

**MILITARY CONTACTS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN  
COMMONWEALTH AND THE DUCHY OF PRUSSIA  
IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE LIVONIAN WAR (1600-1602)\***

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**Abstract:** *The author discusses Polish-Prussian alliance and conflicts caused by the war with Sweden over Estonia and Livonia. The subject of the article is the first period of the war (1600-1602). The Polish-Lithuanian forces acted without a proper financial preparation that forced the King to seek help in the Duchy of Prussia. Financial arrears also prompted the commanders of individual Polish troops to request or extort supply in Prussia. The author analyses the following areas of Polish-Prussian military contacts: official financial and military aid provided at the request of the King and dignitaries of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and unofficial extortion of supplies by Polish soldiers. The article also shows the mechanisms of gradual increase in Polish requirements and ways of meeting them by Prussia.*

**Keywords:** *Military, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Duchy of Prussia, Sweden, Livonian war, supply, army, financial aid*

**Rezumat:** *Contactele militare ale Uniunii statale polono-lituaniene cu Ducatul Prusiei în primii ani ai Războiului Livonian (1600-1602). Autorul discută despre alianța polono-prusiană și despre conflictele provocate de războiul cu Suedia privind Estonia și Livonia. Subiectul articolului îl constituie prima perioadă a războiului (1600-1602). Forțele polono-lituaniene au acționat fără o pregătire financiară adecvată, fapt ce l-a forțat pe Rege să caute ajutor din partea Ducatului Prusiei. De asemenea, arieratele financiare i-au determinat pe comandanții unor trupe poloneze să solicite sau să rechiziționeze provizii în Prusia. Autorul analizează următoarele domenii ale contactelor militare polono-prusiene: ajutorul financiar și militar oficial oferit la cererea regelui și demnitarilor Uniunii statale polono-lituaniene și rechizițiile neoficiale ale proviziilor efectuate de către soldații polonezi. Articolul prezintă, de asemenea, mecanismele creșterii treptate a solicitărilor polonezilor și modalitățile Prusiei de a le face față.*

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**Résumé : Contacts militaires de l'Union polono-lituanienne et du Duché de Prusse pendant les premières années de la Guerre de Livonie (1600-1602).** L'auteur discute de l'alliance polono-prussienne et des conflits causés par la guerre avec la Suède concernant l'Estonie et la Livonie. Le sujet de l'article est la première période de la guerre (1600-1602). Les forces polono-lituanienues ont agi sans préparation financière adéquate, ce qui a forcé le roi à demander de l'aide dans le Duché de Prusse. De plus, les arriérés financiers ont également incité les commandants des différentes troupes polonaises à demander ou à extorquer des fonds en Prusse. L'auteur analyse les domaines suivants des contacts militaires entre la Pologne et la Prusse : aide financière et militaire officielle fournie à la demande du roi et des dignitaires de l'Union polono-lituanienne et extorsion non officielle de fournitures effectuée par des soldats polonais. L'article ci-joint montre, aussi, les mécanismes d'augmentation progressive des exigences polonaises et les moyens d'y répondre de la part de la Prusse.

## INTRODUCTION

The victory of Poland in the war with the Order of the Teutonic Knights and the Second Peace of Thorn of 1466 led to the limitation of the order's territory to its eastern part and recognition of the supremacy of the Polish king. The Treaty of Kraków of 1525, ending the next Polish-Teutonic war, transformed the Teuton state into secular Duchy of Prussia. Its ruler was the nephew of the Polish King Sigismund the Old - Albrecht Hohenzollern. The treaty specified the feudal obligations of the Prussian ruler, including armed aid to the Crown.<sup>1</sup> In a relatively peaceful 16<sup>th</sup> century, Poland did not particularly need this aid. Stephen Báthory demanded it during the Siege of Danzig (1577), and even this was limited to a financial allowance paid by Margrave of Ansbach George Frederick in exchange for taking custody of the mentally ill Duke Albrecht II<sup>2</sup>. The security of Prussia, guaranteed by Poland, also exempted them from the obligation to keep a strong

<sup>1</sup> For the text of the Treaty of 8 April 1525, see O. Balzer, *Corpus iuris Polonici*, vol. 4/1, Kraków, 1910, No. 46, pp. 141-159. See, also D. Makiła, *Prusy Książęce a Korona Polska po 1525 roku. Prowincja czy protektorat?* [Duchy of Prussia and the Polish Crown after 1525. Province or protectorate?] in: *Prusy i Inflanty między średniowieczem a nowożytnością. Państwo - społeczeństwo - kultura* [Prussia and Livonia between the Middle Ages and the early modern period. State - society - culture], ed. B. Dybaś, D. Makiła, Toruń, 2003, pp. 63-72.

<sup>2</sup> Obligation of George Frederick from 23 XII 1577 to pay 200,000 zlotys to the Polish King, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie [Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw] (hereinafter: **AGAD**), Zbiór Dokumentów Pergaminowych [Collection of Parchment Documents], reference number 6922.

army<sup>3</sup>. In this situation, the Duchy of Prussia entered the seventeenth century, a century of war, with outdated and inefficient military system, based on the obligations of landowners - mostly nobility. In the face of numerous wars fought by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth since 1600 - with Sweden, Moscow, and Turkey - Prussia faced the necessity to provide financial and military aid to their suzerain. It happened on three levels, which are analysed in this article - 1) official aid resulting from the demands of Polish authorities, 2) financial aid provided at the request of Polish army commanders, 3) unofficial and extorted supplies for Polish troops, who made arbitrary collections of allowance (*stacja*), that is accommodation and benefits in kind or money, used to maintain the army. The period 1600-1621 occupies a specific place, since the new war with Sweden, which began on 1625 and covered Royal Prussia and the Duchy of Prussia with its range, brought different solutions to supplying the Polish army. In our deliberations, we will focus on the initial phase of this period, i.e. the first years of the Livonian War (1600-1602).

### SOURCES AND LITERATURE

Materials stored in the resources of the Berlin Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz are the most important information source for such a topic, with Ostpreußische Folianten being the most important in this case.<sup>4</sup> Its books contain the correspondence of the Prussian authorities - starosts of border districts, Supreme Counsellors (*nadradcy, Oberräte*) replacing the absent Duke and, more rarely, the ruler himself - with Polish officials and officers, concerning the supply of Polish army, as well as the damage it inflicted. Of particular interest are fourteen books with the numbers 809-822, covering matters from 1600-1622, and for the Livonian War of 1600-1602, books 809-811. Some material can also be found in Etats-Ministerium, which contains more correspondence between the Polish king and the Prussian Supreme Counsellors and the Duke, regarding Prussian military and financial aid for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> S. Augustowicz, *Przebudowa wojska pruskiego w latach 1655-1660. U źródeł wczesnonowoczesnej armii* [Reconstruction of the Prussian army in 1655-1660. At the source of the early-modern army], Oświęcim, 2014, pp. 19-26.

