

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MOTIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION–UKRAINE WAR WITHIN DUGIN’S UNDERSTANDING OF NEO-EURASIANISM

Selim KURT 

Giresun University (Turkey)

E-mail: selim.kurt@giresun.edu.tr

Abstract: *It is accepted that the most important ideologue of neo-Eurasianism, which emerged at the end of the 1980s, is Alexandr Dugin. Neo-Eurasianism was not significantly influential in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy until the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, it is claimed that it began to become more prominent, especially with Putin’s dominance in power. Many international media agencies have reported that, just like the 2014 war between Ukraine and Russia, the war of February 2022 was also provoked by Putin. However, the claim that this war results from an inherited historical legacy, rather than being a war initiated unilaterally by Putin, seems more realistic. At this point, it can be said that neo-Eurasianism was one of the intellectual factors that influenced Putin’s attack on Ukraine.*

Key Words: *Ukraine, Ideology, the Russia–Ukraine War, Alexander Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism.*

Rezumat: *O analiză a motivelor războiului dintre Federația Rusă și Ucraina derivată din înțelegerea neo-eurasianismului de către Dughin. Se admite în general că cel mai important ideolog al neo-eurasianismului, recte versiunea eurasianismului apărută la sfârșitul anilor ‘80, este Aleksandr Dughin. Este atestat îndeobște faptul că, până la sfârșitul anilor ‘90, neo-eurasianismul nu a avut o influență semnificativă în politica internă și externă a Rusiei. Cu toate acestea, se susține îndeobște ideea că acesta a început să devină mai proeminent mai ales odată cu accesarea lui Putin la putere. Multe agenții media internaționale au raportat că, la fel ca războiul din 2014 dintre Ucraina și Rusia, războiul din februarie 2022 a fost provocat de către Putin. Cu toate acestea, afirmația că acest război*

rezultă mai degrabă dintr-o moștenire istorică, decât că este un război inițiat unilateral de Putin, pare mai realistă. În prezent, putem afirma că neo-eurasianismul a fost unul dintre factorii intelectualii care a influențat atacul lui Putin asupra Ucrainei.

Peter the Great did not take anything away from Sweden;
he just returned land that rightfully belonged to Russia.

It is now time for us to take back what is ours.

Vladimir Putin - 10/06/2022

INTRODUCTION

The struggle between Russia and Ukraine turned into war in 2014, which resulted in Russia's annexation of Crimea, and, subsequently, it occupied Eastern Ukraine through its proxies. Later in 2022, Russia launched a large-scale invasion, called 'Special Military Operation', to protect the separatist regions located in the east of Ukraine and stop so-called Ukraine's 'aggression' targeting these regions. Although the breakout of this war is primarily attributed to Putin's personality, it would be more accurate to state that Putin inherited this policy to a large extent. It is possible to say that one of the most important ideologies affecting this heritage is neo-Eurasianism.

The classical period of Eurasianism, which ended in failure in the 1930s following the establishment of the USSR, re-emerged during the late 1980s when the USSR gave signs of disintegration, this time under the name of neo-Eurasianism. Having risen as a response to the new Russian state's quest for political leadership, neo-Eurasianism has numerous representatives. However, there is no doubt that the most influential one is Alexandr Dugin. Dugin's geopolitical perspective is based on the endless struggle between the 'land' and 'sea' civilizations, which he drew primarily from Mackinder. In this context, Dugin emphasized the necessity of building a landlocked Eurasian bloc against the maritime Atlantic bloc, which he sees as the major enemy. At this point, he draws attention to the significance of Russia's unification with its immediate surroundings in its struggle with the United States, the leader of the Atlantic bloc. He claims that the Empire located in the centre of the Eurasian bloc consists of states, besides the Russian Federation, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and he, therefore, implies that he does not consider these states as independent ones. At this point, Ukraine, the centre of the former Kyiv

Principality, the first Russian state in history (but according to Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who was the most distinguished Ukrainian historian, the Kyiv Principality is just the first state of the Eastern Slavs and argued that the history of the Ukrainian nation is distinct from that of the Russian both in its origin and in its political, economic, and cultural development),¹ occupies an important place in the definitions of the Russian homeland and identity, both geographically and sociological. However, at the end of 1991, Ukraine, like other former Soviet republics, gained independence, and their aspiration to protect these territories baffled Russia. Particularly, Ukraine's improving relations with the Atlantic bloc have caused Russia to take an increasingly tough stance on Ukraine since it does not aspire to lose Ukraine to the West. This paved the way for adopting a policy based on the neo-Eurasianist ideas headed by Dugin.

The aim of this study is to seek an answer to the question "Does neo-Eurasianism provide an intellectual basis for Russia's attack on Ukraine?". To this aim, a content analysis was conducted by benefiting from the books and articles written by Alexandr Dugin as well as his writings on the "Geopolitika" website, of which he was the editor. This study consists of two parts. The first part discusses the transformation of Eurasianist theory from classical to neo-Eurasianism.² The second part, primarily based on Dugin, reveals how much impact neo-Eurasianist thought has on Russia's waging war on Ukraine.

EURASIANISM FROM CLASSICAL TO NEO

The word 'Eurasia' was first used by the famous Russian geographer V. Lamansky, who declared in 1892 that 'Great Russia' represents a continent in its own right.³ While Eurasianism was first merely a geographical term, it later

¹ For more information, please see University of Alberta, *Who was Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, <https://www.ualberta.ca/canadian-institute-of-ukrainian-studies/centres-and-programs/jacyk-centre/hrushevsky-translation-project/who-was-mykhailo-hrushevsky.html> (Accessed on 24.10.2023).

² For detailed information please see Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, Arktos Media Ltd., 2014; Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008; Madhavan K. Palat, *Eurasianism as an Ideology for Russia's Future*, in "Economic and Political Weekly", Vol. 28, 1993, no. 51; Ilya Vinkovetsky, *Classical Eurasianism and its Legacy*, in "Canadian-American Slavic Studies", Vol. 34, 2000, no. 2 and Boris Ishboldin, *The Eurasian Movement*, in "The Russian Review", Vol. 5, 1946no. 2, pp. 64-73.

