on this day, in order to recognize all the power of the enemy and give soldiers time to get used to it, sent against the Tartars the only skirmishers, too³⁹. The Tartars, however, supported their soldiers, what forced the Hetman to send more troops. In response to it the Tartars introduced even greater force. It was going to be a general battle, but the Hetman, who knew that artillery is his main advantage, sending the following banners against the Tartars, forbade them to move far away from the camp, not to lose the support of the fire. On the contrary, he asked “to lure Tatars as close as possible to cannons” („żeby co nablížej Tatar przywodzili na strzelbę”)⁴⁰.

Now, the action began Janissaries, who were sent into battle by Ahmed pasha⁴¹. They came to the Polish ramparts and rifled their “horses as dogs” („nasze y konie psowali”)⁴². Hetman, as soon as he found it out, came to the place and decided to risk repelling the Turks. He stepped in front of the gate for this purpose, to marshal the light cavalry battle, when a Janissary shot a horse under him. It did not confuse Zamoyski, who has settled the army and sent against the Turks riders and infantry. They could not resist the attack, and after a brief struggle resigned⁴³.

The tide of battle in favor for Tatars now decided to tilt the Kalga-Sultan Fed Giray⁴⁴, who stood at the head of two strong branches of the army in the lower flow of the Prut River, fought at the head of his people the left wing of the victorious Poles. It was around noon⁴⁵. The hit actually threatened the Polish army to such an extent that the Hetman, as soon as he could, came to counter-attack with seven regiments of Hussars, supported by light cavalry, and eventually by the infantry⁴⁶. A struggle ensued, during which the Poles gradually began to gain victory. Seeing this, the Tatars began to retreat and, pretending to flee, lured the Poles into an open field, out of the reach of the cannons of the camp. Convenient situation was soon observed

³⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 245.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 245.

³⁹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 350–351 and F. Bohomolec, *Życie...*, p. 147.

⁴⁰ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 245.

⁴¹ F. Bohomolec, *Życie...*, p. 147.

⁴² J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 245.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁴⁴ He was the first successor of the Crimean throne and usually led the right wing of the army – here, as an exception, he appeared on the left, probably because of the reason that the fight was personally directed by the Khan Gazi Giray (L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski...*, p. 80).

⁴⁵ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 351.

⁴⁶ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 246 and L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski...*, p. 81.

by the Khan, who threw his reserve troops aside to advancing Poles, wanting to cut them from the camp and destroy⁴⁷. Zamoyski responded immediately, sending to the rescue further regiments of riders from the camp, they opposed the Tatars and forced them to retreat. The Khan, noting that the attempt to destroy the Polish cavalry in the open field has failed, gave the order to retreat. On the battlefield some loose troops fought for some time, but it was basically after the fight⁴⁸.

As an attempt to solve the Polish problem with strength failed, Turkish-Tatar side tried to negotiate. Later in the same day in the evening a Turkized Russian arrived to the Polish camp with the mission from Ahmed pasha. The Castellan of Halych, Gulski, has sent Bohowityn and learned that Sanjak-bey is going to make peace between the Khan and the Hetman and calls for negotiations. He also sent a letter to Zamoyski, which was not answered, because time was late and the Hetman did not trust Ahmed pasha. Once, after all, he had already pledged to make friends, but as soon as the Khan appeared, set off against the Poles. Zamoyski decided to keep the army on alert and not go into any agreements at the time⁴⁹.

The next day, 20 October, the Tatar skirmishers appeared, but also the same Russian, requesting a response to the letter of Sanjak-bey⁵⁰. Seeing that the Turks indeed wanted to negotiate, Zamoyski sent a reply to Ahmed pasha and even ordered to make a tent for negotiations in front of his camp. But when he saw the stalled near a large Tatar army that “one, not small regiment went straight to the camp” („pułk jeden nie mały prosto na obóz szedł”), thinking that the Tatars want to go around and hit the back of the camp, ordered to give fire with guns and asked the army to fight. Cannon fire proved to be extremely effective, as “a significant number of the Tartar significant and some of the others were killed” („Tatarzyna znacznego y innych kilku ubito”), seeing this Tatars quickly gave way the open field. Now a messenger has arrived from the Sanjak-bey with excuses that “he is going to the treaties, not into battle, and the Hetman orders to shoot him” („na traktaty a nie do bitwy jedzie, a hetman nań strzelać każe”). The Hetman replied that, he sees the Khan “wanting to

⁴⁷ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 246.

⁴⁸ The course of the battle of 19 October 1595 is reconstructed basing on the letter of J. Zamoyski to Sigismund III, Cecora, 24 October 1595, in: *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor culese de Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki* [Documents concerning the History of Romanians gathered by Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki], suppl. 2, vol. 1, ed. by I. Bogdan, București 1893, No. CLXXXIII, s. 355-357 and the relations of J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 244-246, R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 351, F. Bohomolec, *Życie...*, p. 147-148 (who mainly repeats Heidenstein), M. Costin, *Latopis...*, p. 104. Also see: T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...*, p. 116-117 (basing on the letter of the Hetman J. Zamoyski) and L. Podhorodecki, *Stanisław Żółkiewski*, p. 80-81 (who uses the relation of the participant of the battle, Paweł Piotrowski, published in *Dwie relacje z wyprawy Zamoyskiego pod Cecorę w 1595 r.*).