<sup>4</sup> Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (hereinafter: **GStA PK**), XX HA Ostpreußische Folianten (hereinafter: OsF).

<sup>5</sup> GStA PK, XX HA Etats-Ministerium (hereinafter: **EM**). The materials we are interested in can be found here for later years, from 1603 - see EM 111c (descriptions of Polish visits

Despite the large amount of source materials, the literature of the topic remains not very abundant. The old German studies by Christian Krollmann and Otto Zimmermann are still of fundamental importance.<sup>6</sup> For the Prussian contribution to the Polish-Turkish War of 1621, we have one article by Dariusz Milewski.<sup>7</sup> To this we can add a number of partial remarks in the elaborations on Polish-Prussian history, which, however, most often focus on discussing the financial aspects of transferring the Prussian fief to the custody, and later the possession of the side lines of the Hohenzollerns.<sup>8</sup> As it can be seen, the topic of Polish-Prussian military contacts in the first decades of the 17<sup>th</sup> century is still waiting on its researcher.

### OFFICIAL PRUSSIAN AID TO POLAND

Depriving Sigismund III of the Swedish crown in 1599 resulted in the following year in the war of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with Sweden, started by the annexation of Estonia by Poland in 1600. As a result of the financial problems of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the war has been prolonged,

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to Prussia from 1610), EM 111j or EM 111m, No. 31 (negotiating for help in the war with Moscow in 1609-1611).

<sup>6</sup> Ch. Krollmann, *Das Defensionswerk im Herzgotum Preußen* [The Defensive work in the Duchy of Prussia], Bd 2: *Das Defensionswerk unter dem Kurfürsten Johann Sigismund* [The Defensive work under the Kurfürst John Sigismund], Berlin, 1909 and O. Zimmermann, *Das Defensionswerk im Herzgotum Preußen unter dem Kurfürsten Georg Wilhelm* [The Defensive work in the Duchy of Prussia under the Kurfürst George William], Königsberg, 1933.

<sup>7</sup> D. Milewski, *W cieniu wojny tureckiej – pogranicze polsko-pruskie w 1621 r.* [In the shadow of the Turkish war - Polish-Prussian borderland in 1621], in: *Dysydenci czy decydenci? Protestanci w obu częściach Prus i Koronie w XVI-XVIII wieku* [Dissidents or decision makers? Protestants in both parts of Prussia and the Crown in the 16-18 centuries], ed. W. Zawadzki, Elbląg, 2018, pp. 207-217.

<sup>8</sup> B. Wachowiak, A. Kamieński, *Dzieje Brandenburgii-Prus na progu czasów nowożytnych (1500-1701)* [History of Brandenburg-Prussia on the threshold of early modern times (1500-1701)], Poznań, 2001; B. Janiszewska-Mincer, *Sejm krajowy Prus Książęcych w 1621 roku na tle walki stanów pruskich z elektorem Jerzym Wilhelmem* [National Sejm of Duchy of Prussia in 1621 against the background of the battle of the Prussian states with the Elector George William], "Zapiski Historyczne" ["Historical Records"] 1963, vol. XXVIII, No. 1; B. Janiszewska-Mincer, *Rzeczpospolita Polska a Prusy Książęce w latach 1598-1621: sprawa sukcesji brandenburskiej* [The Polish Commonwealth and Duchy of Prussia in the years 1598-1621: the question of Brandenburg's succession], Warsaw, 1988; J. Pietrzak, *Po Cecorze i podczas wojny chocimskiej. Sejmy z lat 1620 i 1621* [After Cecora and during The Polish-Ottoman War. Sejms from 1620 and 1621], Wrocław, 1983.

transforming itself into struggles for the maintenance of Livonia. At the same time, the conclusion of the Swedish-Moscow alliance in Vyborg in 1609 became a *casus belli* for the conflict of the Commonwealth with its eastern neighbour (1609-1618). It overshadowed the struggle with the Swedes, punctuated by short-lived truces in 1605, 1611, and 1618. It was not until 1621 that the war broke out again when Gustav Adolf used the Commonwealth's involvement in the Turkish conflict and took Riga by surprise.<sup>9</sup> In turn, the Turkish war broke out quite unexpectedly in 1620, when mutual Polish-Ottoman clashes over the Cossack and Tatar invasions and rivalry for influence in Moldova accumulated. The defeat of the Moldovan expedition undertaken by hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski in 1620 provoked a powerful Ottoman invasion in the following year, led by Sultan Osman II. The Commonwealth undertook gigantic military preparations to resist this aggression, what led to victory in the end.<sup>10</sup>

In all these campaigns, the Poles expected military aid from Duchy of Prussia's authorities, in the form of lending war equipment, and, above all, in the financial contribution to the wars. Margrave of Ansbach George Frederick and, after his death, the Brandenburg Electors Joachim Frederick and John Sigismund used the opportunity to obtain permission from the king and the Commonwealth of Poland to take custody of the ill Albrecht II and to take over the fief after the expected and actual death of Albrecht in 1618. The first attempts in 1600 did not bring the expected result, because the Poles demanded an exorbitant sum of 30,000 zlotys of annual tribute from Prussia or a one-off tribute of 400,000 zlotys (Hohenzollerns proposed 100,000). However, in 1605, in the face of the prolonged war in Livonia, Sigismund III finally came to an agreement with George Frederick and gave him the custody in Prussia for 30,000 zlotys of an annual subsidy, which could be doubled if the Sejm passed taxes on war.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> H. Wisner, *Dyplomacja polska w latach 1572-1648* [Polish Diplomacy in the years 1572-1648], in: *Historia dyplomacji polskiej* [History of Polish diplomacy], vol. 2, ed. G. Labuda, Warsaw, 1982, pp. 40-45. For the subject of the Moscow War in the context of the Moscow-Swedish alliance, see *ibid*, pp. 62-70.

<sup>10</sup> The preliminary peace treaty was signed as soon as the fighting was over - see Polish document of the agreement under Khotyn, October 9, 1621, in: *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15<sup>th</sup> - 18<sup>th</sup> Century). An Annotated Edition of Ahdnames and Other Documents*, ed. D. Kołodziejczyk, Leiden - Boston - Köln, 2000, document 35, pp. 376-380.