³ Alberto Masoero, *Russia between Europe and Asia*, in Pietro Rossi (Ed.), *The Boundaries*

acquired a philosophical and ideological meaning in 19th-century Russia. This ideology that emerged during the crisis periods of Russian political life became again prominent in the 20th century, when the USSR gave some signs of disintegration and tried to evolve a national ideology for Russians.⁴

Eurasianism agrees with the idea of German and Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians that the land-sea duality refers to two distinct political concepts. In this regard, Eurasianists primarily associate the maritime sphere with parliamentary democracies, and the continental sphere with more autocratic regimes. This duality of the world seems to reappear in Savitskii's idea of two imperial models. One of these is continental and overlaps with the ideas and patterns of the civilization model of the Roman/Byzantine Empire. The other is maritime and coincides with the British model, considering the predominance of economic or trade relations, along with the cultural level it dominates. In Eurasianist thought, the continental model, which is claimed to be applicable only to Russia, appears to be accepted as a healthy imperialism capable of creating a supranational culture and serving the progress of humanity.⁵

Eurasianists believe that the prevailing Western idea that considers individuals as 'atomic parts' in the state, public, social groups, and even in the family is inaccurate. They think that the public is a transpersonal organism, the individual 'I' literally does not exist, and the individual personality is nothing more than the enrolment of a social personality. Furthermore, the Eurasianist movement undoubtedly rejects the Eurocentric emphasis on world history. Here, Eurasianists do not accept the understanding of civilization commonly believed for all based on the universal values established by the 'West'. This rejection of Eurocentrism also opposes the western form of liberal democracy, its rule of law, parliamentarism, and human rights. In turn, Eurasianists, as an anti-thesis, have developed the idea of a strong authoritarian state based on the organic unity of the person and the state, in other words, the 'symphonic personality', as well as the principle of the communion of Russian Orthodoxy *sobornost*.⁶ In particular, the

of Europe: From the Fall of the Ancient World to the Age of Decolonisation, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2015, p. 203.

⁴ Boris Ishboldin, *The Eurasian Movement*, in "The Russian Review", Vol. 5, 1946, no. 2, p. 67.

⁵ Marlene Laruelle, *Conceiving the Territory: Eurasianism as a Geographical Ideology*, in Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, and Marlene Laruelle (Eds.), *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 2015, p. 80.

⁶ Christian F. Wehrschutz, *Rus Fikriyatının Parçası Olarak Avrasyacılık* [Eurasianism as

increasingly bureaucratic nature of Soviet life and the enduring totalitarianism of Soviet society have altered the Eurasianists perspective that totalitarian/authoritarian regimes are more suitable for Russia.⁷

Based on these foundations, Eurasianism is an ideological and social-political thought, born in the environment created by the first wave of Russian emigration. In this sense, the foundations of Eurasianism were built in Sofia in July 1921. At that time, four emigrant Russian scholars published a book entitled *Exodus to the East: Forebodings and Events: An Affirmation of the Eurasians*. These scholars were Prince Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoi (1890–1938), a famous linguist and a philosopher; Petr Nikolaevich Savitskii (1895–1968), an economic geographer and skilled geopolitician; Georgii Vasilevich Florovskii (1893–1979), a theologian and historian; and Petr Petrovich Suvchinskii (1892–1985), a gifted musicologist and art critic. They were all immigrants from Bolshevik Russia who had just arrived in Bulgaria. Their book, as the name implies, was also the harbinger of the birth of a new intellectual group called ‘Eurasians’.⁸

Despite its diverse nature, it can be stated that Eurasianism in this period was based mainly on two ideas. The first is the idea of uniting the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples of the USSR. From this perspective, Eurasian differs considerably from Slavic nationalism. Second, like many supporters of the revolution, Eurasians see the Bolshevik Revolution not as a deviation but as a transformation that strictly adheres to the political tradition of the state, and they consider Soviet Russia as the principal Eurasian state.⁹ In the 1930s, some Eurasians who experienced divisions within themselves returned to Russia and began to argue

Part of Russian Idea], in Erol Göka, Murat Yılmaz (Eds.), *Uygarlığın Yeni Yolu Avrasya* [The New Path of Civilization Eurasia], İstanbul, Kızılelma Yayıncılık, 1998, p. 26-27.

⁷ Dmitry Shlapentokh, *Introduction: Eurasianism and Soviet/Post-Soviet Studies*, in Dmitry Shlapentokh (Ed.), *Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism*, Leiden, Brill Publishing House, 1997, p. 131.

⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, Arktos Media Ltd., 2014, p. 24; Shlapentokh, *Introduction: Eurasianism and Soviet/Post-Soviet Studies*, p. 6., Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, Marlene Laruelle, *What Was Eurasianism and Who Made It?*, in Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, Marlene Laruelle (Eds.), *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015, p. 2; Marlene Laruelle, *Conceiving the Territory: Eurasianism as a Geographical Ideology*, p. 69.

⁹ Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Eurasianism: Past and Present*, in “Communist and Post-Communist Studies”, Vol. 30, 1997, no. 2, p. 130-131; Fatih Akgül, *Rusya ve Türkiye’de Avrasyacılık* [Eurasianism in Russia and Turkey], İstanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2009, p. 18-19.

that the USSR was the real Eurasian State. Some of them left this movement, and a significant part of those who remained outside the country was destroyed by the Soviet Secret Service. After the 1930s, Eurasianism was stripped of its so-called politics and became a perspective that could be used by the political will and even a part of the propaganda of the communist regime. In the following years, the Soviet government banned the literature created by Classical Eurasianists, albeit for a while. In this perspective, immigrant Eurasianists in the Soviet Union were accused of being bourgeois nationalists, and their teachings were also suppressed.¹⁰

Lev Gumilev is known to have been one of the USSR's leading representatives of the Eurasianist movement at the end of the Second World War. Gumilev has developed classical Eurasianism in two aspects. He first adopted the general vision that Russian-Eurasia was a multinational civilization, and then he argued that this civilization had become a great continental power not by conquest and domination but by the cooperation of all the Russians and non-Russian people that made it up. Another contribution to Eurasianist ideas Gumilev made is his emphasis mainly on 'lower-level' issues related to ethnicity and ethnonational identity. At this point, Gumilev argued that the biology of ethnicity was based on external geographical factors rather than internal physiological structure and genetics. In this sense, it seems that Gumilev does not believe that nations or ethnicities represent genetically conditioned races. On the contrary, he claims they are always composed of a mixture of different racial elements.¹¹

We can find traces of Eurasian ideas in Soviet political discourse with the proposal of Mikhail Gorbachev for a common 'European home', which granted the Warsaw Pact countries the right to determine their destiny but deprived the union republics of the same right because they were decisively different civilizations. Nevertheless, such rhetoric has remained extremely limited. Eurasianism, which lost its significance over time, revived, and became prominent again with the intellectual pursuits that arose with the collapse of the USSR. Classical Eurasianism, which emerged in the 1920s, was manifested in the 1980s, this time as neo-Eurasianism. After the collapse of the USSR, it has become one of the main

¹⁰ Paul Pryce, *Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?*, in "Romanian Journal of European Affairs", Vol. 13, 2013, no. 1, p. 30; Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008, p. 24-25.