⁴⁹ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 246-247.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

enter with the army” („z wojskiem zaciągnąć chce”)⁵¹. In the answer the Turkish envoy explained that the Tatars moved in order to get better access to water and the feed for horses. Not believing them, Hetman however demanded the Khan to retreat with his army, it would be difficult to stop soldiers from the battle - he was afraid that the Tartars, being close to his camp, did not try any trick, when they start to negotiate. The Khan agreed and withdrew the Horde. In this way, there were removed last obstacles on the road to peaceful negotiations, which had just to begin⁵².

To the negotiations with the Turks and Tatars Hetman has delegated Szczęsny Herburt, Gulski, Bohowityn and translator Temruk, who served on similar occasions since Sigismund Augustus⁵³. From the Turkish-Tatar side appeared Sanjak-bey Ahmed pasha, the chief advisor of the Khan Ahmed aga, as well as two significant Tatars. That day there has not been established nothing, excluding the fact that negotiations would continue and on the next day Ahmed pasha would personally meet with the Hetman Zamoyski⁵⁴.

Then the next day, October 21, after having exchanged hostages⁵⁵, the Hetman met with Ahmed pasha and Ahmed aga, accompanied by the castellan of Halicz and the Starosta of Przemyśl as far as the Field Hetman, the Referee and Stanisław Barski to discuss peace terms⁵⁶. At the same time he ordered to prepare the army for a battle, in case the negotiations were miscarries⁵⁷.

The location of Poles, even when the Muslim attack was repelled, was not the best one, of what the Hetman was well aware. In case if the Tartars decided to continue the battle, the Poles were threatened to be cut off from the supply of food and to starvation in their camp, or the return to the borders of Rzeczpospolita with their fleet, which also could easily end in disaster. Zamoyski also feared that the Tartars did not go into the lands of the Crown, leaving him in Moldavia⁵⁸.

The Khan, however, did not have a very good view in front of him. The military clash persuaded him that the Polish camp would not be easy to win, and in the case of a fight he would be faced with a tough response from the Poles. For Turkish support there was not much time to wait, as Sinan pasha was coordinating the coming of the Horde. Rather, one might expect that the Poles would get some help from the Republic, and even the sabotage of Cossack army, in the foreground of the stripped of the army Crimea, was not excluded. Because of these reasons it was not

⁵¹ Used quotations are from: J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 247- 248.

⁵² The events from the 20 October: J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 247–248 and R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 352.

⁵³ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 248.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

⁵⁵ From the Polish side there were the guarder Zamoyski and Jan Gulski, „którym potem car po szacie złotogłowej darował” – J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 248–249.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁵⁷ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 353: „Nie mając żadnej nadziei na dobry skutek rozmowy, myśląc że zaraz potem trzeba będzie bitwę stoczyć, Hetman rozkazał Żółkiewskiemu szeregowi do boju sprawić i w pogotowiu trzymać”.

⁵⁸ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 352.

possible to go on a gain expedition to the counties of the Crown, leaving behind so dangerous, not yet defeated opponent⁵⁹.

Both sides, therefore, depended on the negotiations and the peaceful settlement of the dispute. Zamoyski not the first time went to negotiations in a difficult situation⁶⁰, and as he was a master in their conduct, he decided to convince his opponent and force him to make concessions. So he immediately has set high and hard conditions – Ieremia Movilă has to be considered the Hospodar of Moldavia and the Turkish-Tatar army has to withdraw from the lands of the duchy within three days, without causing any damage⁶¹. He has easily countered the allegations of Tatars that he has entered the lands, subjected to the Sultan, saying that it is a response to last year's Tatar rally to Poland. Muslims have pointed to the Cossacks as guilty of the Tatar attacks, but Zamoyski said to them that, contrary to the will of the Polish King, they tug the Sultan and are thus also be punished for it. Finally he got what he wanted, making the Tartar Khan to offer to forgive each other injustice and renew old friendships. As a token of his good the Khan would retreat from Moldavia and not only accepts the Hospodar Movilă, but also obtains its approval by the Sultan. The Poles agreed to these proposals and the agreement was concluded⁶². It has been confirmed by the exchange of gifts, Zamoyski sent to the Khan an armor, covered with gold, knight gloves, the portraits of Stephen Báthory and Sigismund III as far as a falcon and a hawk, trained to hunt. The Hospodar also gave to the Khan a sable fur and satin art⁶³.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 352–353.

