

ACCESSION OF PART OF EASTERN GALICIA TO ROMANIA IN 1919: MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

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Abstract: *The article deals with the military and political aspects of the accession of part of Eastern Galicia to Romania in 1919. The diplomatic and military plans of Romania, Poland, and the Entente for the capture of south-eastern Galicia are described; the course of the offensive Operation Pokutia led by the Romanian troops at the end of May 1919 shows the causes of the defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces; the peculiarities of the establishment of Romanian power in the region are revealed, and the uneasy relations between the Romanian and Polish military administrations concerning the seized lands were traced in June – August 1919.*

Keywords: *Eastern Galicia, Entente, Romania, Bukovina, military operation "Pokutia", Romanian military administration.*

Rezumat: *Aderarea unei părți din estul Galiției la România în 1919: aspecte militaro-politice. Articolul analizează aspectele militare și politice generate de ocuparea unei părți din estul Galiției de către trupele române în anul 1919. Articolul prezintă succint planurile diplomatice și militare ale României, Poloniei și Antantei privind ocuparea părții de sud-est a Galiției de către trupele române. Cursul operațiunii ofensive "Pocuția", condusă de trupele române la sfârșitul lunii mai 1919, indică motivele înfrângerii forțelor armate ucrainene. Autorii relevă particularitățile instituirii controlului autorităților române asupra regiunii, precum și tensiunile apărute în lunile iunie – august 1919 între administrațiile militare română și poloneză cu privire la ținuturile ocupate.*

INTRODUCTION

The burden of the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919 fell on the shoulders of the young state of the West Ukrainian People's Republic (West region of the

Ukrainian People's Republic). The Western Ukrainians' situation worsened in the spring of 1919 when radical changes in the deployment of forces took place on the Ukrainian-Polish front. From France, an 80,000 soldiers' Army of General J. Haller arrived, made up of Polish prisoners of war, former Austrian soldiers and officers. At the end of the spring of 1919, the Romanian troops' intervention on the south-eastern borders of Galicia and the occupation of Pokutia and Galicia Hutsul has complicated the situation.

An essential source for exploring this problem is memoirs. Among the works of this nature are the testimonies of eyewitnesses to the events and memories of Volodymyr Bemko¹, Lev-Mykola Burnadz², Ivan Veligorsky³ and others⁴, which covered in detail the first days of the accession of part of Eastern Galicia by the Romanian troops.

Some information was obtained from periodic publications, Central and county authorities and party and political life of West Ukrainian People's Republic and German-speaking newspapers in Bukovina: "Pokutskiy Vistnyk" (Pokutian Bulletin), "Nove Zhyttia" (New Life), "Ukrainskiy Prapor" (Ukrainian Flag), "Czernowitzer Morgenblatt" (Chernivtsi Morning Leaf), "Allgemeine Zeitung Tagblatt" (General daily newspaper). The original value of this corpus of documents lies in the fact that the materials on the causes and the course of the advance of the Romanian troops on the territory of the south-eastern part of East

¹ В. Бемко, *Напад румунів на Покуття 24 травня 1919* [Romanian attack on Pokutia May 24, 1919], in *Коломия й Коломийщина. Збірник споминів і статей про недавнє минуле* [Kolomyia and Kolomiyschyna. A Compendium of Memories and Articles on the Recent Past], Філадельфія, 1988, с. 819-824.

² М. Бурнадз, *На українсько-румунському пограниччю. Спомин* [At the Ukrainian-Romanian border. Memory], in *Відновлення Української Держави 1918 року. Збірник матеріялів із поясненнями та вступним словом зладив Михайло Бажанський* [Restoration of the Ukrainian State in 1918. Collection of Explanatory Notes and Introductory Words by Mikhail Bazhansky], Дітройт, 1979, с. 30-41.

³ І. Велигорський, *З Городенки під Нижнів* [From Gorodenka near Nyzhniv], in *Відновлення Української Держави 1918 року. Збірник матеріялів із поясненнями та вступним словом зладив Михайло Бажанський* [Restoration of the Ukrainian State in 1918. Collection of Explanatory Notes and Introductory Words by Mikhail Bazhansky], Дітройт, 1979, с. 11-14.

⁴ *З днів тривоги на Покутті. Хроніка 23-28 травня 1919 р.* [From the days of Anxiety on Pokutia. Chronicle May 23-28, 1919], in *Відновлення Української Держави 1918 року. Збірник матеріялів із поясненнями та вступним словом зладив Михайло Бажанський* [Restoration of the Ukrainian State in 1918. Collection of Explanatory Notes and Introductory Words by Mikhail Bazhansky], Дітройт, 1979, с. 14-30.

Galicia, and the position of the region after the seizure, were placed here.

A significant source is the archival files of the Central State Archives of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine (fond 2188), which provide information on the economic and political situation of part of Eastern Galicia during the capture of Romanian troops in the fall of 1919, the hostilities and the deployment of army units.

Ukrainian researchers Constantin Kroitor⁵, Volodymyr Kroitor⁶, Mykola Lytvyn⁷, Ivan Monolatii⁸, Oleksandr Novosiolov⁹, and Andrii Korolko¹⁰, Polish historians Henryk Walczak¹¹, Michał Klimecki¹² and Romanians historians Marin

⁵ К. Кройтор, *Проблема Покуття під час польсько-української війни* [The Problem of Attempts During the Polish-Ukrainian War], in *Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність* [Ukraine: cultural heritage, national consciousness, statehood], 2000, Vol. 6, с. 309-310; Idem, *Румунська історіографія про Покуття в часи ЗУНР* [Romanian historiography about Pokutia in the times of ZUNR], in "Ямгорів. Літературно-мистецький і краєзнавчий журнал" [Yamgoriv. Literary and Artistic and Local History Journal], 2000, Vol. 11-12, с. 84-90.