<sup>11</sup> B. Wachowiak, A. Kamieński, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-239; B. Janiszewska-Mincer, *Rzeczpospolita Polska w latach 1600-1603 (Narastanie konfliktu między Zygmuntem III Wazą a stanami)* [The Commonwealth of Poland in the years 1600-1603 (Escalation of the conflict between Sigismund III Vasa and the states)], Bydgoszcz, 1984, pp. 49-51, 74-

The Swedish war in Estonia and Livonia also resulted in another type of Polish-Prussian military cooperation.<sup>12</sup> The Poles tried to obtain from the Prussians permission to make military enlistments, as well as to borrow war equipment. Poland's striving for Prussian help may seem strange, considering the population and military potential of the Commonwealth exceeded the possibilities of Sweden several times, not to mention that of Prussia. However, it will become understandable, given the slowness of the war machine of the Commonwealth, dependent on taxes passed at the Sejm. In addition, in May 1600, the invasion of Wallachian Hospodar Michael the Brave on Moldova, where the Polish warlord Ieremia Moghilă ruled, forced the Commonwealth to act on two fronts.<sup>13</sup> The 1600 Sejm, in session in the spring, accepted the royal declaration on the incorporation of Estonia into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (March 12), but did not pass the relevant taxes. The local sejmiks were to do it.<sup>14</sup> It delayed the Polish war preparations so much that the main spokesman of the war, voivode of Wenden Jürgen von Farensbach, who planned to take over Finland and take back Sweden from there for Sigismund, after receiving a total of 4.5 thousand soldiers found himself without sufficient resources and army against the aggression of Charles, Duke of Södermanland, in Estonia (summer - autumn 1600).<sup>15</sup> In this situation, any help for the Polish-Lithuanian army, whether financial or in war equipment, and finally in soldiers, was welcome and worthwhile.

In April 1600, the king informed Margrave George Frederick that he had started operations in Estonia, and a year later he sent Johan Nilsson Gyllenstierna to Prussia for infantry, asking the advisors to give the necessary help to the rittmeister (*rotmistrz*).<sup>16</sup> The situation was not dangerous at the time, and the

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77, 95-98, 117-120; D. Milewski, *Prusacy finansują wojnę: Zygmunt III i Szwecja* [Prussians are financing the war: Sigismund III and Sweden] [http://www.wilanow-palac.pl/prusacy\\_finansuja\\_wojne\\_zygmunt\\_iii\\_i\\_szwecja.html](http://www.wilanow-palac.pl/prusacy_finansuja_wojne_zygmunt_iii_i_szwecja.html) (Accessed on 14. 11. 2018).

<sup>12</sup> The origins of the Polish-Swedish war were discussed by S. Herbst, *Wojna inflancka 1600-1602* [Livonian War 1600-1602], Zabrze 2006 (reissue of the 1938 edition).

<sup>13</sup> Motifs of Michael the Brave's attack on Moldova, were described in an interesting manner by O. Cristea, *A Second Front: Wallachia and the 'Long War' against the Turks*, in: *Europe and the 'Ottoman World'. Exchanges and Conflicts (Sixteenth to Seventeenth Centuries)*, ed. G. Kárman, R. Păun, Istanbul, 2013, pp. 18-25.

<sup>14</sup> A. Filipczak-Kocur, *Skarbowość Rzeczypospolitej 1587-1648. Projekty - uchwały - realizacja* [Commonwealth's Treasury 1587-1648. Projects - resolutions - implementation], Warsaw, 2006, pp. 94-95; B. Janiszewska-Mincer, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>15</sup> S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-12, 29-34.

<sup>16</sup> Sigismund III to George Frederick, Warsaw, 8 April 1600, GStA PK, OsF 809, f. 321-321v;

voivode of Wenden even planned to drive away the Swedes from Estonia. Unfortunately, before enough troops were gathered, Duke Charles arrived in Reval (now Tallinn). His combined forces reached 14 thousand soldiers. He boldly took the offensive and on October 17, 1600, he took control of Pernau (now Pärnu). At the end of October, Jürgen von Farensbach managed to defeat some of the Swedish forces at Karkus (now Karksi), but this did not prevent further advances of the enemy. Duke Charles took over Fellin (now Viljandi), and at the end of November, Karkus itself. It was only winter that interrupted the Swedish offensive.<sup>17</sup>

The arrival of Lithuanian reinforcements made it possible to defeat a separate group of Swedish troops under Wenden (now Cēsis) on January 7, 1601, which did not change the fact that the main army of Duke Charles took control of the important city of Dorpat (now Tartu) the day before.<sup>18</sup> The Swedes moved forward, occupying Valmiera in February, and attacking Riga and Kokenhausen (now Koknese). It was only these two cities that had resisted well enough to stop the progress of the Swedish army.<sup>19</sup> The Sejm, which met in early 1601, finally passed tax resolutions and began preparations for a counteroffensive, which was to be led by Jan Zamoyski, the Chancellor and Grand Crown Hetman.

Also, in April 1601, the king demanded from the Margrave reinforcements for the Livonian War, demanding, through his secretary, Reinhold Heidenstein, for them to be sent to Kaunas on June 13. At the same time, the king left the Margrave the leeway to send soldiers or help in a different form.<sup>20</sup> A few weeks later, the king specified his expectations, demanding that several guns were sent along with ammunition, gunpowder, and other equipment to the area of military operations.<sup>21</sup> Artillery aid was especially needed due to the poor state of this formation in the Commonwealth, where at the beginning of the war in 1601 only two heavy guns were found in Lithuania and thirteen in the Crown.<sup>22</sup> The Polish

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also, he to Supreme Counsellors, Warsaw, 13 April 1601, GStA PK, OsF 809, f. 26.

<sup>17</sup> S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-51.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 62-68.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 68-77.

<sup>20</sup> Sigismund III to George Frederick, Warsaw, 15 April 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 18-18v.

<sup>21</sup> Sigismund III to George Frederick, Warsaw, 2 May 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 20-20v.

Regarding the settlement on guns between the Lithuanian Grand Treasury Andrzej Zawisza and the Zeugwart Jan Hack, see Sigismund III to George Frederick, Vilnius, 11 February 1602, GStA PK, XX Herzogliches Briefarchiv B1, Kasten 339, [a.z.V.27.8].