¹¹ Mark Bassin, Gonzalo Pozo, *Introduction*, in Mark Bassin, Gonzalo Pozo (Eds.), *The Politics of Eurasianism: Identity, Popular Culture and Russia's Foreign Policy*, London, Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd., 2017, p. 6.

ideological principles of the opposition (from red to brown) against the Yeltsin regime.¹²

In the 1980s, the Soviet system began to experience significant depression, which boosted expectations for change. In such an environment, the word 'reform' in Russia is identified with liberal democracy. The reformists, namely liberal democrats, who accepted the superiority of the West and wanted to imitate it, began to dominate the Soviet system. In this atmosphere, a national-patriotic opposition began to appear, including former Soviet supporters and those disappointed with the reforms. In other words, Russia embarked on a new quest with the feeling of defeat against the West. Eurasianism is an ideology that emerged largely against the West and against the views of Western supporters within the country. It began to become widespread again in the 1990s as the ideology of the recovery of the Russian Empire, which was trying to overcome the difficult period after the collapse of the USSR and did not want to lose its sphere of influence in the Soviet period to the United States. By 2002, it became more prominent in Russian political life with the establishment of two Eurasian parties during Vladimir Putin's rule. Eurasianism has not only changed but also diversified in the process of its political/ideological development.¹³

This new understanding, known as neo-Eurasianism, is essentially the most detailed of the various conservative ideologies that emerged in Russia during the 1990s. The ideology claims that Europe is not in a state of advanced development but represents a certain form of development that cannot be reproduced. For this reason, it is claimed that "Russia must learn the West but reject the imperialism of European identity". The Eurasian doctrine has always been attractive to many intellectuals and politicians, because the doctrine helped the elites to formulate an explanation for the collapse of the Soviet Union and reshape the sense of

¹² Paul Pryce, *Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?*, p. 30. Fatih Akgül, *Rusya ve Türkiye'de Avrasyacılık*, p. 19 and Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Eurasianism: Past and Present*, p. 6.

¹³ Demirhan F. Erdem, *Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Avrasya ve Avrasyacılık: Algulamalar Yaklaşımlar ve Stratejiler* [Eurasia and Eurasianism in the World and in Turkey: Perceptions, Approaches and Strategies], Ankara, Barış Kitap, 2016, p. 20-22; Mehmet S. Erol, *Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde Avrasya Jeopolitiği ve Avrasyacılık Tartışmaları* [Eurasian Geopolitics and Eurasianism Debates in the Global Power Struggle], in İhsan Çomak (Ed.), *Rusya Stratejik Araştırmaları* [Russian Strategic Studies], İstanbul, Tasam Yayınları, 2006, p. 130; Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Introduction: Eurasianism and Soviet/Post-Soviet Studies*, in Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism*, Leiden, Brill Publishing House, 2007, p. 6.

Russia's continuation by focusing on spatial concepts rather than temporal ones.¹⁴ This new and non-uniform way of thinking has manifested itself in the form of neo-Eurasianism, which is considered the continuation of Classical Eurasianism, as well as a wide range of Eurasianist approaches, from integration with the new world order to opposing the dominance of Russia. In this study, we will consider the neo-Eurasianist perspective framed by Alexandr Dugin, which has considerably influenced Russian political discourse and foreign policy since the early 2000s.

Marlene Laruelle states that Dugin occupies an important and controversial role in the Russian public sphere.¹⁵ She argues that Dugin seems to have power in influencing some military and political circles and some people in the presidential administration. Dugin was an adviser to Gennady Seleznev, the chairman of the State Duma from 1996 to 2003. Subsequently, he became the head of the Geopolitical Expertise Department of the Duma's advisory National Security Council. In addition to his position at the Geopolitical Expertise Department, his courses at the General Staff Military Academy have provided him with financial support from military circles. He has easy access to the Duma and supporters in all parties represented in Parliament and his book on geopolitics is taught as a textbook in many higher educational institutions. Aleksei Podberezkin and his organization 'Spiritual Heritage', which has long functioned as the leading think tank of the Communist Party, regularly quotes Dugin and he is also recognized as having inspired several books by Gennady Zyuganov.¹⁶

Dugin's philosophy is based on his emphasis on the irreconcilable conflict between the Eurasian civilization, at the heart of which is Russia, and the Atlantic civilization, led by the United States. Accordingly, there was a long-standing conflict between the land power of the continental states (most notably Russia and Germany) representing the 'heartland' of the Eurasian continent and the naval power of the 'ocean' states (Britain and America) located at the edges of Eurasia. At this point, Mackinder's final thesis is that the power that dominates the Eurasian territory will dominate the whole world. This structure consists of two main elements. The first is Eurasianism, the doctrine that emerged among

¹⁴ Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, p. 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ At the same time, Laruelle claims that it would not be accurate to state that Dugin is the ideological "guru" of the Putin regime. She notes that Dugin's influence is mainly limited to certain academics and students in the fields such as philosophy, culture, political science, and international relations. For more information, see Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, p. 11.

Russian immigrants in the 1920s. The main principle of this thought is the assumption that Russia is a unique mixture of Slavs and Muslims, mostly Turks, as well as other ethnicities of Russia and the Soviet Union, which is considered an organic part. The second-largest building block is the traditional geopolitical understanding at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.¹⁷

Dugin points out that, from a geopolitical perspective, the existence of the Eastern Bloc is a positive factor for both the possible Eurasian Union and the continental integration and sovereignty of the larger area. In this sense, Dugin considers it necessary for the geopolitical and strategic sovereignty of Russia to incorporate the Western continental states (initially, the Franco-German bloc, which tends to get rid of the Atlanticist patronage of the American-led NATO) and Eastern continental states (Iran, India, and Japan) into the Eurasian strategic bloc, along with the lost ‘immediate environment’.¹⁸

MAKING SENSE OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF DUGIN’S UNDERSTANDING OF NEO-EURASIANISM

Dmitry V. Shlapentokh argues that although Dugin’s geopolitical perspective found little direct application in actual Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, it had an impact on Putin’s stance on Crimea and Ukraine, even if indirectly. In this regard, it can be stated that Dugin’s views, especially on Ukraine, are essential in terms of making sense of the war between Russia and Ukraine.¹⁹ Pointing out the importance of Ukraine for the Russian Empire, Dugin draws attention to this matter by stating, “in order to succeed in forming the Eurasian Union, it is enough to get the support of Kazakhstan and Ukraine.” Dugin defines the Moscow-Astana-Kyiv geopolitical triangle as a framework that can assure the stability of the Eurasian Union and points out that Russia and Ukraine have much in common, such as cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic resemblances.²⁰

¹⁷ Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Implementation of an Ideological Paradigm: Early Duginian Eurasianism and Russia’s Post-Crimean Discourse*, in “Contemporary Security Policy”, Vol. 35, no. 3, 2014, p. 381; Meşdi İsmayilov, *Avrasyacılık: Mukayeseli Bir Okuma Türkiye ve Rusya Örneği* [Eurasianism: A Comparative Reading the Case of Türkiye and Russia], Ankara, Doğu-Batı Yayınları. 2011, p. 227-228.