⁶⁰ It is enough to remind Psków, at which he remained with his army until the conclusion of peace in Jam Zapolski, despite the very difficult situation of the Poles („Większa część wojska wymarła – pisał spod Pskowa ks. Piotrowski – trzecia część chora leży; tym, co zostali, od mrozu nosy, nogi odpadają; z straży muszą pacholki na wozach zmarzłe na pół martwe do obozu odwozić. Pan Bóg tedy niech będzie pochwalon, że dał taką wytrzymałość, która sama wycisnęła na nieprzyjacielu ten pokój” – J. Piotrowski, *Dziennik wyprawy Stefana Batorego pod Psków*, ed. by A. Czuczynski, Kraków 1894, p. 208-209).

⁶¹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 353.

⁶² Negotiations from the 21 of October: R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 353–354 and J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 248–250. The Ottoman-Crieman document of the treaty at Cecora, 22 October 1595, in: D. Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish...*, no. 25, p. 298-299 (the text in Serbian language); the Polish document of the treaty at Cecora, 22 October 1595, *Ibid.*, No. 26, p. 301-302. There we could read: „we have conferred the hospodarship on Jeremy Movila in accordance with the request from this land [i.e., from the Moldavian bojars], addressed to His Excellency, the chancellor and the hetman of the Polish Crown. Having become a hospodar, he should send customary payments to His Majesty the Turkish emperor, delivered to the hands of an agent appointed by His Majesty the emperor. He should also send to the khan the same amount, which used to be sent to the former khans by other hospodars. The troops of His Majesty the Turkish emperor, as well as [the troops] of the khan, should not annoy either this land, or the Polish land; moreover, His Majesty the khan should set out immediately and should leave this land within three days”.

⁶³ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 250 and M. Costin, *Latopis...*, p. 104-105.

There was also concluded an agreement to exchange prisoners and take the dead from the battlefield, what the Tatars asked for and negotiations were completed⁶⁴. Tatars departed the very next day in the direction of the Dniester, and when they reached Tehinia, Khan sent a messenger with a letter to King Sigismund III, to whom Zamoyski has handed Szcześny Herburt as an eyewitness to report the trip. Khan demanded to conclude a peace with him on the old terms, but his envoy was sent with nothing, submitting first the agreement with Turkey should go on the final peace, since it is the head of the Crimea, where the Khan offended, "because he kept about himself that he persists the fame of the Sultan, and even surpasses it" („bo trzymał o sobie, że nie ustępuje sławą Sułtanowi, ale nawet go przewyższa”)⁶⁵.

Moldavia after Țuțora

The entering of Zamoyski to Moldavia encouraged Sigismund Báthory, who, since Sinan pasha in anticipation of the Tatars retreated to the Danube⁶⁶, gathered the army, came to Wallachia and laid siege at Târgoviște, where he has entered into a small fight with the Pasha of Anatolia⁶⁷. The Turks fled to the wooden palisades of the camp, but "the wooden Turkish camp was burned by Sigismund's fiery balls, also used by Stefan, they took pasha as a captive, cut almost the entire crew, cannons and other military equipment fell into their hands" („obóz turecki drewniany spalił Zygmunt kulami ognistemi przez Stefana używanemi, Baszę do niewoli zabrał, załogę prawie całą wyciął, armaty i inne sprzęty wojenne wpadły mu w ręce”)⁶⁸. After that he went to Bucharest, which the retreating Turks let go up in smoke⁶⁹, until they were finally caught crossing at Giurgiu. The Turks have lost a lot of people, when the bridge over Danube broke, but they were able, albeit with a great disgrace to the army, go to the other side of the river⁷⁰.

At the news of the Polish-Tatar battle at Țuțora Báthory, however, retreated from Transylvania. The success of the 20-thousandth Transylvanian army⁷¹ could easily be quite ephemeral, if not the action of Poland in Moldavia. However, this action interfered the Prince in the seizure of Moldavia, so Sigismund Báthory tried to remove from there the Poles with all his means.

⁶⁴ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 250. Also see: D. Skorupa, *Stosunki...*, p. 63.

⁶⁵ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 355.

⁶⁶ J.U. Niemcewicz, *Dzieje...*, p. 164–165.

⁶⁷ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 251–252 and R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 354.

⁶⁸ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 354–355; A. Decei, *Istoria [History]...*, p. 279.

⁶⁹ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 252.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 252–253, M. Costin, *Latopis...*, p. 107; R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 355; Solakzade Mehmed Hemdemi, *Tarih*, in: M. Guboglu, *Cronici turcești [Turkish Chronicles]...*, p. 158 and Müneğğimbaşı, *Sahaif ül-ahbar, ibid.*, p. 259–261. About this expedition of Sigismund Báthory also see: L. Bazyłow, *Siedmiogród [Transylvania...]...*, p. 81–82 and A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria...*, vol. 5, p. 168–170.

⁷¹ The number of the armies of Sigismund Báthory and Michael the Brave is given basing on J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 100.