<sup>22</sup> S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 119; H. Wisner, *Rzeczpospolita Wazów*, t. II: *Wojsko Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego - dyplomacja - varia* [The Commonwealth of the Vasa dynasty, vol. II: Army of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania - diplomacy - varia], Warsaw, 2004, p. 95.

monarch also expected the Margrave to send troops from among the nobility of Pilten to the war with Duke Charles.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, already during the expedition, Sigismund III directed a separate Universal to the local nobility with a call to support the Polish-Lithuanian army.<sup>24</sup>

In the following months, the king sent multiple appeals to Margrave George Frederick and Prussian Supreme Counsellors with demands for help in the war against Swedes.<sup>25</sup> The courtier Bogusław Radoszewski has also been sent with an intended mission to Prussia.<sup>26</sup> These efforts did not remain fruitless, as the Prussians finally sent 300 infantry soldiers instead of the 100 required riders (less needed for the expected character of the war and the fact that Poland and Lithuania had excellent riders).<sup>27</sup> With the consent of the Margrave, the king sent Benedict Bucholtz to Duchy of Prussia with the task of taking over command of Prussian soldiers and bringing them under the command of voivode of Wenden Jürgen von Farenbach to the Livonian war.<sup>28</sup> In a similar mission, the king sent to Prussia the Lithuanian notary, Elias Pielgrzymowski, commissioning him, among others, to obtain guns and gunpowder.<sup>29</sup>

The efforts of the monarch were accompanied by the efforts of Polish and

<sup>23</sup> Sigismund III to George Frederick, Warsaw, 31 May 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 52. The former Courland exclave District of Pilten was then ruled by Margrave George Frederick who kept it as a pledge since 1585 - see B. Dybaś, *Powiat piltyński w XVII w. – jego geneza i status w Rzeczypospolitej* [District of Pilten in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. - its genesis and status in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth], "Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne" ["Legal and Historical Journal"], 2003, vol. 55, No. 1, pp. 204-208. See. J. Natanson Leski, *Epoka Stefana Batorego w dziejach granicy wschodniej Rzeczypospolitej* [Stephen Báthory's epoch in the history of the eastern border of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth], Oświęcim, 2014, pp. 128-129.

<sup>24</sup> Universal of King Sigismund III to the District of Pilten, camp on Daugava, September 22, 1601, GStA PK, OsF 809, f. 387.

<sup>25</sup> Sigismund III to George Frederick, Warsaw, 30 May 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 54-54v; also, he to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Warsaw, 2 June 1601, *ibid.*, f. 61-61v

<sup>26</sup> Sigismund III to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Grodno, 16 VII 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 223; B. Radoszewski to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, no place and date of issue [July 1601], *ibid.*, f. 224-224v; Prussian Supreme Counsellors to Sigismund III, Królewiec, 20/30 VII 1601, *ibid.*, f. 254-255v (concept); Sigismund III to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Vilnius, 13 VIII 1601, f. 369.

<sup>27</sup> S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 118.

<sup>28</sup> Sigismund III to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Vilnius, 13 VIII 1601, f. 369; Universal of Sigismund III, Vilnius, 13 VIII 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 416.

<sup>29</sup> Sigismund III to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Vilnius, 9 VIII 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 495. This mission was only mentioned by S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 111.

Lithuanian dignitaries. Already in June 1601, Lithuanian lords wrote to the Margrave, informing him about the course of the fight with Duke Charles.<sup>30</sup> At that time, the war activities focused at Daugava around the Kokenhausen fortress (currently Koknese). The Swedish army under the command of Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm, the natural son of Duke Charles, managed to conquer the city at the beginning of June. However, the Swedes suffered so many losses that they were unable to take the offensive. Conversely, the Polish-Lithuanian army under the command of the Grand Lithuanian Hetman Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Piorun” (The Thunder) went into action. They besieged Kokenhausen and in the battle fought there on June 23, 1601 defeated the Swedish relief force.<sup>31</sup> At the request of the king, the Grand Lithuanian Chancellor Lew Sapieha and the Grand Treasurer of Lithuania Andrzej Zawisza solicited the Prussian Supreme Counsellors for help in rebuilding the equipment of the Polish-Lithuanian army in Livonia.<sup>32</sup>

A special attention should be paid to the efforts of Jan Zamoyski, Chancellor and Grand Crown Hetman, who after the victorious campaign in Moldova in 1600 was directed by the king in the following year to Livonia with the task of replacing the Grand Lithuanian Hetman, Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Piorun” as the commander-in-chief of the Polish-Lithuanian army.<sup>33</sup> Brought up in the military school of Stephen Báthory, the Grand Crown Hetman made careful preparations for the expedition, planning to recover the strongholds occupied by the Swedes in Livonia and Estonia in a methodical campaign.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, he did not leave out the Duchy of Prussia, from which he expected to receive real support. Hence, he wrote to the Prussian Supreme Counsellors about the Livonian War on August 9, to discuss the specific actions of Tomasz Napierkowski and Jan Gniazdowski in two weeks’ time. At the request of the hetman, they were bringing the guns to Kaunas and Zamoyski asked the Supreme Counsellors to give them all the help they needed to shorten the time of transporting the guns.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Merkelis Giedraitis, Bishop of Samogitia, Jan Karol Chodkiewicz, Lithuanian Hetman, Andrzej Wołłowicz Grand Standard-Bearer of Lithuania to George Friderick, Rosienie 13 VI 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 36-36v.

<sup>31</sup> S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-103.

<sup>32</sup> Lew Sapieha and Andrzej Zawisza to the Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Vilnius, 2 June 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 177.

<sup>33</sup> The victorious Moldovan campaign of Jan Zamoyski in 1600 directed against Michael the Brave was discussed by D. Skorupa, *Bitwa pod Bukowem 20 października 1600 r.* [Battle of Bukov on October 20, 1600], in M. Nagielski (ed.), *Staropolska sztuka wojenna XVI-XVII wieku* [Old-Polish military art from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 17<sup>th</sup> century], Warsaw, 2002, pp. 17-43.

<sup>34</sup> See S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-124.