¹⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, p. 10.

¹⁹ Please see Dmitry V. Shlapentokh, *Implementation of an Ideological Paradigm: Early Duginian Eurasianism and Russia’s Post-Crimean Discourse*, p. 381.

²⁰ Alexander Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım* [Russian Geopolitics: Eurasianist Approach], 9th edition, translated by Vügar İmanov, İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, 2014, p. 79.

In this context, Dugin draws attention to the fact that the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine is a highly adverse condition for Russian geopolitics and points out that this case can also easily provoke a military conflict. He stated that, in the current situation in Ukraine, a Russia devoid of the Black Sea from Ozi Castle to the Kerch Strait would be doomed to an extremely small coastline. In this way, Russia would be doomed to an extremely limited coastline, and its existence as a independent state would be regarded with suspicion. He also emphasizes that an independent Ukrainian state, with some territorial claims, poses a great danger to the integrity of Eurasia. It would make no sense to talk about continental geopolitics before the Ukrainian issue is resolved. Therefore, Dugin asserts that Ukraine should be considered a strategic extension of Moscow in the south and west.²¹

Dugin also supports his ideas with historical and sociocultural examples. In this context, he states that the Eastern Slavs, who came out after the Kyiv principality faded away, were divided into various parts in the historical process. However, he claims that this partition did not happen in the form of tribes, but instead occurred in the form of Russians who were divided into different geographies and experienced different destinies. Thus, he notes that in the eastern and northern parts of Russia, one of the branches of the Eastern Slavs, the Kievan Rus people, gradually appeared. Although the term 'Russians' is generally used for these people, he suggests that it would be more appropriate to use the term 'Great Russians' for them as those who live in the western part of the Eastern Slavs are also Russians.²²

He notes that this western part of the Eastern Slavs, the only Orthodox Russian people of the Grand Duchy of Kyiv, was divided into two branches: northwestern and southwestern. The Northwestern Russians are Belarusians because this part of Russia is called Belaya (white), while the Southwestern Russians would later be called 'Little Russians.' However, this term would be used both in a broad sense (including the territory of Galicia-Volyn) and in a narrow sense (concerning Central Ukraine). At this point, it is possible to state that the Little Russians here coincide with the modern-day Ukrainian nation. Nevertheless, despite this distinction, Dugin draws attention to the fact that these are divided not based on nation or tribe, but according to political and historical

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 175-176.

²² Alexander Dugin, *Ethnosociology of Ukraine in The Context of Military Operation*, in "Geopolitika", <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/ethnosociology-ukraine-context-military-operation> (Accessed on 25.06.2023).

criteria, and they are parts of a single nation (Russian). Dugin mentions that, over time, all three branches of the Eastern Slavs (the future Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarusians) lost their sovereignty and found themselves in other, more powerful political formations. He states that the Belarusians and the Little Russians initially found themselves part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and, after the union, part of the Poland–Lithuania Kingdom. Dugin states that in this way, the three branches of a single nation, which he calls the Eastern Slavs as a whole, remain within different political systems. In other words, Dugin has always characterized the historical Ukrainian identity as an integral part of the Russian identity.²³

Dugin points out that, given the political contradictions between the Russian Empire and Western Europe, the process of creating unnatural nations evolved into a political tool, leading to the construction of a separate Ukrainian identity. Dugin argues that the Ukrainian nationalism that emerged at the end of the 19th century was even more unnatural and baseless. Moreover, he points out that the Ukrainian identity is supported primarily by Poles in the hope of countering the Great Russians, gaining an ally in the war against Russia, and regaining their dominance over Western Russia in the long run. At this point, he points out that the Poles have also played an essential role in creating a manufactured Ukrainian language. At the same time, he asserts that Austria–Hungary not only contributed to the Poles in Galicia, but also to the creation of Ukrainian nationalism to use against Russia. Ukrainian nationalism began to take shape rapidly in the process of the collapse of the Russian Empire, and these first steps primarily played only an intermediary role in the struggle of Polish nationalism against Russia. Dugin also argues that in the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West, the founder of geopolitics Halford Mackinder has also been involved in Ukrainian nationalism and the project of creating a Ukraine nation while he was the High Commissioner of the Entente for Ukraine during the Civil War era.²⁴ At this point Dugin states that the Ukrainian identity has been created fully unnaturally with the help of Western states within the framework of the Russia–West conflict. Dugin points out that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was united by Lenin during the Soviet rule but claims that this state was made up of artificially united parts. He also states that it was impossible to build a full-fledged nation in Ukraine due to the socialist

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

understanding and suggests that Ukraine remained a manufactured state during this period.²⁵

Dugin claimed that this historical background led to the emergence of a new, heterogeneous ethnic-sociological structure in Ukraine. He draws attention to the fact that one of the most critical parts of this structure was a crowded population belonging to the Grand Russian family, which in no way stood out in Soviet society. He points out that this population primarily lived in Slobozhanshchyna, Donbas, Novorossiia (as far as Odesa), and Crimea in the territory of Eastern Ukraine, and notes that ethnically, culturally, historically, and linguistically, they are not different from the South Russian population and are often called 'Russians.' He states that the latter are descendants of Cossacks and peasants of Little Russia who passed from the rule of the Poles to the Russian Empire in Central Ukraine, mainly in the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions. He also points out that in these regions, dialects of Little Russian were widespread, and peasants retained many features of the archaic way of life. He claims that the third one is the population living in the Vinnytsia and Zhytomyr regions, located west of the Dnieper, and the population here is even more agricultural and archaic. He notes that the manufactured language here and the Small Ukrainian dialects coexist with the Russian language. He states that the classical Russian ethnicities are relatively few in this region, which he calls Great Russians, and notes that the difference from the Russian identity was more apparent when the Polish influence increased since the region is close to the West. The fourth region, he states, is Galicia, an exceptional region whose population is in no way connected with the Russian Empire. He also draws attention to the fact that although Galicia and Volhynia do not actually belong to Ukraine, the most independent Ukrainian identity developed in this region. And the last part is Subcarpathia, which had been the land of the Hungarian crown for almost a thousand years. The region remained under the sovereignty of the Hungarian part of Austria–Hungary, then became part of Czechoslovakia, then Hungary again.²⁶

Ukraine has always been of particular importance for Russians because it is an area that Russians consider to be within the "actual Russian territory" on both identity and historical grounds.²⁷ As stated by Dugin, there is also a significant

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Aleksandr Soljenitsin, *Rusya Nasıl Kurtulur?* [How to Save Russia?], in Erol Göka, Murat Yılmaz (Eds.), *Uygarlığın Yeni Yolu Avrasya* [The New Path of Civilization Eurasia], İstanbul, Kızılelma Yayıncılık, 1998, p. 209.