So he carried a complaint to the Emperor Rudolf II and Pope Clement VIII that Zamoyski bothers him to oppress the Turks and by introducing his own favorite to Moldavia, who, after all, adheres to the Sultan, does not allow him to “liberate” the country from the yoke of the infidels⁷². The reaction of the Roman Curia was quick: already on 8 of November there came letters to Sigismund III and Jan Zamoyski, condemning their campaign in Moldavia⁷³. The Pope called for the protection of Sigismund Báthory, and an attack on the Turks, returning to the plans of anti-Turkish league, still alive in Rome. Sigismund III answered that he does not come into an alliance with the Turks, but through the actions of Hetman Zamoyski has saved the Christian Moldavia from its turn into an Ottoman province, and the prince of Transylvania – from the certain defeat. This Polish position was submitted to the Pope by Wojciech Baranowski, the bishop of Płock, and he gained so much that Clement VIII decided to send a separate legate to consider the matter⁷⁴.

Meanwhile Sigismund Báthory decided to forcibly regain his influence in Moldavia. Zamoyski, leaving the country after the conclusion of an agreement with the Khan, left Jeremia Movilă several squadrons under the command of Jan Potocki, the Starosta of Kamianets in place of Stanisław Chański, and in Khotyn - cannons and the appropriate garrison. The rest of the troops went to Ukraine to suppress the Cossack rebellion, initiated by Nalewajka⁷⁵.

Polish troops in Moldavia did not expect any armed intervention because of the late season of the year and remained without too much discipline, and even the Starosta of Kamianets himself was not present there⁷⁶. Báthory has decided to take advantage of this situation, and after giving Razvan three thousand soldiers, mostly infantry, sent him by the end of November to Moldavia to regain the throne⁷⁷. He was moving in the direction of Suceava, where Chański was located with his army. Learning of the expedition of Razvan, he sent in front of him Tworzyński with over a dozen of horses, and let him interfere and delay the Hungarian march as much as he could, while he sent for Potocki and gave orders to the captains to gather the troops in Suceava⁷⁸.

Tworzyński, pulling the Razvan frontiers, was retreating to Suceava, supported by the rota (i.e. company) of colonel Chański, lead by Krzysztof

⁷² J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 255 and L. Bazyłow, *Siedmiogród...*, p. 84.

⁷³ L. Bazyłow, *Siedmiogród...*, p. 84 and J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 84–85.

⁷⁴ J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 85–86 and J. Rzońca, *Rzeczpospolita...*, p. 18–19.

⁷⁵ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 253–254 and R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 355–356; he writes there: „Zamoyski na prośbę Mohiły, i żeby ulżyć nieco królestwu w nakładach na wojsko, zostawił mu kilka chorągwi Polskich na jego żołdzie”. On the uprising of Nalewajko see: W.A. Serczyk, *Na dalekiej...*, p. 133–140.

⁷⁶ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 356; J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 86 write that Potocki stayed in Kamianets-Podilskyi.

⁷⁷ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 356; M. Costin, *Latopis...*, p. 105; T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...*, p. 118.

⁷⁸ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 256–257.

Broniowski. In the city, Chański and the Hospodar organized defense and waited for the Polish troops. To 11 of December there drew ten of them, and the governor of Kamianets arrived to Suceava next day, two hours before the battle⁷⁹. Despite the weakness of the army - Heidenstein estimates it for a thousand of cavalry and four hundreds of infantry⁸⁰ - though "reinforced" by the troops of Ieremia Movilă, of which Potocki was not the best sentence⁸¹, it was decided to try luck on a battle field, because Suceava was unprepared for defense and lack of time to carry out the preparations⁸².

An envoy was sent to Razvan, calling him not introduce a war between Christians and to step back to Hungary, but he was confident of his victory, sent the envoy back and went straight to Suceava with his army⁸³. He came towards the Poles down from the mountains, with his right wing protected by them and the left one was protected by tabors, wagons with stock. In front the Hungarian spearmen marched with banners of Transylvania, followed by infantry, then cavalry and, again, infantry. All were confident of their victory⁸⁴.

Polish left wing was occupied by the Moldavians and Cossacks – there also were set cannons. Polish cavalry took the road from Suceava to Baia, hiding in a valley six hundred spearmen, infantry, harquebusiers and Cossacks. In front there were put a hundred of Moldavians⁸⁵.

Seeing the Polish troops, Razvan gave the order to attack. Moldavian spearmen fled from the field almost immediately⁸⁶, but two Polish hussar regiments, commanded by Broniowski and Zebrzydowski, went to oppose the Hungarians. They stopped the soldiers of Razvan, who, in their turn, were decreased by the attack led by Jan and Stefan Potocki. He was supported by an attack of harquebusiers, lead by lieutenant Wierzbowski. The Hungarian defeat was fulfilled by the unexpected blow from ambush of the troops of Tworzyński and Milewski, who have mastered from an ambush the wagons of Razvan. Seeing what was going on, the cavalry of Hungarians rushed to escape, but "from the whole Razvan cavalry went out not more than fifty horses" („wszystkiew iezdy nie uszło z Rozwanowych więcey pięćdziesiąt koni")⁸⁷.