<sup>35</sup> Jan Zamoyski to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Vilnius, 9 VIII 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810,

Greater speed of the Polish expedition was necessary, because the Swedes, despite the defeat at Kokenhausen, did not resign from offensive actions. At the turn of August and September 1601, under the leadership of Duke Charles, they besieged Riga, the main city of Livonia. The Grand Lithuanian Hetman, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, was unable to provide effective help to the city - luckily Riga, defended by Jürgen von Farensbach, withstood the Swedish siege until the arrival of troops led by King Sigismund III and Jan Zamoyski. Upon the news of the upcoming relief, Duke Charles abandoned the siege on September 27.<sup>36</sup>

The retreat of the Swedes enabled Poles and Lithuanians to move to a counter-offensive. After the king's departure from the army - which took place at the beginning of December 1601 - the activities were conducted independently by hetman Jan Zamoyski. He regained Valmiera on December 21, 1601, while Sigismund III, upon his return to Vilnius, resumed efforts to finance the army. Poles and Lithuanians survived the heavy winter and resumed the offensive in the spring, retaking Fellin (now Viljandi), located in the northern part of Livonia from the Swedes (17 May 1602). The success was paid for with considerable losses - as well as the with the death of Jürgen von Farensbach, who was talented and popular in the army.<sup>37</sup> Hetman Zamoyski lost most of the infantry in these battles, he did not have any money to pay the soldiers. He struggled to maintain the revolting soldiers and he had to give up his plans to take back Dorpat. Instead, he headed for the Estonian "white stone" (Paide). There, the Polish army was tied in for three months, forcing the fortress to capitulate only on September 30, 1602. An attempt to further offensive towards Narva was unsuccessful, as the unpaid army demanded the end of the campaign. For this reason, Zamoyski also failed to persuade the soldiers to march to Dorpat. Eventually, having recaptured the cities and leaving his soldiers in them, the Grand Crown Hetman left the theatre of war operations in mid-October. The command of Livonia by the will of the king was to be taken by the Field Hetman of Lithuania Jan Karol Chodkiewicz.<sup>38</sup>

The slowness and cost-intensiveness of the actions of Polish troops during the 1601-1602 offensive contributed to the failure to complete all of its objectives. Most

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f. 493 and also he to them, Augustic (Onikszy), 25 VIII 1601, *ibid*, f. 503.

<sup>36</sup> S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-132, 138-143. Interestingly, both Crown Hetmans were calling on the Swedes to take up the fight - Jan Zamoyski and Stanisław Żółkiewski to Duke Charles, Kokenhausen, 23 September 1601, AGAD, *Metrica Regni Poloniae, Libri Legationum* 27, f. 128-128v.

<sup>37</sup> For the subject of warfare in the winter of 1601/1602 and the capture of Fellin, see S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-173.

<sup>38</sup> S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-183.

of Livonia was recovered and the troops entered Estonia. The Swedes, however, could still take action, which was soon revealed after the departure of Jan Zamoyski, when Duke Charles began a counter-offensive. For the Polish-Lithuanian command, the most urgent matter was to raise money to pay the army and make new enlistments. In this situation, help was sought in Duchy of Prussia once again. Sigismund III sent his servitor Jerzy Burbach in May 1602 with the task of organizing supplies for the army in Livonia. The king did not hesitate to inform the Prussian Supreme Counsellors about it, asking them to help his agent.<sup>39</sup> A few months later, the king renewed his appeal, demanding from the Supreme Counsellors facilitation of the transport through Prussia of goods purchased for the armies in Livonia.<sup>40</sup> Jerzy Burbach, acting in Prussia, also directly intervened at the Supreme Counsellors, describing his needs in supplying the Polish-Lithuanian army.<sup>41</sup>

The royal proceedings were supported by a new commander in Livonia, the Field Hetman of Lithuania Jan Karol Chodkiewicz. He turned directly to Margrave George Frederick, asking for support for his soldiers and seeking to have 300 infantry soldiers sent once more. On that day, he also wrote to the Prussian Supreme Counselors, informing them of the letter to the Margrave and asking for support for his efforts.<sup>42</sup> Mikołaj von Korff also wrote to the Margrave describing the war activities of Chodkiewicz in Livonia.<sup>43</sup>

### FINANCIAL AID PROVIDED AT THE REQUEST OF POLISH ARMY COMMANDERS

By writing about the interventions of both Jan Zamoyski and Jan Karol Chodkiewicz, we gradually move on to the second form of Polish-Prussian military

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<sup>39</sup> Sigismund III to the Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Warsaw, 9 May 1602, GStA PK, OsF 811, f. 230. The king expected the Supreme Counsellors to help Burbach transport the purchased goods "sive terra, sive aqua" (whether by land or water).

<sup>40</sup> Sigismund III to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Cracow, 7 October 1602, GStA PK, OsF 811, f. 470.

<sup>41</sup> Jerzy Burbach to the Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Królewiec (Königsberg), 16 December 1602, GStA PK, OsF 811, f. 510-510v.

<sup>42</sup> Jan Karol Chodkiewicz to George Frederick, camp at Rigenmojza, 1 November 1602, GStA PK, OsF 811, f. 498 and also he to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, camp at Rigenmojza, 1 XI 1602, *ibid.*, f. 500. Response concepts dated 18/28 December 1602 see *ibid.*, ff. 504 and 506.

<sup>43</sup> Mikołaj von Korff to George Frederick, Neiengatte, 19 November 1602, GStA PK, OsF 811, f. 502-502v; George Frederick to M. Korff, no place of issue, 18/28 December 1602, *ibid.*, f. 508-509v (concept).

cooperation, namely the assistance provided by the Prussians directly to the armies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The prolonged Livonian war gave the Polish authorities an impetus to deal with provisioning the army and to attempt to centralize the supply, but this matter was still in its infancy and did not bring satisfactory results until the end of the war.<sup>44</sup> The commanders of the individual rotas, heading for the front in Livonia or returning from there, had to care for themselves on their own. On the way, they often crossed into the Duchy of Prussia, where they expected to find supplies for their troops. Therefore, they asked for allowance, most often addressing starosts of border districts. These, in turn, usually directed such requests to the Supreme Counsellors or the Margrave, if he was in the Duchy, and then responded to those concerned. As a rule, attempts were made to satisfy the needs of Polish soldiers, remembering that the refusal might have resulted in attempts of soldiers to arbitrarily collect their “dues” – we will write about that later. It is true that Duchy of Prussia, as Polish fiefdoms, was not obliged to offer allowance as only Crown lands were burdened with it<sup>45</sup> - however, the lack of a strong army forced the Prussian authorities to negotiate Polish demands and did not allow for the enforcement of a law favourable to the Prussians.