amount of ethnic Russian population living in the east and south of Ukraine, which in the historical process has remained under the control of Russians. Therefore, although fifteen independent states appeared after the collapse of the USSR, the loss of Ukraine was the most difficult for the Russians to adopt. Dugin expresses this situation by saying: “unitary Ukraine cannot be allowed to live any longer. This country should be divided into several areas in accordance with the diversity of the geopolitical and ethnic-cultural realities.” In addition, the necessity of annexing Crimea to the Russian territory, which is located in a highly strategic position for Russia due to its hosting of the Black Sea navy, was also upheld by Dugin in 1997 as follows: “It is impossible to let Crimea be «sovereign Ukraine». Because this situation will pose a direct threat to Russia’s geopolitical security and cause ethnic tensions within Crimea.”²⁸ For these reasons, Dugin states that Western geopolitics and the central ‘Ukrainian issue’ require Moscow to take urgent preventive measures since a strategic blow to Russia is underway. It is unreasonable that Russia, the “geographical axis of history,” should not respond to this issue.²⁹

Anton Shekhovtsov states that neo-Eurasianism’s view of Ukraine can be summarized in several topics within the framework of the points above. The first is that neo-Eurasianism considers Ukraine an ‘unnatural state’ consisting of different regions with different geopolitical allegiances. Second, a sovereign and united Ukraine poses a significant threat to the geopolitical security of Russia and the probable Eurasian Empire. Third, to eliminate this threat, Russia, guided by the neo-Eurasian principles, needs to divide Ukraine and bring most of the territory, especially Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, under the direct control of Moscow by non-military measures (or that could be described as a hybrid war, military and non-military instruments combined).³⁰

It is seen that the implications of neo-Eurasianism framed by Dugin are also reflected in the Russian administration and foreign policy. In addition to the Georgia War in August 2008 and the conflict that broke out in Ukraine in 2014, Russia gained the upper hand owing to its support of the regime in Syria. With its increasing self-confidence, Russia stated in its Russian National Security Strategy

²⁸ Alexander Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, p. 207.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 209-210.

³⁰ Anton Shekhovtsov, *Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian-Ukrainian War*, in Mark Bassin, Gonzalo Pozo (Eds.), *The Politics of Eurasianism: Identity, Popular Culture and Russia’s Foreign Policy*, London, Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd., 2017, p. 185.

(dated December 2015) that the most critical threats to Russia's national security are NATO's even more prominent activities in the region and the implicit activities of the United States close to the Russian borders. This statement brings to mind Dugin's 'common enemy'³¹ principle.³²

As mentioned above, Georgia and Ukraine are crucial for Russia due to their geopolitical importance and historical ties (especially Ukraine). Thus, Russia needs to control these countries in its immediate vicinity. In this regard, Dugin stresses that complete and unlimited control of Moscow along the entire coastline from Ukraine to Abkhazia is an absolute necessity of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast, and this whole area could be fragmented as much as possible according to ethnocultural differences by granting ethnic and religious autonomy to the people of the region, on the condition of military and political control from Moscow. And this area should be kept away from the Atlanticist influence of both the west and Turkey, serving as the extension of the West in the region, and should be under the control of Moscow from a Eurasian perspective.³³

It can be asserted that this point of view clearly reflects the intellectual background of the first stage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The spark of the

³¹ For detailed information about the principle of "Common Enemy", see Dugin, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, p. 52-53.

³² In Russia's National Security Strategy Document (dated December 2015), under the title of "Russia in the modern world", it is stated that "NATO's military buildup activities that violate the norms of international law, as well as the support of the military activities of the bloc states, the growing expansion of the NATO alliance and the deployment of military facilities near the Russian borders, are factors that pose a threat to Russia's national security. In addition to the components of the American missile defence systems, which are practically the embodiment of the «global strike» concept, the deployment of non-nuclear strategic weapons systems in Europe, the Asia-Pacific Region and the Near East, as well as weapons placed in space significantly limits the opportunities for maintaining global and regional stability". The statement in Article 106 of the document, i.e. "Due to NATO's increasing military activities, its military facilities closer to the Russian borders, the construction of a missile-defence system, and its attempts to encourage the alliance to perform global functions in a way that violates the international law, Russia's interests are being undermined, and these developments underline Russia-NATO relations", clearly demonstrates Russia's perspective on NATO. For more information see Marlene Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, p. 11. See also especially *Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 - Full-text Translation*, "Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos", <http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf> (Accessed on 08.09.2021).

³³ Dugin, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım*, p. 176.

war was lit in November 2013, when Ukraine's Russian-backed President Yanukovich refused a major economic deal, he was negotiating with the EU and decided to accept a \$15 billion Russian counteroffer; this decision triggered protests of the masses of EU supporters in Ukraine against the government.³⁴ Demonstrations intensified in the country's west, especially in the capital Kyiv, and continued to escalate. The harsh measures taken by the government further increased the demonstrations, and on February 17, 2014, Yanukovich was compelled to leave the country. An interim administration was established in Kyiv until the elections (May 25, 2014) and, although the West recognized this administration, it was not recognized by Russia. Then, anti-Western and anti-government demonstrations started in the pro-Russian regions of Ukraine and these demonstrations soon spread to the east and south of the country.³⁵ In Crimea, one of the predominantly inhabited places of Russian ethnicity, the Parliament first declared the independence of the region; then, as a result of the referendum held on March 16, 95% of the participants voted "yes" to the separation of Crimea from Ukraine and its integration into Russia.³⁶ Soon after, Vladimir Putin signed the decree officially approving the unification of Crimea with Russia and officially confiscated Crimea.³⁷ Meanwhile, anti-Western demonstrations spread to the Donbas region in the east of the country. On May 11, 2014, referendums were held in Donetsk and Luhansk, the eastern provinces of Ukraine, where a considerable number of ethnic Russians live. As a result of these referendums, the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics were declared. However, Russia did not recognize the independence of the so-called republics at

³⁴ John J. Mearsheimer, *Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin*, in "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 93, no. 5, 2014, p. 4.

³⁵ Hasret Çomak, Ufuk Cerrah, *Karadeniz Jeopolitiğinde Ukrayna ve Kırım'ın Güvenliği ve Bu Güvenliğin Avrasya Enerji Güvenliğine Etkileri* [The security of Ukraine and Crimea in the Black Sea Geopolitics and the Effects of this Security on Eurasian Energy Security], in "BİLGESAM", http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-381-201412291guvenlik_kongresi_bildirileri-43.pdf (Accessed on 05.09.2021).

³⁶ Conversely, this so-called referendum is not recognized by Ukraine, nor is it recognized by the international community. Regarding the fact that such a referendum was not accepted, a decision called "General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region (GA/11493)" was adopted by the UN General Assembly on March 27, 2014. Please see United Nations, *General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region*, <https://press.un.org/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm> (Accessed on 24.05.2023).