The Hungarian infantry, in turn, led personally by Razvan, began bravely. They withstood two volleys of artillery, which at the beginning of the battle the Poles managed to give up, they attacked the cannons so effectively that defending them

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 256–257.

⁸⁰ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 357.

⁸¹ J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 87.

⁸² R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 356.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 356. Heidenstein states that „Rozwan tak pewny był zwycięstwa, że jeszcze przed bitwą rozpiisał listy do różnych Monarchów, że pobit Polaków i Wołochów, a nawet w niektórych już miejscach dziękczynne nabożeństwo za to zwycięstwo odprawiono”.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

⁸⁵ The Polish arrangement: R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 357, J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 257 and J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 87.

⁸⁶ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 257 and R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, s. 357.

⁸⁷ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 258.

Moldavians and Cossacks fled. Even the Hospodar Movilă started to leave the battlefield, and Chański, having discovered the danger, with only one rote (company) and only a handful of infantry, turning back the escaping Hospodar, hit the winning Hungarians. They saw that their cavalry was beaten, began to retreat in the woods, the collapsing dark facilitated them this movement. They did not achieve many, however, as it seemed to them, because the Moldavians later cut them down almost to nothing⁸⁸.

After the battle, fought on December 12 on the outskirts of Suceava, the Poles got returning from eight cannons and a banner of Transylvania, as the rest was “taken out by the Wallachians” („rozdrapała Wołosza”)⁸⁹. This was not o little, because Razvan, confident of his victory “was carrying with him the treasures taken from Aron [a former Moldavian Hospodar, our note] and all other things that were sacked, and even objetcs taken from Târgoviște and Giurgiu” („wiózł z sobą skarby Aaronowi zabrane i to wszystko, co gdzie złupił, a nawet zdobycz z Targowist i Dziurdziewa”)⁹⁰. The Razvan himself was taken by the chase of Ieremia’s Moldavians, as though he changed his clothes, the people covering him handed him over. With him were all the recognized dignitaries captured. The Hospodar, who yesterday fled from the battlefield before Razvan, now decided to make up for it, and ordered him to be impaled together with his companions. It was supposed to be a punishment for the cruel rule and the last attempt of usurpation. To achieve better result, the brother of Razvan was beheaded in his presence, “and the view that the pain aroused in him, shook him with the pole on which he was taken” („a widok ten taką boleść w nim wzniecił, że się aż z palem cały zatrząsł”)⁹¹. The Poles looked at this with disgust, but they did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Moldavians. As for the captive Hungarians and Szeklers, they were let free⁹². It could be allowed because of the reason that the government of the Hospodar Ieremia was now grounded for good.

The effects of the expeditions and reactions to it

„Klemens VIII Papież [...] znowu także pisał drugi list do króla po tej porażce Rozwanowej: dziwując się temu i frasując bardzo że się to tak stało. Czym nie tylko chrześcijaństwu wszystkiemu się nie dogodziło, ale i poganinowi pociecha się wielka stała: którym gwoli będą rozumieć chrześcijańscy panowie że to król uczynił. Więc

⁸⁸ Ieremia Movilă to J. Zamoyski, Suceava, 16 December 1595, *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor, E. Hurmuzaki, supl. II, vol. I, 1510-1600*, ed. by I. Bogdan, Bucuresci 1893, No. CLXXXIX, p. 371-372. More detailed description of the battle is presented J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 257-259 and R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 357-358. It is also discussed by J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 87-88.

⁸⁹ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 259.

⁹⁰ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 358.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 358 and R. Heidenstein, *Vita...*, p. 128.

napominał króla i wiódł do zgody z księciem siedmiogrodzkim jako z powinnym, a jeśli by co takiego między nimi było różnego chcąc je pojednać”⁹³.

Sigismund Báthory after this new failure that happened to him in Moldavia, which he was so eager to win, once again raised the alarm that it is going to hurt him, and was supported by the imperial diplomacy⁹⁴. The fact that Ieremia Movilă has sent a message to Istanbul to negotiate with the Sultan for his recognition of the power⁹⁵, granted additional verisimilitude to the Habsburgian propaganda, accusing Poles of complicity with the Sublime Porte to the detriment of Christianity. Hence, such was the reaction of the Pope, who, with an eye on bringing to fruition of the anti-Ottoman league, in which Rzeczpospolita was to be one of the main pillars, and for which so much merit laid the prince of Transylvania – as it seemed, and as he himself assured – could not understand such proceedings of the Poles⁹⁶.

Pope, however, was able to be quickly softened, and not by factual arguments, which were submitted to him by the intentionally sent Secretary Wawrzyniec Gembicki, the future Primate⁹⁷, as by the news of the concluded in late 1595 and 1596 the Union of Brześć. Not wanting to alienate Poland, Clement VIII decided to somehow mitigate this procedure, and urge Rzeczpospolita for a sooner the league with the Emperor against the Turks. Even in 1595 he sent for that purpose the legate Henrico Gaetano to Poland⁹⁸.