⁶ В. Кройтор, *Проблема Покуття у відносинах між Румунією і ЗУНР* [The Problem of Attempt at Relations between Romania and ZUNR], in "Таличина. Науковий і культурно-просвітній краєзнавчий часопис" [Galicia. Scientific and cultural-educational journal of local lore], 2001, Vol. 5-6, с. 231-235.

⁷ М. Литвин, *Українсько-польська війна 1918-1919* [Ukrainian-Polish War 1918-1919], Львів, 1998, 488 с.

⁸ І. Монолатій, *Коломия в часи Західно-Української Народної Республіки* [Kolomyia in the time of the West Ukrainian People's Republic], Коломия, 2000, 80 с.

⁹ О. Новосолов, *Румунська військова інтервенція на Покутті (травень – червень 1919 р.)* [Romanian military intervention in Pokutia (Mai – June 1919)], in "Карпатський край" [Carpathian region], 2019, No. 1-2 (12-13), с. 44-51.

¹⁰ А. Королько, *Румунська окупація Покуття й Галицької Гуцульщини (травень – серпень 1919 р.): передумови, перебіг, наслідки* [Romanian occupation Pokutia and Galician Gutsulshchyna (May-August 1919): background, course, consequences], in "Науковий часопис Національного педагогічного університету імені М. П. Драгоманова. Серія Історичні науки" [Scientific journal of National Pedagogical Dragomanov University. Historical sciences], 2016, Vol. 14, с. 195-210.

¹¹ H. Walczak, *Józef Piłsudski wobec sojuszu Polski z Rumunią w okresie międzywojennym* [Józef Piłsudsky on the Union of Poland with Romania in the interwar period], in "Przegląd Zachodniopomorski" [West Pomeranian Review], 2018, No. 3, p. 109-136.

¹² M. Klimecki, *Polsko-ukraińska wojna o wschodnią Galicję 1918-1919 r. Polskie spojrzenie* [Polish-Ukrainian war for eastern Galicia 1918-1919. Polish View], in "Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність" [Ukraine: cultural heritage, national consciousness, statehood], 2009, No. 18, с. 373-384.

Stănescu¹³, Ion Giurcă¹⁴, Alexandrina Cuțui¹⁵, Dumitru Preda, Vasile Alexandrescu, Costică Prodan¹⁶, Dumitru Seserman¹⁷, Valeriu Avram, Lucian Drăghici, Gabriel-George Pătrașcu, and Ion Rîșnoveanu¹⁸ were deeply engaged in studying this problem.

THE PROBLEM FORMULATION

The article is devoted to the examination of the political-military aspects of the Eastern Galicia part accession to Romania in 1919. The diplomatic and military plans of Romania, Poland, and the Entente for the capture of south-eastern Galicia are described as well as the course of the offensive Operation Pokutia, conducted by the Romanian troops in late May 1919. It also shows the causes of the defeat of the Ukrainian armed forces and the peculiarities of the establishment of the Romanian power in the region. The complex relations between the Romanian and Polish military administrations concerning the seized lands, which were traced in June – August 1919, are also revealed.

Romania's annexation of eastern Galicia, as well as Poland, Romania and the Entente, was the result of diplomatic relations between the Polish and Romanian military authorities.¹⁹ Researcher Mykola Lytvyn believes that Romania's aggressiveness towards Ukrainians was advantageous to Poland's military

¹³ M. Stănescu, *Operația Pocuția. Mai-august 1919* [Operation Pokutia. Mai – August 1919], in “Magazin istoric”, 1995, No. 1, Ianuarie, p. 10-14.

¹⁴ I. Giurcă, *Trei luni în Pocuția: acțiuni ale Diviziei 8 Infanterie (23 mai – 24 august 1919)* [Three months of staying on the Pokutia: acts of the 8th Infantry Division (May 23 – August 24, 1919)], București, 2019; Idem, *Armata Română în Pocuția* [Romanian Army on the Pokutia], in “Străjer în calea furtunilor”, 2019, No. 26, Decembrie, p. 26-34.

¹⁵ A. Cuțui, *Generalul Iacob Zadik și eliberarea Bucovinei de sub dominația habsburgică* [General Jacob Zadik and the liberation of Bukovina from the rule of the Habsburgs], in *Armata română și patrimoniul național*, București, 2010, p. 516-517.

¹⁶ D. Preda, V. Alexandrescu, C. Prodan, *În apărarea României Mari: Campania armatei române din 1918-1919* [In defense of Greater Romania: the march of the Romanian army of 1918-1919], București, 1994.

¹⁷ D. Seserman, *Divizia 8 Infanterie în Pocuția Mai 1919 – August 1919* [8th Infantry Division in Pokutia. Mai-August 1919], in “Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare”, III, 2004, p. 30-41.

¹⁸ V. Avram, L. Drăghici, G.-G. Pătrașcu, I. Rîșnoveanu, *Războiul de Întregire: (1916-1919): comandanți militari români* [War of Integration (1916-1919): Romanian Military Commanders], București, 2016.

¹⁹ H. Walczak, *op. cit.*, p. 109-110.

sphere, as it weakened the southern front of the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919 and diverted many of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic material resources.²⁰ Therefore, at the beginning of 1919, Warsaw established close military-diplomatic relations with Bucharest, where it directed the military mission of General S. Lamezan (Head), Major O. Bork (Military Attaché), and others. A Polish military mission was formed at the command of the Romanian Army in Bukovina. The Poles sought to draw Romania's military potential into joint action against the Ukrainians.