³⁷ Anton Shekhovtsov, *Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian-Ukrainian War*, p. 181.

that time. Separatists even declared that referendums could also be held in eastern provinces other than Donetsk and Luhansk and, with the participation of these provinces, a new republic could be declared in the east of Ukraine with the name of 'Novorossiya' (New Russia).³⁸ However, these referendums, like the others, did not comply with international law and were not recognized by the other states.³⁹

From the end of February 2014, Dugin actively publicized neo-Eurasianism and anti-Ukrainian messages using mainstream media, as well as neo-Eurasianism-supporting media, and shared his comments on the developments in Ukraine on Facebook and the Russian platform. Anton Shekhovtsov claims that Dugin's messages on the Ukrainian war generally focus on four issues. First, pro-Atlanticists declared war on Russia, bringing the Nazis to power in Ukraine. Second, the Provisional Government is a Nazi junta with no legitimacy. Third, Ukraine does not now exist. Finally, Russia needs to act decisively to prevent the pro-Atlanticists from establishing control over the entire territory of former Ukraine.⁴⁰ The Russian side used these issues also in the 2022 war as justifications for legitimizing the war.

All these developments essentially paved the way for the conflict to flare up again in February 2022. Dugin lit the flare of the war that would break out on February 24, 2022, by stating, "Since the rhetoric that Kyiv will remain alone or abandon its pro-American and anti-Russian policy is unrealistic, Russia will have to solve the Novorossiya problem radically sooner or later".⁴¹ In order to effectively protect Crimea and solve the Donbas problem, the entire Novorossiya region should be liberated, Dugin says, noting that if the war is inevitable, Moscow's only task is to win the war as soon as possible. At this point, the goal that can be considered a victory is to create a friendly Russian region or

³⁸ Hasret Çomak, Ufuk Cerrah, *Karadeniz Jeopolitiğinde Ukrayna ve Kırım'ın Güvenliği ve Bu Güvenliğin Avrasya Enerji Güvenliğine Etkileri*.

³⁹ Please see John B. Bellinger, *Why the Crimean Referendum is Illegitimate*, in "Council on Foreign Relations", <https://www.cfr.org/interview/why-crimean-referendum-illegitimate> (Accessed on 24.05.2023).

⁴⁰ Information is also contained in the work of Shekhovtsov that Dugin gave direct instructions to certain members of the pro-Russian separatist movement in Donetsk. For more information, see Shekhovtsov, *Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian-Ukrainian War*, p. 192.

⁴¹ Alexander Dugin, *Principles and Strategy of The Coming War*. Part II, in "Geopolitika", <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/principles-and-strategy-coming-war-part-ii> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

independent states from Odesa to Kharkov, or to incorporate them into Russian territory, and he also pointed out that the fate of the Central and Western Ukraine is not of great value.⁴²

In addition, Dugin states, “I am completely sure that if we lose the Donbas, we will lose Crimea, and then all of Russia”, making the war almost a matter of existence.⁴³ On the other hand, Dugin declares that he is not against the existence of a sovereign Ukraine if it is to be an ally or partner of Russia or at least a neutral intermediate region. Dugin notes that Russians want to be together in a single state with Ukrainians. Still, Ukrainian citizens should decide it, and what should never be allowed is the occupation of Ukraine by the Atlantic Bloc. Noting that the enemies of Russia are very well aware that Russia can only become great again together with Ukraine or by forming some type of balanced alliance, he also points out that it is impossible to create a united and robust Russian world in Ukraine without a Eurasian axis, whether peaceful or not. Stating that Russia cannot evade its historical responsibilities, Dugin points out that if they challenge Russia and tear up the Minsk Agreements in Donbas, it will become inevitable for Russia to achieve a victory in Ukraine.⁴⁴

Davor S. Vuyachich, who wrote an article about the war on Dugin’s website “Geopolitika”, claimed Russia does not want any armed conflict to occur in Ukraine and has been trying for eight years to solve the issue through diplomacy. However, he claimed that Ukraine refused to resolve the dispute on the table through diplomacy and fulfil the Minsk agreements due to Washington’s support and promises. He also noted that Ukraine has been arming for more than eight years to recapture the Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk People’s Republics using weapons. At this point, he pointed out that Russian intelligence services obtained strong evidence that Ukraine was preparing for an armed attack ultimately led to the necessity for Russia to intervene militarily in Ukraine, even though Putin was reluctant to intervene until the last minute. Vuyachich noted that the Kyiv regime’s extraordinarily hostile and aggressive policy towards Russia makes Ukraine’s military confrontation with Russia inevitable, and all responsibility for this belongs to the United States.⁴⁵

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Alexander Dugin, *War in Donbass will be Imposed on us by Washington and Kiev*, in “Geopolitika”, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/1276-war-in-donbass-will-be-imposed-on-us-by-washington-and-kyiv.html> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Davor S. Vuyachich, *Ukraine – From Euromaidan to Afghanistan*, in “Geopolitika”, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/ukraine-euromaidan-afghanistan> (Accessed

Pepe Escobar, another author who published in “Geopolitika”, in parallel with Dugin, claiming that Ukraine has never actually been a state and has always been a part of states or empires such as Poland, Austria–Hungary, Turkey, and most notably, Russia. Noting that Ukraine means ‘border region’ in Russian, Escobar stated that in the past, it constituted the westernmost regions of the Russian Empire. In this regard, when the Empire began to expand to the south, he noted that the new regions, mostly seized from Turkish rule, were called ‘Novorossiya’ (New Russia), and the northeastern regions were called ‘Malorossiya’ (Little Russia). At the beginning of the 1920s, he pointed out that it was up to the USSR to deconstruct all these parts and call it ‘Ukraine’ and to annex western Galicia, which was not historically Russian territory. Commenting that the most critical turning point in the future of Ukraine occurred with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Escobar notes that Novorossiya and Malorossiya regions were not allowed to rejoin Russia, but Russia is now reclaiming these historical Russian lands based on its own power. Escobar states that the ultimate goal of the ‘Special Military Operation’ targeting Ukraine is to liberate all of Novorossiya and ensure complete control of the Black Sea coastline, which is currently part of Ukraine.⁴⁶

Dugin notes that even if Russia loses Ukraine, its system will not tumble down completely, and its influence will not decrease much either. Nevertheless, he claims that the loss of Ukraine would symbolically deal a major blow to Russia’s power and open a breach in the walls of its empire. He also notes that though Ukraine is just a pawn for the West, it means a lot more than that for Russia. According to Dugin, on the path to world hegemony between Russia and the United States, Ukraine is a must-win actor. Similar situations occurred in the 1990s, but the Ukraine issue is becoming even more vital today, and the only way out of this problem is now a victory. In this sense, the victory does not mean maintaining Ukraine’s current form in exchange for some small demands of Russia. Dugin points out that the ultimate success is a complete change of both Ukraine and Russia, implying that a completely dominated Ukraine will mean the ultimate victory.⁴⁷

on 25.05.2023).