The Habsburgs were more endured in protests and not going to so easily accept the Polish influence in Moldavia. So stirred up an internal opposition in Rzeczpospolita, where the leader was, as before, the Primate Karnkowski⁹⁹. They complained that Zamoyski exposed in his expedition the country to war with Turkey, and even entrusted army staged in grave danger¹⁰⁰. In view, however, of clear benefits and success that he has achieved, these allegations were of less importance. Maybe only the provocation of a war with Turkey - but this issue had to be discussed in Sejm.

The Habsburgs tried to discourage Poland of the use of its success, pushing the King – by Maria Christina, the mother in law of Sigismund III, who was going back to Transylvania through Poland – to withdraw their support for Movilă¹⁰¹. They also tried to prevent Poland in its pro-active policy in Moldavia by binding its hands by Cossack rebellions, which were intrigued in Sweden¹⁰².

⁹³ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 260.

⁹⁴ J.P. Niederkorn, *Die europäische...*, p. 485 and J. Rzońca, *Rzeczpospolita...*, p. 18-19.

⁹⁵ J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 88–89.

⁹⁶ P. Piasecki, *Kronika*, p. 128–129 and W. Konopczyński, *Dzieje...*, p. 183.

⁹⁷ P. Piasecki, *Kronika*, p. 128–129 and J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 260.

⁹⁸ A. Śliwiński, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 319–320; J. Szujski, *Dzieje Polski*, p. 145 and J. Rzońca, *Rzeczpospolita...*, p. 20. The league in this time was much more in the interest of the Pope, than the Emperor.

⁹⁹ R. Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski...*, p. 347–348.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 347–348 and A. Śliwiński, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 318–319.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 348.

¹⁰² A. Śliwiński, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 320.

Under such conditions the Sejm started on March 26, 1596, in Warsaw¹⁰³. The Emperor has sent there as his delegates of the Bishop of Olomouc and Adam Lobkowitz, who together with the legate Gaetano had to take one more attempt to draw Rzeczpospolita into a war with Turkey through an alliance with Austria¹⁰⁴. Especially sought for it a papal legate, but because the imperial deputies again did not want to promise anything definite in terms of the proposed alliance, the matter was postponed to a special committee, which was to be collected on 1 August in Krakow¹⁰⁵. Before it happened, Gaetano sent his secretary Vanozzi to Zamoyski to persuade the Hetman to the league. It did not succeed¹⁰⁶. Hetman told him directly that he does believe in a league with Austria and does not agree to it, because the behavior of the Habsburgs is hypocritical and deceitful. The Emperor did not want to give up Moldavia, the Archduke Maximilian has not sworn the Będzin settlement, Austria perverts the Cossacks not only against Turkey, but also against Poland, and intriguing in Sweden wants to force Sigismund III to leave Poland, to take an advantage of his absence and to introduce Maximilian to the throne. Besides that, apart from the Polish-Austrian things, in order for the league to have success, it's essential part laid in Venice, the princesses of the Reich, the Pope, and especially in Spain, which is not likely to be concluded – Transylvania as an ally is not enough¹⁰⁷.

And indeed, when the Polish commissioners requested – a waiver of the imperial claim to Prussia, Livonia and Mazovia after Wańko, prince of Płock, and of Moldavia, omission of the anti-Polish intrigues against Moscow, paying one third of the salary to the Polish Army, the participation of the king of Spain and the traditional already sworn by Maximilian of the Będzin settlement – Austrians responded evasively and the hated Maximilian they saw as the future leader of expedition, thus the Poles declared to the Legate that any league is not possible and it will be the fault of the Austrians¹⁰⁸.

Ultimately, the matter of on anti-Turkish league was buried in the winter-spring Sejm of 1597, and largely due to the occurrence of Zamoyski on 22 February. He saw the Turkish danger, saying: “The wolf will find a cause to the sheep, when he wants to eat, so the enemy will find one to a covenant, how to cover his perfidy” („Znajdzie

¹⁰³ J. Bielski, *Dalszy ciąg...*, p. 261.

¹⁰⁴ J. Szujski, *Dzieje Polski*, p. 145.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 145; P. Gawron, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 36-39; A. Barwicka, *Rzeczpospolita...*, s. 303-305.

¹⁰⁶ A. Śliwiński, *Jan Zamoyski...*, p. 320–321.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 320–321 i J. Macurek, *Zápas...*, p. 88–89. As has marked J. Rzońca, *Rzeczpospolita...*, p. 19, Jan Zamoyski was already in 1596 aware that his coalition with the Emperor would not bring any profits to Poland and therefore he tried to persuade the King to an alliance with Turkey. Sigismund III has sent in January 1596 Piotr Ostrowski to Bosphorus to get information about the possibilities to be allied with Turkey if an alliance with Rudolf II would not be concluded.

¹⁰⁸ J. Szujski, *Dzieje Polski*, p. 146–147 and J. Rzońca, *Rzeczpospolita...*, p. 21-23.

wilk przyczynę na owcę, kiedy mu się chce jeść, znajdzie nieprzyjaciel złamawszy przymierze, ma czym pokryć perfidyą swoją”¹⁰⁹.