The first letters asking for the issue of the allowance, sent directly by the rittmeister or their deputies to the Prussian starosts, appeared already in the spring and summer of 1601 (e. g. for the infantry *rota* of Jan Przeciszewski<sup>46</sup>). Almost at the same time, there were also complaints about military extortions, but we will deal with it later - however aware of the artificiality of such a separation. Meanwhile, let us look at selected cases of agreeable Polish-Prussian cooperation.

Already in August 1601, Mikołaj Zbyszewski, the lieutenant of the *rota* of Stanisław Potulicki the son of voivode of Kalisz, wrote to Margrave of Hohenstein

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<sup>44</sup> P. Gawron, *Organizacja i status prawny armii polsko-litewskiej w Inflantach w latach 1602-1611* [Organization and legal status of the Polish-Lithuanian Army in Livonia in 1602-1611], in: K. Bobiatyński, P. Gawron, K. Kossarzecki, P. Kroll, D. Milewski (eds.), *Hortus bellicus. Studia z dziejów wojskowości nowożytnej* [Hortus bellicus. Studies of the history of early-modern military], Warsaw, 2017, pp. 151-173.

<sup>45</sup> For the subject of military allowances, see J. Wimmer, *Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku* [Polish Army in the second half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century], Oświęcim, 2013, pp. 341-343; T. Srogosz, *Żołnierz swawolny. Z dziejów obyczajów armii koronnej w XVII wieku* [A lawless soldier. From the history of the customs of the Crown Army in the 17<sup>th</sup> century], Warsaw, 2010, pp. 41-62; idem, *Życie codzienne żołnierzy armii koronnej i litewskiej w XVII wieku* [Everyday Life of Soldiers of the Crown and Lithuanian Army in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century], Oświęcim, 2018, pp. 85-86.

<sup>46</sup> For correspondence in this matter from July-August 1601 see GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 317-319v.

asking for allowance for his troops.<sup>47</sup> The matter was successfully settled, moreover - rota received a relevant official letter from the Hohenstein authorities: „My rada i pospólstwo miasta J. Ks. M. Olsztynka oznajmujemy wszem wobec i każdemu z osobna, komu by to wiedzieć należało, że rota J. M. Pana Stanisława Potulickiego wojewodzica kaliskiego rotmistrza K. J. Mci, idąc przez dobra J. Ks. M. i mimo miasto nasze Olsztynko, zachowała się dobrze, krzywdy nikomu nie uczyniwszy, na co tej rocie J. M. Pana wojewodzica wyżej pomienionego skrypt swój od miasta naszego dajemy, i pieczęć naszą miejską przykładamy. Działo się w Olsztynku 14 Augusti Anno D[omi]ni 1601. Proconsul & consules”.<sup>48</sup> We also know that successfully conducted talks allowed the city to negotiate some concessions from the soldiers regarding the issued allowance. It encompassed in the end: „owsa łaszt 1, jałowic 10, połci mięsa 20, masła stifów 100. Insze rzeczy gwoli pospółstwu się opuszczają”.<sup>49</sup>

From the same period, we have correspondence regarding the issue of the allowance from the starost of Olecko to Mateusz Sokołowski, amounting to 237 zlotys and 27.5 groszy.<sup>50</sup> We also find the first consultations of the Prussian Supreme Counsellors with the Margrave George Frederick on the supply for Polish troops.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Mikołaj Zbyszewski to the Margrave of Hohenstein, Ostrowina, no date 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 344 also he to him, Tomaszków, no date 1601, *ibid*, f. 345.

<sup>48</sup> “We, the council and commoners of the city of Hohenstein announce to everyone and to whomever needs to individually know that rota of Stanisław Potulicki, son to the voivode of Kalisz, rittmeister of the king, on their travel through the lands of the Duchy and the city of ours Hohenstein, behaved well, wrongful to no one, for what this rota of the son to the voivode, shall be given the official letter from our city and we shall place on it our city seal. All that took place in Hohenstein 14 Augusti Anno D[omi]ni 1601. Proconsul & consules”, The statement of the council and commoners of Hohenstein on the behavior of rota of the son of voivode of Kalisz, Hohenstein, 14/24 VIII 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 346.

<sup>49</sup> “1 last of oats, 10 heifers, 20 sides of meat, 100 half-gallons of butter. Other things shall remain in the gesture of the common folk”, List of issued allowance, no place and date of issue [Hohenstein, August 1601], GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 346. For the subject of feeding the army and its needs in this area, see T. Srogosz, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-98.

<sup>50</sup> Sebastian von Lehndorff starost of Olecko to Supreme Counsellors, Olecko, 5/15 VIII 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 387-388 (with the list of allowances issued); Prussian Supreme Counsellors to Mateusz Sokołowski, Królewiec, 11/21 VIII 1601, *ibid.*, f. 382-386av.

<sup>51</sup> Prussian Supreme Counsellors to George Frederick, no place of issue [Królewiec], 14/24 VIII 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 454-455.

### EXTORTING SUPPLIES BY POLISH TROOPS

On the threshold of the war, the Polish authorities with the king at the helm tried to regulate the provisions concerning military discipline, and after the first military failures, the Grand Lithuanian Hetman, Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Piorun" in June 1601 issued his own military articles for the army fighting in Livonia.<sup>52</sup> Jan Zamoyski also issued his own military articles in the summer of 1601 when he took command of the army in Livonia. They referred to state laws and regulated, among other, the methods of obtaining food, guaranteeing its collection in the allowance, but only up to a certain amount - surplus was to be bought at market prices.<sup>53</sup> This, however, did not prevent the undesirable phenomena. Almost permanent lack of soldier's pay and insufficient supply resulted in not only deserting the battlefield and unwillingness for further service by the soldiers. There was also the acute problem of soldiers' extortion and robberies. They not only concerned the area of operations, but also areas of concentration and march of the army.<sup>54</sup> Lithuania has suffered, among others, from the Zaporizhian Cossacks, returning to Ukraine along the course of Daugava and Dnieper and committing excesses in Polotsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev. The northern Lithuanian districts were also devastated by the mercenary army (*wojska zaciężne*) returning from the campaign. The soldiers demanded that the allowance be issued in kind or in money, which was very burdensome for the civilian population. There were often abuses or regular robberies taking place, under the pretext or when collecting allowance. The soldiers did not always obey the law, allowing them to collect allowance in the Crown lands, and they also reached for the goods of clergy and nobility. The situation could only be appeased by the immediate payment of money - the king promised it, and meanwhile he called for the discipline with his Universal.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> K. Łopatecki, „*Disciplina militaris*” w wojskach Rzeczypospolitej do połowy XVII wieku [“*Disciplina militaris*” in the armies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until the mid-seventeenth century], Białystok, 2012, pp. 383-395.