⁴⁶ Pepe Escobar, *The Total War to Cancel Russia*, “Geopolitika”, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/total-war-cancel-russia> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

⁴⁷ Alexander Dugin, *Victory or Nothing*, in “Geopolitika”, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/victory-or-nothing> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

Regarding the limits of the operation, Dugin notes that many people accuse the proponents of the Russian world and Eurasian geopolitics of calling for a disproportionate expansion of the great Eurasian state. However, he finds this unrealistic and states that everything starts with an idea in politics. In the Ukrainian crisis, the idea is the reconstruction of the borders of Russia-Eurasia and the Russian world. At this point, noting that he has certain reservations about the future of Western Ukraine, Dugin stresses that ethno-sociologically, historically, and psychologically, it is impossible to integrate this region into Eurasia, except for the Orthodox peoples of Transcarpathian Ruthenia and Volhynia. Against this background, he criticizes Stalin, noting that when he reintegrated West Ukraine into the Empire, the only achievement was increasing Russian hostility and rejecting any unity. To this end, Dugin largely excludes the west of Ukraine from this definition, arguing that Russia should seize places that it can realistically absorb and defend.⁴⁸

As for the ultimate goal of the ‘Special Military Operation’, Dugin points out that there are two primary goals. One is ‘de-Nazification’, and the other is ‘demilitarization’. This means that Russia will not stop until it has eliminated the model of nation and nation-state that the Ukrainian nationalists have built with the support of the West. This means that Russia will not stop until it destroys the nation and nation-state model that Ukrainian nationalists have built with the support of the West. He also notes that this will mean starting off a new phase in which the Great Russians and the Little Russians will be reunited into a single nation. It is worth noting that according to Dugin, this does not necessarily mean a victory of the Russians over the Ukrainians, but the reunification of the Eastern Slavs, namely Great Russians and Little Russians (and Belarusians). He points out that if one wants to move toward a resurgent society, one should also learn from the mistakes of Ukrainians and never incline toward nationalism. To express this situation, Dugin states, “we are not a nation; we are the people”. In this sense, he expresses his goals: “we must build a great state that will accommodate all, whose fate is connected with us, primarily, our East Slavic brothers”.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Alexander Dugin, *The Future of the Ukrainian State*, in “Geopolitika”, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/future-ukrainian-state> (Accessed on 25.05.2023).

⁴⁹ Alexander Dugin, *Ethnosociology of Ukraine in The Context of Military Operation*, passim.

CONCLUSIONS

Eurasianism is defined as an ideology of a crisis period since it has played an essential role in Russian political life during and after the disintegration of the Russian Tsardom and the USSR. Classical Eurasianism has changed and become more thriving over time and it came to the agenda in the 1990s as neo-Eurasianism. It is widely accepted that one of the most influential figures of neo-Eurasianism (even the most influential) is Aleksandr Dugin. His role in Russian politics and his prolific academic career as a writer played a significant role in recognizing and accepting his views.

Although neo-Eurasianism was not dominant enough in Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, it is generally accepted that it became prominent, especially during the Putin period. Of course, it is also unrealistic to claim that Putin has always considered the idea of neo-Eurasianism in all his steps. However, the affinity between Dugin's neo-Eurasianism and Putin's practices is clearly not a coincidence. Since Putin, who desires to make Russia an empire again, is fed from many different sources in Russian political life, his practices also parallel neo-Eurasianism. It can be argued that Ukraine is one of the most critical areas where this parallelism can be best explained. Dugin primarily characterizes Ukraine as an essential part of the historical Russian homeland since the first Russian state, the Principality of Kyiv, is based in Ukraine. He notes that from a geographical point of view, Ukraine is located in the center of the Russian imperial territory, and even calls the area where Ukraine is located 'Little Russia.' Dugin notes that the south of Ukraine and the east of the Dnieper River are related to the Russian ethnicity, and the population living in these regions also belongs to the sect of Orthodoxy, as do the Russians. In other words, he claims that Ukraine is part of the Russian Empire on historical, geographical, ethnic, and religious grounds. By claiming that the Russian Empire, located at the center of the Eurasian Empire, consists of Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, he clearly states that he does not consider these states to be independent. Thus, he implies that these states will be integrated into the Russian Empire when the time is up.

Based on these considerations, Dugin argues that there is no Ukrainian ethnicity; it was created completely unnaturally with the help of western states within the framework of the Russia–West conflict. However, maintaining that this state cannot go beyond being a manufactured state, he draws attention to the significance of destroying this unnatural nation and the state based on it, thus disrupting the game of the Atlantic bloc. He proposes that the heavily Russian-

populated South of Ukraine, and the east of the Dnieper River, called Donbas, be connected to Russia.

As Dugin points out, the south of the country was largely connected to Russia with the annexation of Crimea in the 2014 war and a Russian-backed uprising began in the Donbas region. From the concentration of Russian troops in the south (to establish a land connection between the east of the country and Crimea), it is understood that the remaining task work is done with the war in February 2022. On February 10, 2022, on a television program, Putin, implying the war in Ukraine, stated, "Peter the Great waged the Great Northern War for 21 years. When he was at war with Sweden, he did not take anything away from Sweden; he just returned land that rightfully belonged to Russia. Now it seems our turn to take back what is ours";⁵⁰ thus, he points out that this policy has historical grounds. Although there may be many historical reasons for this war, it is possible to state that neo-Eurasianism also plays an essential role in forming an ideological basis for it.

REFERENCES:

1. Akgül Fatih, *Rusya ve Türkiye'de Avrasyacılık* [Eurasianism in Russia and Turkey], İstanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2009.
2. Aktan Sertaç, *Putin Rusya'ya Ait Olan Yerleri Geri Almak Konusunda Kendini Rus Çarı Büyük Petro'ya Benzetti* [Putin Likened Himself to Russian Tsar Peter the Great in Taking Back Russian Lands], in "Euronews". 2022, <https://tr.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/10/putin-rusya-ya-ait-olan-yerleri-geri-almak-konusunda-kendini-rus-car-buyuk-petro-ya-benzet>
3. Bassin Mark, Glebov Sergey, Laruelle Marlene, *What Was Eurasianism and Who Made It?*, in Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, Marlene Laruelle (Eds.), *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015, pp. 1-13.
4. Bassin Mark, Pozo Gonzalo, *Introduction*, in Mark Bassin, Gonzalo Pozo

⁵⁰ Sertaç Aktan, *Putin Rusya'ya Ait Olan Yerleri Geri Almak Konusunda Kendini Rus Çarı Büyük Petro'ya Benzetti* [Putin Likened Himself to Russian Tsar Peter the Great in Taking Back Russian Lands], in "Euronews", <https://tr.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/06/10/putin-rusya-ya-ait-olan-yerleri-geri-almak-konusunda-kendini-rus-car-buyuk-petro-ya-benzet> (Accessed on 23.10.2023).