In turn, the Entente feared the export of the Bolshevik revolution to the west, and therefore considered Soviet Russia a destabilizing factor that prevented the post-war international order. In this regard, Ambassador of the Ukrainian People's Republic, K. Matsiievych, noted: "If the Entente surrenders to the Bolsheviks, it means the revival of Greater Russia, the great ruin of Poland and Romania, and the long delay of Ukraine's independence".²¹ The Entente leadership urgently took precautionary measures. At a meeting of the Council of Four on March 27, with the participation of Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd-George and Orlando, Commander-in-Chief of the Union Army Marshal Foch stated forcefully: "To stop the Bolshevism penetration, it is necessary to create a barrier from Poland and Romania, closing the Lemberg Pass (seizing Eastern Galicia. – *ed.*)".²² The leadership of the Entente states suggested that Romanian Prime Minister I. I. C. Brătianu agreed to create a joint Polish-Romanian anti-Bolshevik front. Also, in the complicated turmoil of the Ukrainian-Polish war, Poland sought from Romania to carry out decisive anti-Ukrainian military actions.²³

PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION IN GALICIA

Romanian troops were preparing to capture south-eastern Galicia. On January 13, 1919, General Iacob Zadik ordered the introduction of the state of siege in Kitsman, Zastavna, Vashkivtsi, Storozhinets districts, that is, just in those Bukovinian lands that were directly adjacent to the south-eastern part of Galicia²⁴.

²⁰ М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, с. 368.

²¹ П., *Румунія і Україна. (Інтерв'ю з послом К. Мацієвичом)* [Romania and Ukraine. (Interview with Ambassador K. Matsievich)], in "Україна" [Ukraine], 1920, No. 128, с. 2.

²² М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, с. 369.

²³ *Західно-Українська Народна Республіка, 1918–1923: Ілюстрована історія* [Western Ukrainian People's Republic, 1918-1923: Illustrated History], Львів, Івано-Франківськ, 2008, с. 356.

²⁴ А. Суґуї, *op. cit.*, р. 516–517.

In preparation for military action against the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Romanian government sought repressive measures against those who had moved to Galicia after joining Bukovina. During the second half of April – early May 1919, at the direction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were orders issued under no. 291 to all the posts, for each gendarme, in particular, to prepare lists of persons "...who participated in the political life of the region and... especially those who left for Ukraine, to determine if they joined the troops there, doing what they do ...".²⁵

More than a month before the start of the offensive in the south-eastern part of Galicia, the Romanian military administration carried out mobilization activities at the border with the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic. In a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Galician Army dated April 27, 1919, the Ukrainian intelligence officer informed that on April 12-13, 1919, Romanian military units were on full alert on the right bank of the Dniester river and carefully made sure that no one appeared on the river bank. Previously, a similar situation could be observed on April 7, 1919, near the village of Ozeriany.²⁶ And on April 30, 1919, a telegram-phonogram with the following information was received from the District Military Command of Kolomyia to the Ukrainian Galician Army's Primary Command in Khodoriv: "On Tuesday, April 29, a message came from Bukovina that a new Romanian division had arrived in the Nepolokivtsi – Barbivtsi area. One hundred new planes have arrived in the outskirts of Vyzhnytschyna in Polish circles in Bukovina. It is believed that Romanians will advance all the way to Halych, where Poles from Lviv should meet".²⁷

²⁵ А. Королько, *op. cit.*, с. 198.

²⁶ Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України (ЦДАВО України) [The Central State Archives of Supreme Authorities And Governments Of Ukraine], ф. 2188 Начальна команда Галицької Армія Західної області УНР (м. Чортків, 1919–1920, 1924), оп. 1, спр. 42 *Оперативні зведення військових груп про хід воєнних дій та послаблення дисципліни і відомості про бойовий, продовольчий стан I корпусу Галицької армії. 27 квітня 1919 р. – 29 квітня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups on the course of hostilities and the weakening of discipline and information on the fighting, food condition and corps of the Galician Army. April 27, 1919 – April 29, 1919], арк. 40.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, спр. 43 *Оперативні зведення військових груп про хід воєнних дій та відомості про бойовий та продовольчий стан II корпусу Галицької армії. 30 квітня 1919 р. – 3 травня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups on the course of hostilities and the weakening of discipline and information on the fighting, food condition and II corps of the Galician Army. April 30, 1919 – May 3, 1919], арк. 52.

The Romanian prefects of the counties, which were directly adjacent to the territory of Eastern Galicia, were obliged to provide weekly written information on the condition and mood of the local population.²⁸ The Ukrainian newspaper "Pokutskiy Vistnyk" reported about the arrival in Kolomyia of transport of Bukovinian Ukrainians who, with the establishment of Romanian authorities in Bukovina, were forced to move to the territory of Eastern Galicia: "On Sunday, May 11, transport of Bukovina expatriates, made up of 52 wagons with 500 people, arrived in Kolomyia. From these brothers of ours, driven out of their native land by a Romanian rider, we learn how our Bukovinian brothers live in captivity. From this, we see what would happen to us if an enemy came to us. Many Ukrainian National Teachers were dismissed, and Romanians who did not speak our language were sent to their place ...".²⁹