<sup>53</sup> K. Łopatecki, „*Disciplina militaris*”, pp. 263-268.

<sup>54</sup> The first complaints about soldier's plundering in Courland come from the summer of 1600 - see Krzysztof Radziwiłł to rittmeister Mikołaj Sucharzewski, Birże, 28 July 1600, GStA PK, XX Hauptabteilung Adelsarchiv, No. 986, f. 21. Two years later, the Livonians - the nobility and the inhabitants of Livonia complained about the difficult situation to Jan Zamoyski, Ryga, 9 June 1602, AGAD, Archiwum Zamoyskich [Zamoyski Archive], File 134, pp. 23-24.

<sup>55</sup> S. Herbst, *op. cit.*, pp. 183; A. Filipczak-Kocur, *op. cit.*, pp. 96.

Trouble with the insistent demands of Polish soldiers began in Prussia in the spring of 1601. We have a very interesting letter from Krzysztof Marystern to the starost Henryk von Haller from this period. The starost shuddered at the thought of the release of the allowance demanded by the Poles, so Marystern advised to compromise.<sup>56</sup> It regarded allowance of „owska z włóki po wiertlu filipowskiej miary albo po gr dziesięć, siana z włók dziesięciu wóz jeden albo po złotemu, jałowica dobra z włók trzydziestu albo złotych ośm, gęś z włók dwu jedna albo gr sześć. Kur jeden z włóki albo gr cztery. Masła pół stosa z włók dwu albo po gr ośm, ser z włóki jeden albo po gr trzy, item ze czterech włók beczka piwa albo złoty”.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>56</sup> “[...] jakom przedtym radził, tak i teraz radzę i upominam, żebyś się WM niepotrzebnie nie waśnił z Ich Mościami pany żołnierzami. Jakoż mówiłem z nimi według pisania i prośby WMci i chociaż z nich wyrozumiał, że się byli nie lada jako przeciw WMci obrazili niektórymi postępami WMci, jednak na prośbę i żądanie moje obiecali to Ich Mść mimo się puścić, pod tą kondycją, żebyś WM z nimi do zgody przystąpił. Czym gich WM sobie rychlej dowinkujesz i do wszytkiego przywiedziesz, niżli się przeciw nim niepotrzebnie gotując i koszt niewinny wiodąc. O czym wszytkim oni prawie dobrze wiedząc tym barziej mieli koniecznie wolą pokazać, iż nic zgoła nie dbają na największą gotowość WMci. Racźże mi WM tedy oznajmić wolą i zdanie swoje w tej mierze, nie czekając przyjazdu pana rotmistrzowego, a ja się postaram i pomogę do tego chętnie, iż WM ze wszytkiego będziesz kontent. Tylko by w tym nie trzeba mieszkać i dawać mi znać co rychlej dziś albo jutro. A co się tknie pana rotmistrza samego, to WM potym, kiedy przyjadzie, wolno będzie prosić go w dom swój, albo też tu przyjechać nawiedzić go i poznać się z nim. Lecz teraz jakom rzekł, lepsza tym czasem zgoda i zachowanie dobre z towarzystwem Ich Mść wszytkim” [... as I advised before, so now I advise you and make sure that you do not unnecessarily quarrel with the soldiers. In fact, I spoke with them according to your writing and prayers, and although I have learned from them that they took offence to some of your doings, at my request and demand they have promised to forget about their offence, under this condition, that you come with them into an agreement. That will get them on your side and make them listen more than unnecessarily becoming angry with them and making the innocent bear the cost. Knowing that all, it made them even more willing to show that they have no care for your fierce willingness. Offer me your will and opinion in this matter, without waiting for the arrival of the rittmeister, and I will try and help you willingly, so that you are content with everything. Only do not let this linger and let me know what you have decided quickly today or tomorrow. And regarding the rittmeister himself, you can invite him into your house, or come here to visit and meet him. But now, as I have said, consent is better and good behaviour with the whole company] – Krzysztof Marystern to Henryka von Hallera, Rajgród, 22 May 1601, GStA PK, OsF 810, f. 26a.

<sup>57</sup> “Quarter of oats per volok or ten groszy, one cart of hay per ten volok or one zloty, one good heifer per thirty volok or eight zloty, goose per two volok or six groszy. One

A year later, starost of Olecko, Sebastian von Lehndorf corresponded with rittmeister Marcin Granowski on mutual damage. While the Polish commander complained about the killing of two camp followers (*ciura*) by the Prussians, the starost cited a list of Polish vices, writing that „na każdy dzień płacziwe skargi przychodzą, że poddanym Ks. JMci ciężkie i nieznośne krzywdy od żołnierzy Króla JMci tuteczną ziemią pruską przechodzących się stawają, zwłaszcza niesłychane i niesłuszne stacje, albo raczej drapiestwa i główne zaczęły się zabijania, tyraństwa i okrucieństwa”.<sup>58</sup> After which he clarified, listing the latest vices - shooting one woman in the village of Mieruniszki and killing a “poor man, the Duke’s subject”. His letter ended with the announcement of appeal to the king, but also the execution of justice towards people who were at fault with the Poles.<sup>59</sup>

Prussians actually complained about soldier's vices to the Polish king. Their appeals did not go unnoticed, as both Sigismund III and the Grand Crown Hetman Jan Zamoyski began early to respond to the antics of Polish soldiers. The basic *modus operandi* was the issue of Universals for commanders and soldiers, forbidding the march to Livonia through the territory of Duchy of Prussia.<sup>60</sup> Nevertheless, both the king and the hetman realized that the troops would still go that way, and in this case, they demanded calm behaviour, refraining from plundering and buying food, not extorting it. Let us refer, for example, to the words of the royal Universal: „Wiernie nam mili, rozskarżali się u nas żałobliwie poddani książęcia JMci pruskiego, że wielkie a nieznośne krzywdy i szkody im stały przez żołnierze nasze, tak przechadzające tamtędy przez ziemie i Księstwa Pruskiego, jako i na zad się wracające i tak się rozszerzyła ich swawola, że nie tylko wszelakie potrzebne żywności im swowolnie i gwałtem, nie zapłaciwszy odejmują, ale też i owszem ludzie rozbijają, mordują, gwałty i inne haniebne się postęпки bez karanía zbroją. Co po prawdzie nas wielce obraża, gdyż ta swawola przeciwko Panu Bogu, wolej naszej królewskiej i przystojnym obyczajom żołnierskim się dzieje. A tak Wier[ności] Wasz[e] *serio* napominamy i rozkazujemy z ramienia naszego królewskiego. Naprzód, gdzie by kto na potym ludzi wojska naszego do Inflant wiódł, aby

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chicken per volok or four groszy. Half a stack of butter per two volok or eight groszy, one cheese per volok or three groszy, and one barrel of beer per four volok or one zloty”, *Ibid.*, f. 25v.