(Eds.), *The Politics of Eurasianism: Identity, Popular Culture and Russia's Foreign Policy*, London, Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd., 2017, pp. 1-17.

5. Bellinger B. John, *Why the Crimean Referendum is Illegitimate*. "Council on Foreign Relations", 2014, <https://www.cfr.org/interview/why-crimean-referendum-illegitimate>.

6. Çomak Hasret, Cerrah, Ufuk, *Karadeniz Jeopolitiğinde Ukrayna ve Kırım'ın Güvenliği ve Bu Güvenliğin Avrasya Enerji Güvenliğine Etkileri* [The security of Ukraine and Crimea in the Black Sea Geopolitics and the Effects of this Security on Eurasian Energy Security], in "BİLGESAM", 2014, in http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-381-201412291guvenlik_kongresi_bildirileri-43.pdf.

7. Dugin Alexander, *Ethnosociology of Ukraine in The Context of Military Operation*. "Geopolitika", 2022, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/ethnosociology-ukraine-context-military-operation>.

8. Dugin Alexander, *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, Arktos Media Ltd., 2014.

9. Dugin Alexander, *Principles and Strategy of The Coming War*, Part II, in "Geopolitika", n.d., <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/principles-and-strategy-coming-war-part-ii>.

10. Dugin Alexander, *Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım* [Foundation of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia], 9th edition, translated by Vügar İmanov, İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, 2014.

11. Dugin Alexander, *The Future of The Ukrainian State*, in "Geopolitika", 2022, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/future-ukrainian-state>.

12. Dugin Alexander, *Victory or Nothing*, in "Geopolitika", 2022, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/victory-or-nothing>.

13. Dugin Alexander, *War in Donbass will be Imposed on us by Washington and Kiev*. "Geopolitika", 2015, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/1276-war-in-donbass-will-be-imposed-on-us-by-washington-and-kiev.html>.

14. Erdem F. Demirhan, *Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Avrasya ve Avrasyacılık: Algılamalar Yaklaşımlar ve Stratejiler* [Eurasia and Eurasianism in the World and in Turkey: Perceptions, Approaches and Strategies], Ankara, Barış Kitap, 2016.

15. Erol S. Mehmet, *Küresel Güç Mücadelesinde Avrasya Jeopolitiği ve Avrasyacılık Tartışmaları* [Eurasian Geopolitics and Eurasianism Debates in the Global Power Struggle], in Çomak İhsan (Ed.), *Rusya Stratejik Araştırmaları* [Russian Strategic Studies], İstanbul, Tasam Yayınları, 2006, pp. 119-141.

16. Escobar Pepe, *The Total War to Cancel Russia*, in "Geopolitika", 2022, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/total-war-cancel-russia>.

17. Ishboldin Boris, *The Eurasian Movement*, in "The Russian Review", Vol. 5, 1946, no. 2, pp. 64-73.
18. İsmayilov Meşdi. *Avrasyacılık: Mukayeseli Bir Okuma Türkiye ve Rusya Örneği* [Eurasianism: A Comparative Reading the Case of Türkiye and Russia], Ankara, Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 2011.
19. Laruelle Marlene, *Conceiving the Territory: Eurasianism as a Geographical Ideology*, in Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov, Marlene Laruelle (Eds.), *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 2015, pp. 68-84.
20. Laruelle Marlene, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008.
21. Masoero Alberto, *Russia between Europe and Asia*, in Pietro Rossi (Ed.), *The Boundaries of Europe: From the Fall of the Ancient World to the Age of Decolonisation*, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2015, pp. 192-208.
22. Mearsheimer J. John, *Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin*, in "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 93, 2014, no. 5, pp. 1-12.
23. Palat K. Madhavan, *Eurasianism as an Ideology for Russia's Future*, in "Economic and Political Weekly", Vol. 28, 1993, no. 51, pp. 2799-2809.
24. Pryce Paul, *Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?*, in "Romanian Journal of European Affairs", Vol. 13, 2013, no. 1, pp. 25-43.
25. *Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 – Full-text Translation*, "Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos". 2015, <http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf>.
26. Shekhovtsov Anton, *Aleksandr Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian-Ukrainian War*, in Mark, Bassin, Gonzalo, Pozo (Eds.), *The Politics of Eurasianism. Identity, Popular Culture and Russia's Foreign Policy* London, Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd., 2017, pp. 181-201.
27. Shlapentokh V. Dmitry, *Eurasianism: Past and Present*. in "Communist and Post-Communist Studies", Vol. 30, 1997, no. 2, pp. 129-151.
28. Shlapentokh V. Dmitry, *Implementation of an Ideological Paradigm: Early Duginian Eurasianism and Russia's Post-Crimean Discourse*, in "Contemporary Security Policy", Vol. 35, 2014, no. 3, pp. 380-399.
29. Shlapentokh V. Dmitry, *Introduction: Eurasianism and Soviet/Post-Soviet Studies*, in Dmitry V. Shlapentokh (Ed.), *Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism*, Leiden, Brill Publishing House, 2007, pp. 1-9.
30. Soljenitsin Aleksander, *Rusya Nasıl Kurtulur?* [How to Save Russia?], in Göka Erol, Yılmaz Murat (Eds.), *Uygarlığın Yeni Yolu Avrasya* [The New Path of

Civilization Eurasia], İstanbul, Kızılelma Yayıncılık, 1998, pp. 207-214.

31. United Nations, *General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region*, 2014, <https://press.un.org/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm>.

32. University of Alberta, *Who was Mykhailo Hrushevsky*, n.d., <https://www.ualberta.ca/canadian-institute-of-ukrainian-studies/centres-and-programs/jacyk-centre/hrushevsky-translation-project/who-was-mykhailo-hrushevsky.html>.

33. Vinkovetsky Ilya, *Classical Eurasianism and its Legacy*, in "Canadian-American Slavic Studies", Vol. 34, 2000, no. 2, pp. 125-139.

34. Vuyachich S. Davor, *Ukraine – From Euromaidan to Afghanistan*, in "Geopolitika", 2022, <https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/ukraine-euromaidan-afghanistan>.

35. Wehrschutz F. Christian, *Rus Fikriyatının Parçası Olarak Avrasyacılık [Eurasianism as Part of Russian Idea]*, Göka, Erol, Yılmaz Murat (Eds.), *Uygarlığın Yeni Yolu Avrasya [The New Path of Civilization Eurasia]*, İstanbul, Kızılelma Yayıncılık, 1998, p. 23-41.