The government of the Western Region of the Ukrainian People's Republic tried to insure itself against Romania's possible aggression through diplomatic channels. The State Secretariat has decided not to mobilize "for the purpose of speaking out against Romania ... with the desire of the same pledges from Romania".³⁰ But the anxiety of the Ukrainian authorities increased, as during the late winter – early spring of 1919 there was a concentration of Romanian troops at the border with Eastern Galicia, in particular in Pokutia. An attempt was made to reach an agreement through negotiations about the boundaries with the Romanian General Iacob Zadik. The following decision was made: "Ukrainian envoys should go to Bucharest and negotiate with the Romanian government for the purpose of managing temporary relations between the Ukrainian and Romanian states...".³¹

With the consent of the Entente, the Romanian government ordered the General Staff to develop a plan for a military operation to capture the land. Following his approval under the code name "Pokutia", King Ferdinand personally inspected the troops. According to the plan of the military operation, the Romanian Army had to cross the Galicia-Bukovina border and occupy the territory of Eastern Galicia between the Carpathians and the Dniester River, along the Nadvirna – Otinia – Nezvysko line. The Chief of the Romanian General Staff,

²⁸ В. Кройтор, *Проблема Покуття у відносинах між Румунією і ЗУНР...*, с. 232–233.

²⁹ *Життя Покуття. Буковинські гаразди* [The life of Pokutia. Bukovina affairs], in "Покутський вістник" [Pokutian Bulletin], 1919, No. 41, с. 1.

³⁰ В. Кройтор, *op. cit.*, с. 231.

³¹ *Засідання Ради Держ. Секретарів* [Meeting of the Council of State Secretaries], in "Нове життя" [New Life], 1919, No. 59, с. 2.

General Constantin Prezan, commanded the 8th Division that "... Romania is directly interested in controlling the Chernivtsi – Kolomyia – Horodenka, Kolomyia – Rakhiv – Sighet rail link between Bukovina and Transylvania ...".³² He demanded that Romanian troops avoid conflicts with the Army of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, arguing "Romania seeks to maintain friendly relations with its neighbours".³³

To carry out the operation, Romanian troops were divided into three groups. The first, central group, according to the plan of action, was to lead the offensive in the direction of Nepolokivtsi – Snyatyn – Kolomyia. The northern group attacked in the course of Kyseliv – Gorodenka – Nezvisko. The southern group, following the disposition of the command, was tasked with leading the offensive in the direction of Vashkivtsi – Zaluchchia – Vyzhnytsya – Kutu – Kosiv.³⁴

On May 13, 1919, the Polish attaché reported to the General Staff that Ukrainians had small forces on the Romanian border: about 1,000 bayonets, 4 double-barrelled guns and eight guns. Besides, in the catchment area in Zalizchychy districts – 1 000, in Snyatyn and Kolomyia – 500, in Stanislav – 2 000 bayonets, as well as 30 – 300 in the counties; together there were no more than 3 000 bayonets. The note specified that the 8th Romanian infantry division of General J. Zadik has three regiments (2 thousand knives) on the Bukovina front and a cavalry and a cannon (16 guns) regiment. In other areas, Romania has the 4th, the 9th and the 10th Infantry, and the 1st Cavalry Division.³⁵ On May 22, 1919, Bucharest informed the Polish General Staff that in the morning of the next day, the 8th Infantry Division would start its offensive and should reach the line Nadvirna – Otnia – Gorodenka in the first stage of the operation, as well as seize undamaged bridges on the Dniester river in Zalizchychy and the village Nizhniv.³⁶

On the eve of the advance of the Romanian troops, the Ukrainian border crossing the Sniatyn county regularly reported to the District Military Team of the city of Kolomyia about the revival on the opposite side of the border. On Saturday, May 3, 1919, a Romanian military reconnaissance aircraft spread leaflets printed in Polish, German and Ukrainian over Kolomyia that intimidated the population with the rapid arrival of the Bolsheviks "... if we would allow the development of

³² Покуття. Історико-етнографічний нарис [Pokutia. Historical and ethnographic sketch], Львів, 2010, с. 165.

³³ M. Stănescu, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

³⁴ Західно-Українська Народна Республіка, 1918–1923..., с. 357.

³⁵ М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, с. 370.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

Bolshevism in our country".³⁷ Five days before the onset of Romanian troops in the south-eastern part of Galicia, the Ukrainian border guard in Sniatyn informed about the mobilization of the Romanian forces – many cavalries appeared instead of border guards, and there was also a department of Polish lancers.³⁸

ROMANIAN ARMY IN POCUTIA

On May 22, 1919, in preparation for an armed speech against the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the Romanian General Staff demanded in an ultimatum form that the Kolomyia district military command liberate the territory from the Bukovina border to the Stanislav – Kolomyia railway line: "Forced by the need to establish a connection between the Bukovina and North Transylvanian fronts and given the fact that this connection can only be established through the control of the Kolomyia – Marmarosh-Siget railway line, our occupation forces in Bukovina received orders on the morning of the 24th of this month to move forward and take the railway line. At the same time, the high command of the Romanian Army has issued an instruction that in carrying out this purely military task, we will avoid confrontations with your troops".³⁹ Also, under the disguise of combating the Hungarian Communist regime, the Romanian government demanded that the Ukrainian railways be transferred to the Romanian Army within 24 hours (according to other sources – 12 hours⁴⁰) and transfer the railroad to the Romanian troops: "... to eliminate the Ukrainian troops from the railways (Sniatyn, Kolomyia, Khriplin, Deliatin, Yasinia) and the districts lying along these paths, as Romanian strategic plans against the Magyars require. The desire is justified by the Romanian commandant by order of his authorities with the consent of the Entente".⁴¹ On May 30, 1919, the State Secretary of Military Affairs of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Colonel Viktor Kurmanovich noted that in these actions of the Romanian troops "we did not see ... any hostile intentions against us, and to avoid military strips with the Romanian

³⁷ *Життя Покуття. Румунські звідомлення* [The life of Pokutia. Romanian Announcements], in "Покутський вістник" [Pokutian Bulletin], 1919, No. 38, c. 4.