<sup>58</sup> “every day teary complaints arrive, that to the subjects of the Duke heavy and unbearable wrongs are being done by the soldiers of King, passing through the Prussian land, especially unheard-of and unjust allowance or rather plunder, and killings, tyranny and cruelty began”.

<sup>59</sup> Sebastian von Lehndorff to Marcin Granowski, Olecko, 17 VIII 1602, GStA PK, OsF 811, f. 344.

<sup>60</sup> Universal of Jan Zamoyski, Antzen Moyza, 18 II 1602, GStA PK, OsF 811, f. 55; Universal of Sigismund III, Wilno, 5 III 1602, *ibid.*, f. 57v.

się starał, ile mógł, żeby przez ziemię i powiatów Księstwa Pruskiego nie szedł, ale tych ziemi jako mogąc minął. A gdzie by inaczej być nie mogło, a trafiło się iść tamtędy przez ziemie pruskie, aby to przez szkody i krzywd wszelakich odprawowali. Porucznicy starsi nad ludzi żołnierskimi, aby ich zahamowali, gwałtu i innych szkód bronili, żywności wszelakie aby za słuszne pieniądze sobie dostawali, rozbijania i mordowania żadnego, także i inne haniebnie okrucieństwa nie dopuścili, ale we wszystkim spokojnie się zachowali i inszych dróg sobie nie najdowali, jedno tych zażywali, które im imieniem księżęcia Jego Mci pruskiego pokazowane będą, pod srogiem karaniem i niełaską naszą królewską”.<sup>61</sup>

Unfortunately, royal and hetman Universals did not much good against the enormous debts of the crown and Lithuanian treasures towards the fighting troops. The taxes passed by the Sejm in 1601 were delayed, and meanwhile the costs of the Livonian War were increasing - also due to the increase in the salary paid to the soldiers. The Commonwealth used loans as aid - with Jan Zamoyski alone providing a loan of 92,608 zlotys only to the Livonian war - and yet the current needs were not kept up. The Livonian army was paid only until January 1603, after which it was supposed to serve for credit. It is not surprising that in this situation the military confederation soon came to live, that is, the rejection of obedience to the command until the debt was paid.<sup>62</sup> It turned out to be also fatal

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<sup>61</sup> “Our loyal dear, the subjects of the Duke of Prussia have complained to us pitifully that horrible wrongs and damages have been done to them by our soldiers crossing the lands of the Duchy of Prussia, and returning through them, and so vast is their lawlessness that not only do they take all needed food by force and with no pay, but also rob, kill, rape and do other disgraceful deeds with no punishment. It is an offence to us as such frolics are against the will of God, against our royal will and are unsuitable manners for soldiers. We are reprimanding you, Our Allegiants and we order you by the will of the Kind. Firstly, those leading out forces to Livonia shall not go through the land of Duchy of Prussia but try to avoid it. Shall that not be possible, and they must cross the Prussian land, they shall cause no wrong or harm. Senior lieutenants shall stop the soldiers from violence and other wrongdoings, have them receive food for honest money, have them not plunder or kill nor do any disgraceful cruelties but to behave calmly and not seek other paths than those shown to them in the name of the Prussian Duke, under threat of severe punishment and our royal disfavour”, Universal of Sigismund III, Wilno, 5 III 1602, GStA PK, OsF 811, f. 57v.

<sup>62</sup> Great Treasurer of the Crown Jan Firlej himself showed a deficit of more than 200,000 zlotys at Sejm of 1603. See A. Filipczak-Kocur, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-102. For the establishment of the Confederation of the Livonian Army, see M. Ciara, *Konfederacje wojskowe w Polsce w latach 1590-1610* [Military Confederations in Poland in the years 1590-1610], “Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości” [“Studies and Materials for the History of Militarism”], 1989, vol. 31, pp. 70-72.

for Duchy of Prussia. Starting from 1603, they will become not only the object of interest of the king and Polish and Lithuanian dignitaries as a country that can support Polish actions against the Swedes.<sup>63</sup> Prussia will also be affected by the increased wave of extortions from unpaid Polish troops.<sup>64</sup> This, however, in the face of radically changed circumstances, requires a separate study.

### CONCLUSION

Summing up the first period of Polish-Prussian cooperation in the era of the Livonian War before the confederation of Polish-Lithuanian troops, we can assume that both sides were able to communicate on the most critical issues. Duchy of Prussia did not refuse the Commonwealth the requested military aid, but it also turned out to be a valuable area for war purchases. The contacts of the local authorities with the Polish army demanding sustenance brought about the first misunderstandings and conflicts. There were acts of violence on both sides, although there was also peaceful cooperation. The relatively mild course of difficult military relations with the civilian population had several reasons. We can point out the very fact of the initial stage of the war, which has not yet taken its toll on the Prussians and made them more inclined to satisfy Polish demands. On the other hand, the soldiers' doings were so far suppressed by the command and did not take on gigantic proportions. As we noted above, the confederation of the army and the prolongation of war will fundamentally change the picture of things. Polish soldiers will become more insistent, while the Prussians will be increasingly tired and irritated by constant demands. It will result in a series of conflicts and plunders that nobody has dreamed of at the beginning of the Livonian War.

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<sup>63</sup> Numerous correspondence proves this. See, among others, Sigismund III to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Kraków 13 III 1603, GStA PK, OsF 812, f. 30; also, he to them, Kraków 3 December 1603, *ibid.*, f. 502; Lithuanian lords (among others, Benedykt Woyna Bishop of Vilnius, Lew Sapieha Lithuanian Grand Chancellor) to Prussian Supreme Counsellors, Wilno, 28 May 1604, GStA PK, OsF 813, f. 148 and Prussian Supreme Counsellors to Benedykt Woyna and Lithuanian lords, no place of issue [Królewiec], 9/19 July 1604, *ibid.*, f. 150-151v (concept).

<sup>64</sup> Its beginning is already signaled by the Universal of King Sigismund III, Krakow, 10 March 1603, GStA PK, OsF 812, f. 77v.