The alliance with the Emperor, which “we pulled off several Sejms in vain, which is already discussed in so many ways, and nothing certain could be concluded about it” („nam kilka sejmów nadaremno zwlokła, o której się już tak wiele traktowało, a nic pewnego postanowić nie mogło”)¹¹⁰, was his opinion unfavorable, because „co się dotycze najprzedniejszego w chrześcijaństwie pana, który by z nami miał być w tej lidze, to jest cesarza JMci, w jego potężność i możność ufając, jakoby i on nas miał ratować: gdy wejrzymy w to, obaczem, że sam nieborak tylko jedną pomocą królestwa czeskiego, które jeszcze ma nie rozerwane, podpomaga w drugich swych państwach. Omylne by były pomoce cesarza JMci i jednoby ułomkami jakimi jemu walczyć z nami przyszło, gdyż jest wielkie rozszarpanie w królestwie węgierskiem, w ziemi siedmiogrodzkiej i w innych państwach należących do cesarza JMci; a tak z tej przyczyny nie barzo potężną pomoc cesarza JMci za złączeniem w ten związek być upatruję”¹¹¹.

He did not believe it in the help of Rome: „Negotium Ojca Św. Papieża widzę, że barzo jest pilne, i veri pastoris officio czyni dość, i widzę żeby rad i duszę wylał dla dobra Rzpltej Chrześcijańskiej i temu ktoby nie rad? Ale zabawiony czym inszym [...]. Poseł ten Ojca św. Papieża, człek zacny i godny ksiądz Legat Kajetan Kardynał, że tę ligę słuszną, potężną i świątobliwą pokazuje, sam to też przyznać muszę i życzyłybych jej: ale jaka proporcja, z takim się małym towarzystwem i tak niepewnym przeciw tak wielkiemu i walecznemu tyranowi złączyć się, złączywszy się wojnę zacząć, jaka bezpieczeńność nasza, zacząwszy o sobie nam radzić, obalić tak wielki ciężar na samych nas, obalić *molem belli* na koronę?”¹¹² Hence, he concluded that “this, then, despite the uncertainty of the league and what they [the envoyes of the Emperor] want to conclude, I see that we have to abandon it” („tę tedy niepewność ligi bacząc i jaką oni [envoyes of the Emperor] zaciągali, widzę, że już jej nam poniechać przyjdzie”)¹¹³. At the end he advised to the envoyes: „albo ligę gruntowną zawierać, albo pokój dość niepewny z tym poganinem stanowić; do którego jeżeli nam przyjdzie, tedy potrzeba, aby się poseł prędko wyprawił, aby żołnierz pogotowiu na granicach czekał, aby tym potężniej nasze traktaty popierać się mogły, dla tego też aby wojsko pogotowiu było, jeżeliby wzgardził przyjaźnią naszą, gotowość koronnej obrony aby obaczył”¹¹⁴.

¹⁰⁹ The speech of Jan Zamoyski in: *Diariusze sejmowe 1597*, in: *Scriptores rerum Polonicarum*, vol. XX, Kraków 1907, p. 75.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 72–73.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77. For the larger discussion see: T. Korzon, *Dzieje wojen...*, p. 118–120; S. Grzybowski, *Jan Zamoyski*, p. 269–270. The attitudes against the league were so strong that even if the noblemen, gathered in pre-Sejm assemblies in 1597 did not reject the very intention to conclude an alliance, but only doubted in its benefits, so in the Sejm J.

All hopes for the thoroughness of the league had vanished, according to the Hetman's opinion Stanisław Gulski was sent as an envoy to Istanbul. It is interesting, that the King demanded on this occasion from the Sultan to recognize him as an equal sovereign, entitling him Padishah¹¹⁵.

The Turks were persuaded that the Polish intervention in Moldavia two years ago did not break the peace between the two countries, and since the Hospodars of Moldavia from now on would be named by the Polish King, but would continue to pay tribute to Istanbul, the Sultan agreed to such the Polish-Turkish condominium in Moldavia and in November 1597 he renewed the treaty of friendship, concluded by his father, Murad III, with Sigismund III¹¹⁶.

Using the occasion, in a separate list, the Sultan invited the King to an alliance against the Habsburgs. Since the concluded treaty was not fully responsible to exorbitant demands of Poland, in 1598 a new envoy was sent to Istanbul, the Royal Secretary Jan Szczęsny Herburt. He negotiated a new treaty, which incorporated Ieremia Movilă. It stated that the Crimean Khan, who will be receive by Rzeczpospolita his usual gifts, will not under any circumstances destroy the Polish property, and if the Polish king will call for help, he will hurry to aid. Also, once again the principle of the Polish-Turkish condominium in Moldavia was confirmed, when Mehmed III approved Ieremia Movilă on the throne of the Hospodar, ensuring a succession of his son after him, as long as they are friends of Turkey and will demonstrate their loyalty. The Sultan has also returned to a proposition of an alliance against the Habsburgs, offering to the King cities that were in the spoken time in Hungarian possession: Košice, Huszth and Munkács¹¹⁷. And although the tractability of Turkey has to be associated with their still unfinished war with Austria¹¹⁸, and it could be expected that in the future they want to change their mind about the joint Polish sovereignty over Moldavia, some events have already happened, and it depended only from the skills of Polish politics whether the successes of the risky Moldavian campaign of 1595 would not be lost.