³⁸ В. Бемко, *op. cit.*, c. 821; М. Бурнадз, *op. cit.*, c. 33.

³⁹ О. Добржанський, В. Старик, *Змагання за українську державність на Буковині (1914–1921). Документи і матеріали* [Competition for Ukrainian statehood in Bukovina (1914–1921). Documents and materials], Чернівці, 2009, c. 411.

⁴⁰ *З румунської окупації* [From the Romanian occupation], in "Український прапор" [Ukrainian Flag], 1919, 8 серпня.

⁴¹ *З днів тривоги на Покуттію...*, c. 14; М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, c. 370.

units, we removed our units from that line". Moreover, after the capture of the railway branch on May 24, 1919, the Romanians assured the military command of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic that they "had no intention of moving any further ...".⁴²

Contemporaries of the current events testify to the unwillingness of the Ukrainian military formations to stop the Romanian troops at the border, focusing on organizing the resistance to the Poles at the front in the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919: "From the beginning, all the attention of the District Military Team in Kolomyia was directed to organizing marching companies or hundreds for the Lviv front, thereby neglecting part of the Romanians' security".⁴³ Lieutenant Mykola Burnadz, who led the third hundred border guards in Sniatyn, reported that Ukrainian border guards were unprepared, Romanian border guards on the Bukovina side of Prut and Cheremosh were twice or three times more.⁴⁴

Contemporaries considered the unlawful military dictatorship of Teodor Primak, the head of the District Military Team in Kolomyia, as another reason for the lack of organization on the eve of the advance of the Romanian troops.⁴⁵ There was no shared position on the part of the local Ukrainian military command after Romanian troops were reported offensive. Discussions regarding the deployment of military units were different from the talks at the District Military Team meeting in Kolomyia. Some considered the immediate general mobilization of soldiers at the Ukrainian-Romanian border. Others, on the contrary, expressed their unwillingness to meet the enemy: "There are just over two companies on the entire Romanian front from Horodenka to Zhabogo (now the district centre of Verkhovyna, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Ukraine – *ed.*). In the trenches themselves recruits ...". Some advised to withdraw all the troops and go to the mountains where the Hutsuls should help, which others said: "We will starve there in a week because the Hutsuls are starving and dying themselves".⁴⁶ It was also challenging to choose the right step because the State Secretariat of Military Affairs of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic did not make appropriate

⁴² ЦДАВО України, ф. 2188, оп. 1, спр. 50 *Оперативні зведення військових груп та розпорядження Начальної Команди Галицької армії про план і хід воєнних дій та розташування військ. 29 травня 1919 р. – 1 червня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups and order of the Galicia Army Main Command on the plan and course of hostilities and deployment of troops. May 29, 1919 – June 1, 1919], арк. 62.

⁴³ В. Бемко, *op. cit.*, с. 819.

⁴⁴ М. Бурнадз, *op. cit.*, с. 32.

⁴⁵ *З румунської окупації...*

⁴⁶ *3 днів тривоги на Покуттю...*, с. 15.

diplomatic or military-strategic decisions to solve the problem. The district military team agreed that the evacuation unit should be a village: Nyzhniv over the Dniester River (now the town of Tlumach district, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Ukraine). However, the military chaos could not be stopped: "From the Artillery Basket, two guns are almost out of service. It was hard to reach Nyzhniv. ... The Romanians ended up with a sapper warehouse with a lot of materials, a gunpowder warehouse, several other shops and warehouses, even grocery stores, because even in their dreams they could not have removed them, when the sergeants and shooters left them early, picking up their carts and horses".⁴⁷

On May 24 1919, Romanian troops invaded eastern Galicia. The State Secretariat ordered the UGA (Ukrainian Galician Army) soldiers in Kolomyia not to resist and to start the evacuation. Romanian troops moved smoothly through the territory of the region and did not meet serious resistance. Only in Kolomyia and several villages between the invaders and the UGA there were minor clashes⁴⁸. The fate of the Snyatyn Cossacks dwelling at the border guard, which was the first to meet the enemy offensive, was extremely unfortunate. Instead of resisting his troops, on May 24, 1919, the centurion Nebylovets joined the mission of the State Secretariat of Defense, led by Stepan Vitwitsky, in talks with the leadership of the Romanian troops. That is why three hundred firearms were in the hands of the enemy. Only part of the warriors, led by Commander M. Burnadz, were able to escape from the enemy's grip and retreat to Kolomyia.

On the other hand, the detachment of military recruits of Lieutenant Golota, stationed in Zabolotiv (now Zabolotiv village of Snyatyn district, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Ukraine), was extremely coordinated. Going to Kolomyia, and then to Stanislav, this detachment was able to stop the looting of ammunition, weapons of Polish prisoners. They successfully broke through to the village. The Cossack dwelling of Gorodenka military outpost under the leadership of sotnik Svitlik and *Bukovynska sotnia* was successfully destroyed in the town Nizhniv.⁴⁹ Lieutenant Volodymyr Bemko commanded the military units in the village Nizhnev of Tovmach district.

News of an attack by Romanian troops caused panic among the population of Kolomyia, and Ukrainian military units were ordered to evacuate combat units and state property. The first to leave the city were the marching groups of the Kolomyia regiments, consisting of 15 officers and 295 shooters. Lieutenants

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, c. 16–17.

⁴⁸ О. Новосьолов, *op. cit.*, c. 46.

⁴⁹ *3 днів тривоги на Покуття...*, c. 19.

Maxim Mykytyuk and Kardash coordinated the assignment.⁵⁰

The telegram, signed by the Secretary of State for Military Affairs of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Colonel Viktor Kurmanovich, dated May 26, 1919, indicated that Romanians had occupied Gorodenka and Kolomyia, and that the "Polish gangs" dominated the village Khotymyr of the Tovmach district.⁵¹ Although another official statement, signed by V. Kurmanovich, prepared on the night of May 26-27, 1919, indicated that on May 26, Romanian troops crossed the border near Sniatyn "without any hostile intentions" and moved further to Kolomyia and Gorodenka. The Romanian military command said, "they will not go beyond that line". According to V. Kurmanovich, the conduct of such a raid by enemy troops is conditioned by an attempt to ally with the Marmarosh-Siget Romanian task force. The Secretary of State for Military Affairs of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic assured that Ukrainian soldiers controlled all crossings on the Dniester River in the Carpathian region.⁵²

By the end of May 1919, the Romanian troops practically occupied the entire territory of south-eastern Galicia (Pokutia and Galicia Hutsul). The Romanian periodical considered not be a hostile act the seizure of these territories. Still, a means to establish a rail link between Bukovina and Körösmező (now the village of Yasinia, Rakhiv district, Transcarpathian region, Ukraine), where Romanian troops should stop. Accordingly, a proclamation was prepared, which was scattered from aeroplanes in and around Kolomyia. The leaflet stated that the Romanian Army did not join Eastern Galicia to wage war with the Ukrainian Army or the local population. "Therefore, we request, as stated in the proclamation, that all soldiers and civilians from our occupied territory voluntarily surrender all weapons, ammunition and other military materials and continue to carry out their daily activities".⁵³ The occupying power guaranteed respect for the lives and property of all residents who would not commit acts of hostility; According to the old regional laws, the Romanian authorities will continue to be supervised by local

⁵⁰ В. Бемко, *op. cit.*, с. 822.

⁵¹ ЦДАВО України, ф. 2188, оп. 1, спр. 49 *Оперативні зведення військових груп та розпорядження Начальної Команди Галицької армії про план і хід воєнних дій і розташування військ. 20 травня 1919 р. – 22 травня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups and orders of the Galician Army Initial Command on the plan and course of hostilities and deployment of troops. May 29, 1919 - June 1, 1919], арк. 167.

⁵² *Ibid.*, арк. 195.

⁵³ А. Королько, *op. cit.*, с. 202.

government officials under the authority/command of the Romanian Army.⁵⁴ The German-language newspaper "Allgemeine Zeitung Tagblatt" quoted a message from the "Vestea" newspaper saying that the real purpose of the occupation by the Romanian troops of Pokutia was to assist Poland in the war against the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic: "... This resulted in a long-awaited deployment of the Polish troops near Stanislaviv, not near Kolomyia. Thanks to the occupation of Pokutia, the connection between Bukovina and northern Marmorosh has been achieved, which is necessary for our future protection ...".⁵⁵

The real threat of an attack on the south-eastern borders of the Western Ukrainian state came as a surprise to the leadership of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic and put it in a critical position. Even before the Romanian occupation of part of Eastern Galicia, at the State Secretariat meeting on May 21, 1919, various proposals were made to overcome the demanding military and political situation. In particular, S. Vitwitsky offered to capitulate to Romania, which "stands on the shoulders of the Entente", E. Petrushevich and K. Levitsky hoped to form a federation with Czechoslovakia, others – "to give orders to the local authorities to remain in place and to stand by".⁵⁶ Instead, the Ukrainian authorities of the Ukrainian People's Republic disagreed with the military move towards the Romanian occupation of south-eastern Galicia. This is evidenced by a protest note of the Ukrainian People's Republic Extraordinary Ambassador to Romania, Yuri Gasenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, prepared on May 28, 1919.⁵⁷

To manage the occupied lands, a territorial Committee of Pokutia was set up by the Romanian authorities. Having conquered the south-eastern part of Galicia, Romanian troops joined forces in northern Transylvania. General Staff appointed J. Zadik as the commanding officer of a group of troops located in Bukovina, south-eastern Galicia (Pokutia) and north Bessarabia. After some time, on June 5, 1919, the headquarters of the 8th Division was relocated from Kolomyia to Chernivtsi.⁵⁸

On May 28 1919, after the meeting of the commander of the 8th Romanian

⁵⁴ "Czernowitzer Morgenblatt", 1919, 27 Mai; О. Добржанський, В. Старик, *op. cit.*, с. 413-414.

⁵⁵ "Allgemeine Zeitung Tagblatt", 1919, 4 Juni; О. Добржанський, В. Старик, *op. cit.*, с. 414.

⁵⁶ *Західно-Українська Народна Республіка, 1918–1923...*, с. 357-358.

⁵⁷ О. Карпенко, К. Мицан (упоряд.), *Західно-Українська Народна Республіка 1918–1923. Документи і матеріали: у 5-х томах* [West Ukrainian People's Republic 1918–1923. Documents and Materials: in 5 volumes], Івано-Франківськ, 2009, Vol. 5 (1) *Зовнішня політика і міжнародне становище. 1918–1919 рр.* [Foreign Policy and International Situation. 1918–1919], с. 491-492.

⁵⁸ V. Avram, L. Drăghici, G.-G. Pătrașcu, I. Rîșnoveanu, *op. cit.*, p. 220-221.