Zamoyski was supported even by the Primate S. Karnkowski, who in public held a speech against the alliance with the Emperor – J. Rzońca, *Rzeczpospolita...*, p. 24-26.

¹¹⁵ The envoye instruction for S. Gulski, 1597, in: I. Corfus, *Documente*, No. 199, p. 379-382. J. Macûrek, *Zăpas...*, p. 93 and D. Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish...*, p. 127

¹¹⁶ The treaty of the Sultan Mehmed III with Sigismund III, Istanbul, 11-20 November 1597, in: Z. Abrahamowicz, *Katalog dokumentów...*, No. 238, p. 229-230 (the new edition: D. Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish...*, No. 27, p. 308-312). Also see: Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...*, p. 148.

¹¹⁷ The treaty of Sultan Mehmed III with Sigismund III, Istanbul, 4 August 1598, in: Z. Abrahamowicz, *Katalog dokumentów...*, No. 241, p. 232-233 (the new edition: D. Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish...*, No. 28, p. 319-323). It is more detailed discussed in: Z. Spieralski, *Awantury...*, p. 148; J.P. Niederkorn, *Die europäishe...*, p. 491-492; D. Skorupa, *Stosunki...*, p. 65-66 and D. Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish...*, p. 127.

¹¹⁸ In the opinion of J. Macûrek, *Zăpas...*, p. 93, the Sultan, when facing the war with Austria in Hungarian territories, „chtěl býti kryt se strany polské”.

At this moment it was quite a result – the direct Turkish-Tatar danger was moved away from the borders of Rzeczpospolita, a dam to Habsburg aspirations to sovereignty over Moldavia was put and, finally, Polish influences were rebuilt there, not causing a war with the Ottomans¹¹⁹. It was much, but it also created a possibility for greater works. Zamoyski's plans to cover by protectorate both principalities of the Danube, and even Transylvania, and make them a buffer zone between Rzeczpospolita and Turkey, gained a basis for its implementation. Soon, already in 1600, these plans were almost carried out¹²⁰.

We must of course realize that the Polish-Turkish friendship was fragile and based on mutual benefits of installing of the pro-Polish Hospodar in Iași, and at the same time of the maintaining of the Ottoman sovereignty over Moldavia. Rzeczpospolita has sought in the coming years to exclude Moldavia from the Turkish protection and replace it with its own¹²¹. There were also tries to strengthen economic ties and to create opportunities for Polish nobility of military service for a Hospodar and the acquisition land estates in Moldavia¹²². These Polish efforts could, however, be a separate subject of a research. At this stage, it is rather to be stated that the Sublime Porte never agreed to a very far-reaching concessions and did not release Moldavia and Wallachia from its power.

Resolution of the issue, who will be the subject to the Danube principalities, was made on the battle fields of Țuțora and Khotyn in the years 1620-162 and was approved in the peace treaty, concluded by Prince Krzysztof Zbaraski on behalf of the Republic with the Ottoman Empire in 1623. The competition was won by the stronger player, which turned out to be Turkey.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 93–94. The Turks have insisted on their position, postponing Polish demand, after their victory at Mezökeresztes in 1596 – see: C.M. Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperial Policy and the Economy of the Black Sea Region in the Sixteenth Century*, “Journal of the American Oriental Society”, 1966, vol. 86, No. 2, p. 93; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 282-283.

¹²⁰ J. Sas, *Wyprawa...*, p. 89. It is worth to add that J. Zamoyski enjoyed good relations with Ahmed pasha, who recognized in the Hetman the main decisive person in Moldavia affairs and in December of 1597 sent him a friendly letter – Ahmed pasha to J. Zamoyski, Hăgğî Ogłu Păzāry, 15 December 1597, in: Z. Abrahamowicz, *Katalog dokumentów...*, No. 240, p. 231; also see: J. Besala, *Hetman...*, p. 100.

¹²¹ C.A. Bobicescu, *Unia*, p. 224-225.

¹²² It could be supported by the texts from the letters between Ieremia Movilă and Jan Zamoyski. See, for example: J. Zamoyski to Ieremia Movilă, *Zamość*, 1598, in: I. Corfus, *Documente...*, No. 204, p. 392-393 or Ieremia Movilă to J. Zamoyski, camp in Saponaty, 29 November 1603, in: *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor culese de Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki*, suppl. 2, vol. 2, ed. by I. Bogdan, București 1895, No. CLX, p. 321-322. Also see: C.A. Bobicescu, *Unia*, p. 235-237.