Division, General J. Zadik, with the Polish General Kralicek, the establishment of a joint military command in Kolomyia and a civilian administration was decided. At the end of May 1919, the Polish leadership sent troops to the territory of south-eastern Galicia. The districts were led by military commanders, who reported to the Territorial Committee. The Dniester River was divided into sectors. The order of retreat of the Romanian Army from Pokutia was also discussed.⁵⁹

Konstantin Kroitor claimed that the Romanian authorities tried to curb the illegal actions of the Poles. They in the course of the retreat of military units in Pokutia tried to take over local authorities and dismiss the administrative posts of Ukrainians. In response to the Romanian army leadership, Poles were appointed prefects in three counties of Pokutia and Galicia Hutsul region, and their deputies were Ukrainians. In the other three counties, the appointed prefects were Ukrainians and their deputies were Poles.⁶⁰ In particular, the head of the Ukrainian counties in Pechenizhyn was Genik, in Gorodenka – G. Martynets, in Kosovo – A. Lepky.⁶¹

The spheres of action of the Polish and Romanian soldiers were created. For example, when on May 31, 1919, a Polish commander requested Romanian general J. Zadik to be allowed to stay in Nadvirna, he was refused. The reason was that Polish troops were widespread in fear and panic, killing civilians, and Ukrainians asked the Romanian military "to protect the Ukrainian administration and its servicemen in Pokutia and part of the territory northeast of the Dniester". Due to the "... inexcusable behaviour of officers and lower ranks..." of the Polish Army, the local population asked the Romanian soldiers to protect the Ukrainian administration and its servants not only in Pokutia but also in part of the territory northeast of the Dniester River.⁶² An unknown contributor to the "Ukrainian Flag" reported that Zheligovsky's military brigade, assembled from the Polish army units of the A. Denikin Volunteer Army, carried out shameful robberies of the local population: "from the Bukovina border to the Romanian-Polish border, not a single border or one small town has been fortunate enough not to be robbed by the sons of "noble" people."⁶³ The author initially summarized "But this is nothing compared to the fact that there is no threat to the life of Ukrainians under Romanians. In the unhappiness Romanians

⁵⁹ К. Кройтор, *Проблема Покуття під час польсько-української війни...*, с. 309.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, с. 309.

⁶¹ "Український прапор" [Ukrainian flag], 1919, 15 серпня.

⁶² К. Кройтор, *op. cit.*, с. 310.

⁶³ "Український прапор" [Ukrainian flag], 1919, 15 серпня.

have brought to the Ukrainians, hitting them in the back, it is fortunate that Ukrainian citizenship did not suffer the hell that the Poles suffered from Poles in Sambir, Stryi, Stanislaviv, etc."⁶⁴

In turn, the Poles were dissatisfied with the Romanian military administration-of the occupied territory. In a memorandum dated June 27, 1919, addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Polish Liaison Officer Lieutenant Horodinsky indicated that the Romanian authorities were treating the Polish population of south-eastern Galicia in the worst possible way. In particular, the commander of Kolomyia, Captain Mironescu, calls Polish soldiers bandits. Romanian officials are scared of the Ukrainians, so they are friends enrolled in the gendarmerie service. Poles are removed from office, Polish-language schools are closed. Pokutia is now a gathering place for demolished Ukrainian military units, which is dangerous for the Poles.⁶⁵

On the deployment of Romanian troops in the Horodenkovschyna and in the border villages of Bukovina in late May-early June 1919, we learn from the operational intelligence of the UGA Primary Command from June 10 and 14, 1919. Thus, at the end of May 1919, the Romanian artillery moved from Gorodenka and was stationed on the line of the village Korniv – village Semenivka. Small Romanian detachments were in the village Isakiv.⁶⁶ At the beginning of June, one hundred enemy troops and 15 "riders" were stationed in Gorodenka, 20 Romanians in the town of Potochyshche, 30 Romanians in the village of Semenivka and two high-speed cartridges, and 10 Romanians in the community Babin (now the village of Zastavna district of Chernivtsi region, Ukraine).⁶⁷ The village Semakivtsi of Horodenka district had a Romanian military headquarters.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ О. Карпенко, К. Мицан (упоряд.), *Західно-Українська Народна Республіка 1918–1923. Документи і матеріали: у 5-х томах* [West Ukrainian People's Republic 1918–1923. Documents and Materials: in 5 volumes], Івано-Франківськ, 2005, Vol. 3 (1), с. 126–128.

⁶⁶ ЦДАВО України, ф. 2188, оп. 1, спр. 50 *Оперативні зведення військових груп та розпорядження Начальної Команди Галицької армії про план і хід воєнних дій та розташування військ. 29 травня 1919 р. – 1 червня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups and orders of the Galician Army Initial Command on the plan and course of hostilities and deployment of troops. May 29, 1919 – June 1, 1919], арк. 73.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, спр. 51 *Оперативні зведення військових груп та розпорядження Начальної Команди Галицької армії про план і хід воєнних дій і розташування військ. 3 червня 1919 р. – 12 червня 1919 р.* [Operational reports of military groups and orders of the Galician Army Initial Command on the plan and course of hostilities and deployment of troops. June 3, 1919 – June 12, 1919], арк. 155.

In addition to the ground forces, this village contained boats, pontoons and artillery. On June 14, 1919, many troops arrived from Gorodenka town from the west, sending separate units and special ammunition to Kitsman town.⁶⁸ It was also noted that the Poles from the occupied Roman settlements of the Carpathian region moved to Chernivtsi to "join the Polish army there".⁶⁹

The Romanian authorities have put into circulation their currency – lei, cancelling the obligatory exchange rate of the Ukrainian hryvnia. This led to the difficult financial situation of the population of the region: local exchanged hryvnia to Romanian lei at an unfavourable exchange rate (the monetary value of the hryvnia decreased by 35-50%)⁷⁰. The Romanian military requisitioned all the property after the retreat of the Ukrainian Galician Army troops (weapons depots, ammunition, food, railway trains), special commissions were set up in Kolomyia, Otyniia and Chernivtsi, to record and assess all fires. However, most of the food was distributed to the local population, and the rest was bought and exported to Romania. This is evidenced by a telegram from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a representative in Bucharest on June 18, 1919, on the situation of the Ukrainian lands of Eastern Galicia annexed by Romania. It stated that the Romanian authorities could not suspend the Bolshevik and anti-Polish actions of the local population there, including the speeches in Pechenezhin and Kosiv. According to the Polish military attaché, Romanians are requisitioning military and agricultural vehicles and which are transported to Bukovina without registration. This was not in line with the intentions of the Polish-Romanian cooperation.⁷¹

At the time, the Ukrainian newspaper periodical critically described the arrival of the Romanian military administration in Eastern Galicia. An unknown correspondent for the "Volia" magazine of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party noted that the local Ukrainian population met with distrust and feared the arrival of the Romanian troops. Residents of the region have always suffered from thefts and requisitions by Romanian soldiers. In general, it was difficult to communicate with the Romanians, because few of them knew Ukrainian or any other Slavic language. Particularly annoying on the Romanian side was the "requisition" of horses from local peasants.⁷²

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, спр. 52, арк. 68.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, спр. 51, арк. 155.

⁷⁰ "Український прапор" [Ukrainian flag], 1919, 15 серпня.

⁷¹ О. Карпенко, К. Мицан (упоряд.), *op. cit.*, Vol. 3 (1), с. 121-122.

⁷² *Вісти з Покуття* [News from Pokutia], in "Воля. Орган української соціал-

During the Romanian occupation, the situation of the inhabitants of the mountain and foothills of the Carpathians worsened. An unknown contributor to "Volia" magazine complained: "The oldest people do not remember such a famine now in the mountains, nettles sprinkled with bagels or cereals made from decayed corn; this is the only food of the inhabitants of our mountains". Therefore, before the harvest, many Carpathian Hutsuls travelled to Bukovina to earn at least something to support their families in the winter.⁷³

The Romanian authorities saw no difference in their attitude towards the Poles and the Ukrainians, thus "cooling the enthusiasm and joy with which many Poles met the arrival of the Romanian liberators". The Romanian military administration has stopped publishing Ukrainian and Polish-language newspapers in Kolomyia. Only Chernivtsi German-language magazines were allowed to be distributed.⁷⁴

The views of contemporary Ukrainian historians are divided on whether to consider the Romanian occupation system should be regarded as cruel to the Ukrainians. Mykola Lytvyn believes that on the territory of the south-eastern part of Galicia, the Romanian authorities established a brutal regime, forbidding meetings and the carrying of weapons, restricting the movement of citizens, and censoring the press. An "educative" role was assigned to the Army, which allowed requisition and cruel punishment.⁷⁵ Instead, Constantine Kroitor argued that the Romanian administration had restored the railway movement, stimulated reopening of trade, ensured the normal functioning of medical institutions, facilitated the resumption of production by cancelling customs duties, and secured a loan from Romanian banks. Thanks to the political and administrative measures taken and their general actions, the Romanian Army maintained stability in the south-eastern part of Galicia for three months.⁷⁶

After the Polish troops launched an offensive against the ZUNR army on July 3, 1919, the Romanian command reviewed the deployment of soldiers in northern Bessarabia, Bukovina and Pokutia and during August 17-25, 1919, evacuated Romanian troops from Pokutia and Halytsia Hutsulia. On the basis of a preliminary agreement, a military border was established from the village

демократичної партії" [Will. Body of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party], 1919, no. 8, c. 2.

⁷³ Ibid, c. 2.

⁷⁴ Ibid, c. 2.

⁷⁵ М. Литвин, *op. cit.*, c. 370–371.

⁷⁶ К. Кройтор, *Румунська історіографія про Покуття в часи ЗУНР...*, c. 87.

Babin on the Dniester River (now the town of Sredny Babin in the Kaluga district of Ivano-Frankivsk region) to the Yablunytsya town on the White Cheremosh River (now, Yablunytsya village of Verkhovyna district, Ivano-Frankivsk region, Ukraine).⁷⁷ The territory of the south-eastern part of Galicia was in the hands of Poland.

CONCLUSIONS

Romania's accession to Eastern Galicia was in line with the Entente's plans to curb Bolshevism, and Poland was comfortable at the final stage of the Polish-Ukrainian war, as it diverted many military and material resources from the Western Front of the Ukrainian People's Republic to the southern front. Capturing the south-eastern part of Galicia was reasonably straightforward, as the Romanian military units have been prepared for such a move. The readiness of the Ukrainian army units to defend the land should also be acknowledged since the main focus was on the Polish-Ukrainian war on other fronts. The Ukrainian government has not taken firm diplomatic and military-strategic decisions to resolve the problem. The occupied territory was the centre of contradictions between the Romanian and Polish military command. Moreover, according to sources, the local Ukrainian population requested assistance from the Romanian authorities to suspend the robbery and extortion of Polish soldiers. However, after the end of the Polish-Ukrainian war during the Romanian-Polish agreements in the second half of August 1919, the south-eastern part of Galicia came under the Polish rule.

⁷⁷ В. М. Ботушанський (ред.), *Буковина в контексті європейських міжнародних відносин (з давніх часів до середини ХХ ст.)* [Bukovina in the context of European international relations (from ancient times to the middle of the twentieth century)], Чернівці, 2005, с. 497.